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many years ago, when as a child I was taken around parts of England and Wales by my parents; more recently, my partner has endured visits to historic buildings and boggy fields, more than once commenting wistfully how days out or holidays had transmogrified into civil-war trails! This book is dedicated to them – my parents, Dennis and Audrey, and my partner, Mandy.

INTRODUCTION

The Faces of War

> Truly, England and the church of God hath had a great favour from the Lord, in this great victory given unto us, such as the like never was since this war began. It had all the evidences of an absolute victory obtained by the Lord's blessing upon the godly party principally. We never charged but we routed the enemy. The left wing, which I commanded, being our own horse, saving a few Scots in our rear, beat all the Prince's horse. God made them as stubble to our swords, we charged their regiments of foot with our horse, routed all we charged. The particulars I cannot relate now, but I believe of twenty thousand, the Prince hath not four thousand left. Give glory, all the glory, to God.

In one of the most famous letters of the civil war, the parliamentarian general Oliver Cromwell gave his brother-in-law news that on 2 July 1644 parliament had won a striking, God-given victory over a royalist army commanded by the king's nephew, Prince Rupert, on rolling moorland west of York. The military triumph was unprecedented, Cromwell thought, greater, more complete and more destructive than any since the war began. But he had opened the letter with a strangely ominous sentence: 'It's our duty to sympathise in all mercies; that we may praise the Lord together in chastisements or trials, that so we may sorrow together' – for he also had to break the news that his own nephew, the recipient's son, had been killed in battle, his leg smashed by a cannonball, so that surgeons sought to amputate it, but this caused his death: 'Sir, God hath taken away your eldest son by a cannon shot. It brake his leg. We were necessitated to have it cut off, whereof he died.' Cromwell then sought to console his brother-in-law through their shared belief that the dead lad had been truly religious and that he was now with God in everlasting salvation:

Sir, you know my trials this way; but the Lord supported me with this: that the Lord took him into the happiness we all pant after and live for. There is your precious child full of glory, to know sin nor sorrow any more. He was a gallant young man, exceeding gracious. God give you His comfort […] Truly he was exceedingly beloved in the army, of all that knew him. But few knew him, for he was a precious young man, fit for God. You have cause to bless the Lord. He is a glorious saint in heaven, wherein you ought exceedingly to rejoice.[1]

1. *This is one of the earliest known images of Oliver Cromwell, from the mid 1640s, and thus significantly earlier than all the extant contemporary portraits in oils, which date from the end of the 1640s and the 1650s. It shows Cromwell visibly younger and less smooth, the rising star and active soldier of the main civil war, than the man featured in the more familiar and accomplished but later portraits.*

With around 46,000 men involved and 4,000 or more killed, the battle of Marston Moor was by far the biggest and probably the bloodiest engagement of the civil war. It was unusually decisive, ending in crushing defeat for one side and sublime victory for the other, and it led to a major change in the balance of power and territorial possession, for the king's position in northern England quickly collapsed. Although the combatants could not have known it, it also occurred almost exactly midway through the war, which formally began in August 1642 and ended 46 months later, in June 1646, with complete military victory for parliament. Such was the scale and importance of this midpoint battle that not only did it loom large in the letters and accounts of several senior officers who took part – such as Cromwell's fellow parliamentarian Sir Thomas Fairfax, who wrote of his sadness in losing a brother, 'sorely wounded, of which in three or four days after he died; he was buried at Marston, aged 23'[2] – but it was also widely reported in newspapers and noted in many diaries, journals and commonplace books. However, it was not the only fighting and military operation under way in midsummer 1644; nor was everyone's life being entirely shaped by the war. Surviving first-person accounts from the period around the time of Marston Moor convey something of the flavour of the age and of the variety of lives found in the midst and midpoint of civil war.

The king and his main southern army played no part in the campaign and battle of Marston Moor. Instead, they clashed with a southern parliamentarian army around Cropredy in northern Oxfordshire in late June, in an engagement which, unlike Marston Moor, was a running fight and a series of strikes and counter-strikes between armies marching on parallel courses; it was also much smaller and indecisive, with both armies marching away reasonably intact. On 1 July the king's army set off across the Cotswolds at dawn on a three-day march to Evesham. En route, on 3 July, one of the king's lifeguards, Richard Symonds, who had a keen interest in church and family history, visited St John's in Fladbury in south-east Worcestershire. There he was much taken with the internal fittings and features and made detailed notes about the ancient glass in the east window, recently damaged by parliamentarians but still 'very fair and old' [Plate 1], about a monument to Thomas Mordon, a fifteenth-century clergyman, 'upon a flat stone in the chancel, [with] the picture of a clergyman', and about various other tombs and monuments,

including one 'in the middle of the church […in the style of] a fair altar tomb of blue marble, the top […] inlaid with brass, with pictures of a man in armour, in the form of the Black Prince, and a woman'.[3] A member of the parliamentarian army, commanded by Sir William Waller [Plate 2], left a matching account of what he and his colleagues did in the aftermath of battle. As they marched off, they passed 'many dead corpses lying naked and unburied, forty graves in the highway and many [dead?] stately horses', while in a nearby church and churchyard 'were many commanders buried who had been slain in the fight'. On the evening of 1 July they stopped for the night 'at a poor village', before trudging away northwards.[4]

In the aftermath of his rebuff at Cropredy, Waller's army fell apart, as discipline collapsed and many troops deserted. Probably in the hope of restoring order, Waller convened a series of courts martial in mid July as his forces marched across Northamptonshire and into Buckinghamshire. At Daventry on 12 July a council of war judged three soldiers guilty of mutiny, two of whom were sentenced to be 'hanged by the neck until […they] be dead', while a third, perhaps an officer, was to suffer a more

2. *The fifteenth-century memorial brass to Thomas Mordon, described by Richard Symonds in July 1644, is still in St John's Church, Fladbury. As the accompanying Latin inscription indicates, Mordon, who is shown praying and in his cope, was rector here for around 30 years until his death in 1458, and also served as treasurer of St Paul's Cathedral.*

elevated death by being shot by firing squad or 'harquebusiered to death', as the records put it. Meanwhile, because 'he did not with his best power endeavour to suppress the said mutiny', a quartermaster was to witness the execution of the other three and then be 'cashiered the army, never to bear arms therein'. Five days later, a council of war found one soldier guilty of 'abusing and cutting' a fellow soldier as well as of drunkenness, and another of being 'a countenancer of plunderers, a drunkard and an abuser of prisoners'. Each was to be 'hanged up by the hands until he stand on tiptoe near the main guard for the space of a quarter of an hour with a pair of handcuffs about his wrists and then to be cashiered never to return to the army again'.[5]

As well as field engagements and their consequences, during June and July 1644 several garrisoned strongholds were under siege. Thus on 15 June 1644 a royalist force under the king's nephew and Rupert's brother Prince Maurice abandoned a long siege of the parliamentarian port of Lyme Regis in Dorset. That the royalists had deserted their earthworks and departed was first suspected during the early hours of the morning, when

> two or three of the besieged […] gave fire on the enemy's works to alarm them. No answer being made, they fired a second time, to which no answer being made they ran violently on the enemy's works where they unexpectedly found a mine that they endeavoured to spring in order to blow up their works on the south side and within pistol shot of the town about ten feet into the earth.

According to this parliamentarian account, the troops went to nearby houses, previously held by royalists, only to find them also deserted, the royalists leaving behind so 'much arms and provision' that the parliamentarians 'had a market and sold it there'. Soldiers and inhabitants who had been cooped up in Lyme for weeks relished their freedom and during the day they 'walked into the fields and green meadows to refresh themselves after so long a siege and to enjoy the benefit of the fresh air'. However, the mood was punctured by

> one act of cruelty [which] was committed by the mariners this day, who finding an old Irish woman of the enemy's looking out her friends

> [amongst the royalist forces and camp followers], not supposing them to be gone, drove her through the streets to the seaside, knocked her on the head, slashed and hewed her with their swords, robbed her of 20 or 40 shillings, cast her dead body into the sea, which was cast on shore between Lyme and Charmouth, where her carcass lay till consumed.[6]

Around the same time, a parliamentarian force was besieging the royalist stronghold of Basing House in Hampshire. A royalist account related how during June parliamentarian attempts to approach it by occupying nearby houses were thwarted by royalist sallies, which not only set fire to these houses and burned them down but also forced the parliamentarians back, some 'into the hedges, others further off'. Some parliamentarian officers stumbled into a royalist ambush and ran 'bloodied from the hedge', while the brother of a parliamentarian colonel was captured and taken prisoner by the king's men, who swiftly rejected parliamentarian demands that he be released on the 'pretence of being a traveller' with no military involvement. However, parliamentarian reinforcements during the last week of June made counter-attacks of this sort more difficult, the account admitted, though a royalist sortie on 26 June succeeded in cutting down trees protecting another building, a former mill, held by the besiegers. By the end of June a parliamentarian artillery bombardment was 'battering our kitchen and gatehouse', while in early July enemy guns focused on bringing down Basing's towers and chimneys, and at one point the distinguished owner, the Marquess of Winchester, was shot 'through his clothes', but the bullet did not hit his body and caused no injury. The well-defended garrison continued to resist the lengthy parliamentarian operation and Basing House remained in the king's hands.[7]

Many other people in England and Wales were caught up in and directly affected by the war in midsummer 1644, even though they were not soldiers or combatants. Sir John Oglander was an elderly royalist supporter living on the Isle of Wight, controlled by parliament throughout the war. As such, he was under suspicion and several times summoned to and held prisoner in London while his activities were investigated. He was in London during summer 1644, initially 'committed close prisoner to the basest place in London, a messenger's house at the farthest end of Cabbage Lane', but through the intercession of his wife then

allowed to stay at one of his own properties, 'the Severn Stars in the Strand', though he could not leave London. While there he received news of his beloved wife's illness with smallpox and of her death on 12 June, Oglander being unable to attend her on the Isle of Wight. He was distraught, recording in his commonplace book that 'greater grief and sorrow could not have befallen any man. No man can conceive the loss, but he that hath a good and careful loving wife.' In an adjoining entry, now much faded but apparently inscribed as Oglander described it, he wrote: 'O my poor wife, with my blood I write it. Thy death hath made me most miserable.'[8]

Similarly, but less tragically, Thomas Knyvett, a Norfolk landowner who had been on the fringes of an anti-parliamentarian rising in Lowestoft, spent summer 1644 at semi-liberty, staying with friends at Richmond upon Thames and shuttling between there and the capital, while he nervously awaited a hearing before a parliamentary committee. On 12 June he wrote to his wife that 'tomorrow I shall know my doom if I can be heard', and that, despite having recently seen statements prepared against him, in which he found 'a great deal of malicious pains taken', he was optimistic. Although 'so lame of my left foot' that he needed to hire expensive coaches to get around and also missing his



3. *This depiction of Basing House at the time of the civil war and under attack gives a good impression of the size and strength of the major royalist stronghold, which survived several sieges and assaults before it finally fell to parliament in autumn 1645. It comprised a mainly medieval assemblage of buildings (on the left, marked 'A', including a corner tower already rendered ruinous by parliamentarian artillery, marked 'C') and a fortified Tudor mansion (on the right, marked 'B'), both enclosed by a defensive circuit (marked 'D'), beyond which the besieging parliamentarians had built their own offensive line (marked 'E').*

wife, he told her, 'I shall study to carry myself as well as I can to give no offence.' The hearing was repeatedly postponed, though Knyvett busied himself during late June and early July by gathering papers and sounding out possible witnesses to enhance his defence. By 27 June he was gloomier, writing that 'this business hath almost broke my heart' and that 'I am struck blank again, seeing myself environed with eyes and ears that seek my utter ruin'. On 4 July, still nervously awaiting a hearing, he confessed that 'I go up and down here like a body without a soul, a kind of forlorn creature that breathes nothing but discontented air'. On 11 July, in the final surviving letter of the sequence, Knyvett was frustrated by the failure of the committee to hear his case, while noting that 'I must not commit to paper my thoughts of these carriages; God send me to improve my time in a heavenly way in this school of patience.' As he often did, he closed his letter by calling himself 'thy faithful friend till death' and asking his wife to 'bless my poor girls'.[9]

Others were on the fringes of the war in midsummer 1644. For example, the pro-parliamentarian minister John Shaw had fled his native Yorkshire the previous year when royalists took control of most of the county, and instead was based during 1644 in parliamentarian and godly Manchester, while also preaching at Lymm in north Cheshire. But in spring 1644 he accepted an invitation temporarily to minister to the people of Cartmel in northern Lancashire. By May he and his wife had moved there, 'where I found a very large spacious church, scarce any seats in it, a people very ignorant, yet willing to learn'. Accordingly, during the summer he began work in his new, temporary parish, preaching regularly not only in Cartmel Church but also in

> four chapels in the parish, [where] I preached and catechised often seven or eight times in one week; I preached and catechised, in season and out of season, at every one of the chapels and usually the churches were so throng[ed] by nine o'clock in the morning that I had much ado to get to the pulpit. I also preached at other churches round about in the week-day […] I hope the fruit of God's blessing on my labours will not yet be forgotten there.[10]

At the same time, the pro-royalist Thornton family moved the other way, for they returned to their native Yorkshire during 1643, welcoming

royalist control there and staying with relatives around Richmond. According to the account written later in life by Alice Thornton, at that time a teenager, one of her brothers, Christopher, went off to school in York and for a time the family thought of moving there. However, those plans were deferred when, during spring 1644, a huge parliamentarian army laid siege to the city. In early July, when the family heard that a major battle was looming around York, another brother, George, was sent to find Christopher and to bring him home. As luck would have it, George found his brother 'riding out of the town to see the fight' and, lifting him up on his horse, he carried him away, though for a time the pair were 'pursued by a party of horse of Scots', who wrongly suspected George of being a royalist officer. The two brothers arrived home safely at midnight, 'out of those great dangers of being murdered', as Alice rather dramatically put it. However, as known royalist sympathisers living in what quickly became, in the wake of Marston Moor, a parliamentarian-controlled county, life become much tougher for Alice and her family. For the Thorntons, midsummer 1644 was a turning point, when an interlude of peace and security ended and harassment and financial and material pressure under parliamentarian control began, for the inhabitants were compelled to swear loyalty to parliament or 'were forced to fly or […be] imprisoned and ruined'.[11]

However, other people were fairly distant from combat zones in summer 1644, and for them and their families life went on with a semblance of peacetime normality. The MP, lawyer and diarist Bulstrode Whitelocke continued to sit in parliament during summer 1644. He and his family had been living for a while in Highgate, but growing 'weary of his house and rent', a colleague lent him his Thames-side house at Deptford,

> and thither Wh[itelocke] removed with his contented wife and small family and found it a pretty place for the summer only. Here they enjoyed all mutual comfort and upon a walk next to the river she was so often seen with her then little daughter Frances expecting the coming home of her husband [from attending parliament or business in London] that the watermen knew them and would say there is the pinnace [a light boat supporting a bigger merchant vessel] and her cockboat [a small rowing boat for moving goods and people to and from shore].

However, their summer sojourn was disrupted when Whitelocke became ill and so he 'went with his wife in June to drink Tonbridge waters', lodging and socialising in that Kentish spa town.[12]

Also living in London through most of the war was the lawyer and diarist John Greene. During spring 1644 he and his young family were in London, but Greene was concerned about a minor outbreak of plague there and became alarmed when, in late April and after playing eight sets of tennis, he felt 'extreme weary and ill the next day' and was still 'ill and out of temper' a week later. Perhaps for this reason, he and his family decided to leave London and to go on a midsummer jaunt, though one which avoided royalist or active war zones. They travelled by coach to Cambridge and on to King's Lynn in Norfolk, where they had relatives, before turning back south and spending the rest of the summer with other kin at a house they owned in rural Essex. It turned into something of a family house party, with 17 members of the Greene family staying there and, somewhat to Greene's alarm, getting through significant quantities of food and drink:

> I do find that we do expend almost ten stone of beef one week with another, and about three quarters of mutton and a quarter of lamb […] and about one barrel of 6*s*. beer a week and about 6*s*. more in bread corn, about 8*s*. a week in butter, milk and cheese, and about 6*s*. per week in rabbits and chickens.

In early August, Greene recounted the excitement of dragging nearby ponds, where they caught 'about ten good carp […] and pretty store of tench', most of which were used to stock another pond. Although once back in London in early September Greene noted with dismay that he had spent £54 in the country, he hoped to recover part of that from other family members who stayed with him in Essex and in any case it had clearly been an enjoyable summer.[13]

Ralph Josselin, another assiduous diarist, was minister of Earls Colne in north-eastern Essex and a strong supporter of parliament. During the first week of July 1644 he accompanied a local regiment to a rendezvous in Northamptonshire, probably as chaplain, but also taking the opportunity to visit friends in the area, before returning home, pleased to find his wife and family in good health upon his return. His diary

reveals that Josselin was investing money in small business ventures, in early August laying out £14 10*s.* to buy 'a part in a ship', apparently a coastal trading vessel, as Josselin paid to send a bag of hops to Sunderland, presumably to be sold there for profit. Around the same time, changes were under way in the Josselin household, for a servant was leaving to marry, while his sister was coming to live with him 'as a servant', though he reminded himself that he should always treat her as a sister. Although relieved that he and his family seemed in good health, he was worried by the proximity of the plague, noting how 'that arrow of death' had broken out in nearby Colchester, bringing not only fatalities but also a decline in trade, while his mother-in-law was also well despite the presence of 'the spotted fever', again often fatal, around her home at Olney in Buckinghamshire.[14]

During the 1640s Joyce Jeffreys was an elderly but active spinster of Herefordshire, a woman of financial standing who had made a good living before the war through money-lending. During the opening year of the war, when Hereford – where Jeffreys was then living and had property – changed hands four times, she suffered significant dislocation and expenses. By summer 1644 town and county were held for the king and largely at peace. Jeffreys had royalist sympathies and probably could have returned to Hereford, but although she retained and occasionally visited a town house there, she spent much of 1644 with friends or family in the countryside or at her own home of Ham Castle in eastern Herefordshire, close to Worcestershire. Her detailed financial accounts reveal that in late spring and summer 1644 she was incurring expenses in respect of her Hereford property. In late May she paid 2*s.* 6*d.* as a tithe on some gardens she held in Hereford, together with 20*d.* 'for work done in making bulwarks to defend the city of Hereford from invasion', though she drew the line at having her own timber requisitioned for this, tipping 'an honest carpenter' 1*s.* 'for preserving my timber from the governor's knowledge, which sought for timber to make works to defend Hereford'. However, most payments over the period May to July 1644 related to her time at Ham, with wages and expenses to servants; small payments to joiners and labourers for unspecified work and to others for carrying letters and papers to or from her; 6*d.* to a workman who cut and supplied wood 'for my chamber'; 4*d.* for paper and 2*d.* for ink; 16*d.* for new shoes for her 'young bay mare'; 2*s.* 6*d.* for having her

beaver hat dressed at Worcester and another 6*d*. for work 'stiffening the brims of my best beaver [hat]'; 2*s*. to a local woman who knitted her 'a pair of white thread gloves' using thread that Jeffreys had bought; assorted payments for purchases of other thread, ribbons, bands and material; 1*s*. to a Worcester tailor 'for making me a polony coat and kirtle'; and 1*s*. for two pounds of cherries and 8*d*. to a local woman 'for preserving me' the cherries using sugar. The restoration of peace and stability locally meant that Jeffreys was also receiving a steady income at this time, mainly interest upon or part repayment of money she had lent out, but also occasional payments of rent and for purchasing from her barley malt. Although Jeffreys had been affected to some extent by the war, her own life during midsummer 1644 seems quite settled, peaceful and comfortable.[15]

Together, these snapshots of what people were doing around the midpoint of the civil war reveal the dangers, dislocation, horrors and impact of that conflict. Many men were fighting as soldiers – recently historians have suggested that perhaps one in ten adult males living in England and Wales were in arms at the height of the campaigning seasons in the summers of 1643, 1644 and 1645, while one in four were in arms at some stage of the war, albeit in many cases briefly and unwillingly. Some were in field armies, of the sort which engaged at Cropredy and Marston Moor, moving around the country and involved in an assortment of operations, including raiding and plundering, skirmishing and occasional confrontations with other substantial armies, resulting in major battles. Others were based in towns, castles and fortified houses, such as Lyme Regis and Basing House, where they served in garrisons and engaged in raids, sorties and ambushes; occasionally, they too came under attack and endured siege, bombardment or storm. Around 200 English and Welsh towns or substantial villages were garrisoned and attacked or suffered significant damage during the war, and scores of castles, manor houses and churches were similarly garrisoned and often damaged or wrecked, so that much of the physical landscape was militarised and changed. As a consequence of all this, many combatants suffered sudden or lingering death in action, their bodies perhaps decently buried in a nearby church, perhaps – as around Cropredy – placed in hurriedly dug and shallow graves on and around the battlefield or perhaps simply left unburied to rot. Others died as a consequence of harsh military justice

or in atrocities, perpetrated by the armies themselves or their supporters, such as those who gleefully hacked an elderly Irish woman to death at Lyme Regis. Again, recent work by historians has suggested that around 200,000 people, soldiers and civilians, died in England and Wales as a consequence of all the fighting during the mid seventeenth century, which, as a proportion or percentage of the national population, is higher than in any other English or British war, including World War II, with the sole exception of World War I, where the death rate was around the same level. Lots of people were on the move, travelling around the country with armies and seeing new sights – such as all the churches and their contents which enthralled Symonds – or, in the case of civilians like Shaw, finding it sensible to move on in search of more congenial and less hazardous surroundings. Other civilians, such as Oglander and Knyvett, came under suspicion and were liable to wartime justice meted out by king or parliament, entailing imprisonment, fine or seizure of property.

But not everything was changed out of recognition and, especially but not exclusively in areas which were firmly held for king or for parliament and which were largely uncontested and sheltered from the fighting, aspects of normal civilian life continued. The round of birth and baptism, marriage, having children and family life, death and burial was maintained. As we have seen, especially in the accounts of Whitelocke, Greene, Josselin and Jeffreys, people continued to move to pleasanter houses; enjoyed strolling by the river; suffered illnesses and sought remedies and recuperation; participated in sport and played games; socialised with family and friends, sometimes moving around the country to visit kin; worried about the price of food and drink and were startled by holiday bills; speculated and engaged in commercial ventures; fretted about diseases and epidemics prevalent in the area and checked on the well-being of family members; had their favourite horse reshod and their favourite hat spruced up; and ordered new clothes and preserved fruit. All of these pursuits continued during the war, not always quite as usual or entirely unaffected by the conflict, but they clearly did continue. While a book of this nature inevitably has a military core and concentrates upon the conflict and upon those soldiers, politicians and administrators who waged, directed and maintained it, as well as upon those directly caught up in the fighting, it is important to remember the wider population and the – limited or extensive – impact which the civil

war had upon them. At appropriate points, this account also explores that aspect of the war.

This book offers a history of the civil war fought in England and Wales during the early and mid 1640s. A work of this length cannot cover all aspects of the mid-seventeenth-century conflicts and there are two important parameters. Firstly, there is no attempt at full and equal coverage of all the conflicts which took place within Britain and Ireland around that time. In the late twentieth century it became historically fashionable to view the English and Welsh civil war as just one aspect of a wider 'British crisis' and resulting 'British wars' or 'wars of the three kingdoms', though that approach has faded of late. While the nature and timing of England's civil war are seen as being shaped in part by events in Scotland and Ireland and that war, in turn, is seen as impacting upon subsequent developments in those two countries, including substantial English military campaigns there in 1649–51, in the early twenty-first century many historians have returned to believing that England and Wales had their own quite distinctive civil war, at least semi-detached from the Scottish and Irish wars going on around the same time. Accordingly, the coverage here of Scotland and Ireland is limited to occasions when and ways in which those two kingdoms and their inhabitants directly influenced the timing, nature and course of the English and Welsh crisis and war.

Secondly, although parliament won the civil war of 1642–6, neither a political settlement nor a durable peace followed. Instead, after more than 18 months of fraught discussions and continuing divisions, during spring and summer 1648 some parts of England and Wales saw renewed fighting, caused by a series of disparate anti-parliamentarian or pro-royalist risings and rebellions, and over the summer the far North West was invaded by a Scottish–royalist army; that army was engaged and destroyed in and south of Preston in Lancashire in mid August, most of the home-grown risings were very small and were within days contained and crushed by local parliamentarians and even the rather bigger rebellions, in Kent, Essex and parts of South Wales, lasted only a matter of weeks and were put down by sections of the main parliamentarian army. Historians sometimes refer cumulatively to these events of 1648 as a 'second civil war', but the fighting was geographically patchy and brief,

the English and Welsh risings had various and differing origins and causes, and the armed outbreaks were not coordinated and generally had little interconnection. In important ways, therefore, this was not equivalent to or comparable with the civil war of 1642–6 and thus the events of 1648 in England and Wales, as well as the English regime's military expeditions to Ireland and Scotland beginning in 1649, are examined here only briefly, as part of the consequences or legacy of the war.

This book is designed as a military history of the English and Welsh civil war of 1642–6 and at its core is a chronologically based account of the main national and regional campaigns of those years. Chapter 1 assesses the origins and causes of the war and examines the problems of the early Stuart state and of the reign of Charles I which led to breakdown and war. Chapter 2 explores the slide from peace to war during 1642 and shows how, while the raising of the king's standard in August is generally seen as the date upon which civil war began, in reality the outbreak was not so crisp or simple; the chapter also explores the campaign and battle of Edgehill of autumn 1642 and so provides a military narrative of the opening months of the war, down to late 1642. Chapter 3 looks at the nature of the war, at factors which shaped and provided an overall context for the fighting and at how armies were organised in the conflict; the types of soldiers and their equipment involved in the fighting on land and the differing types of operations seen during the war, including the contribution of naval forces, are also explored. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the major hostilities of 1643, 1644 and 1645–6 respectively, as war raged across much of England and Wales, following the main armies and charting the campaigns of king and parliament during these three and a half years, culminating in a victory for parliament in midsummer 1646; they therefore provide a substantial analytical narrative of the bulk of the civil war. Chapter 6 closes by reviewing both possible factors which led to parliament's victory and the royalist defeat and the historical debate this has spawned. Finally, a broad concluding chapter explores key aspects of the impact, consequences and legacies of the civil war, in the short, medium and longer term.

Throughout this book, contemporary sources and first-person accounts of the fighting and of the wider wartime context are drawn on heavily, in order to give a distinct flavour of the time and of the realities of war. Such contemporary accounts often convey a sense of immediacy

and impact, revealing how real people fought and participated in, suffered during or were changed by the war. In citing and quoting these contemporary sources, dates are given according to the 'Old Style' calendar in use in England and Wales at that time, but the year is taken to begin on 1 January, even though in the seventeenth century many people in England and Wales still treated 25 March as New Year's Day, when the old year ended and the new began. In quoting from seventeenth-century sources, whether printed or archival, spellings have generally been modernised and texts have been lightly repunctuated to make them more accessible to modern readers. The titles of contemporary printed pamphlets and other seventeenth-century published works cited here have been handled in a similar way, including rendering place names and personal names which appear within them in modern and consistent forms.

1

'One unexpected accident after another, as waves of the sea': The Origins and Causes of the English Civil War

> Mr Speaker, the question which was last propounded about raising of forces [and] naming a general and officers of an army hath been very rare before this time in this assembly and it seems to me to set us at the pit's brink, ready to plunge ourselves into an ocean of troubles and miseries […] God blessed us with a long and flourishing peace and we turned His grace into wantonness, and peace would not satisfy us without luxury nor our plenty without debauchery. Instead of sobriety and thankfulness for our mercies, we provoked the giver of them by our sins and wickedness to punish us […] by a civil war, to make us executioners of divine vengeance upon ourselves.

In July 1642, as the House of Commons debated raising an army and appointing a commander, the MP Bulstrode Whitelocke – lawyer, politician and, when it came to war, parliamentarian – made a rousing speech, explaining that he was moved by the hope of containing 'a flame, which I see so kindled' and which he feared 'may consume us to ashes'. While stressing that he did not oppose the principle of the motion and that parliament should prepare for 'a just and necessary defence' of 'our religion, lives and liberties', Whitelocke argued that more time should be given for negotiations. He clearly dreaded the approach of war and all the 'rage of fire and storm and (which is worse) of brutish men' which would attend it. Regretting that the long and flourishing peace of the preceding age had been squandered through sinfulness, wickedness and debauchery by a nation turning upon itself, he conjured up an image of a looming war in which 'we must surrender up all our laws, liberties, properties and lives into the hands of insolent mercenaries,

whose rage and violence will command us and all we have, and reason, honour and justice will leave our land'. Warming to this theme, he went on to predict that

> the ignoble will rule the noble and baseness will be preferred before virtue, profaneness before piety […] we shall burn our own houses, lay waste our own fields, pillage our own goods, open our own veins and eat our own bowels. You will hear other sounds besides those of drums and trumpets, the clattering of armour, the roaring of guns, the groans of wounded and dying men, the shrieks of deflowered women, the cries of widows and orphans, and all on your account, which makes it the more to be lamented […] What the issue of it will be, no man alive can tell, probably few of us now here may live to see the end of it.

In the midst of this, Whitelocke sought to explain how the nation had moved from peace to the brink of war, though he confessed himself perplexed.

> It is strange to note how we have insensibly slid into this beginning of a civil war by one unexpected accident after another, as waves of the sea, which have brought us thus far; and we scarce know how, but from paper combats by declarations, remonstrances, protestations, votes, messages, answers and replies; we are now come to the question of raising forces and naming a general and officers of an army.[1]

Many contemporaries shared Whitelocke's opinion that early Stuart England and Wales had enjoyed peace and plenty. Compared with much of Europe, from 1618 engulfed by the horrors of the Thirty Years War, during the 1620s and 1630s England and Wales seemed a haven of security and tranquillity.[2] Whitelocke found it hard to see a clear explanation for the path which the nation had recently taken or to discern a rational and linked sequence of events and developments to account for the looming hostilities. He fell back on a story of an insensible slide to war and of a succession of unexpected and apparently unconnected accidents, possessing all the coherence of waves breaking on the shore, as he confessed himself scarcely able to understand why the country had moved from peace to war. Although his near contemporary, the

royalist Earl of Clarendon, went on to explore the causes of the war at far greater length, he, too, admitted difficulties in discerning a pattern to events which led the country to war, writing instead of the 'general combination and universal apostasy in the whole nation' which 'could, in so short a time, have produced such a total and prodigious alteration and confusion over the whole kingdom' and about 'passages, accidents and actions, by which the seed-plots were made and framed' and which led to these 'mischiefs'. Like Whitelocke, he too pointed to the preceding age of peace and prosperity, which had caused the nation to be 'swollen with long plenty, pride and excess', so that it incurred the 'wrath of God'.[3]

Tempting as it might be to follow Whitelocke and Clarendon in ascribing the origins of the civil war to a mixture of indolence born of plentiful peace, indeterminate sinfulness, God's displeasure and divine providence, or to follow Whitelocke in seeing the causes of the war as unconnected and random accidents, historians seek deeper and more coherent explanations for why a peaceful nation descended so quickly into civil war. This chapter re-evaluates the possible origins and causes of the civil war by exploring the early Stuart state and the tensions which existed under both Elizabeth I and James I, by examining Charles I's kingship from his accession down to the onset of hostilities in summer 1642 and by charting how a difficult inheritance turned into crisis and civil war.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE EARLY STUART STATE

When he opened his history of the war, Clarendon claimed that he need not lead his readers 'farther back in this journey for the discovery of the entrance into these dark ways than the beginning of this king's reign', that is, the accession of Charles I in 1625, though he was aware that others were already seeking origins significantly earlier than that, commenting that 'I am not so sharp-sighted as those who have discerned this rebellion contriving from (if not before) the death of Queen Elizabeth [in 1603]'.[4] While most modern historians are critical of Charles and his kingship and pile much of the blame for fomenting civil war upon his shoulders, and while for a time it was common for historians to look to short-term or very short-term causes of the civil war, most now recognise that in 1625 Charles inherited unresolved and complex issues which had the potential to create difficulties. Several of these, it is claimed, emerged

or worsened over the previous half-century or more, during the reigns of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), the last of the Tudors, and James I (as king of England, 1603–25), Charles's father and the first of the Scottish Stuart dynasty to rule England and Wales [Plate 3]. If in 1625 the new king was in some ways fortunate in his inheritance – his succession was smooth and undisputed, he succeeded as a reasonably fit young adult and he took over a nation which, as Whitelocke and Clarendon noted, was apparently flourishing – in a number of ways and in several areas his inheritance was problematic.

Historians who favour longer-term causes for the war, and who find its roots pre-dating Charles's accession, point to several weaknesses in the early-modern state and in its secular and religious structure.[5] The hereditary monarch possessed extensive prerogative powers and played a very active role as head of government, deciding and directing national policies, while the Crown was expected to exercise enhanced power at times of war or emergency to protect the country and its people. Much, therefore, depended upon the individual monarchs, their outlooks, ambitions, preferences and abilities. At various times contemporaries – followed by some modern historians – felt that early-modern monarchs, including Elizabeth and James, were neglecting business or delegating too much power to others, were too old or too ill or were pursuing policies out of tune with national interest. Equally, in a country without a written constitution, there were uncertainties about the extent of royal powers, both in peacetime and in wartime, with potential for clashes between the prerogative powers of the Crown and the rights and liberties of the people expressed in and protected by parliament.

All this was exacerbated by the poverty of the Crown and the weakness of royal finances, for Tudor and early Stuart monarchs were trying to run the country on what was still essentially a medieval financial system. This led to clashes between Crown and parliament when a monarch sought additional parliamentary taxes or grants and to simmering discontent when a monarch sought to exploit new sources of income or to revive medieval revenues without parliamentary approval.[6] It also meant that the Crown had to be very wary of embarking upon adventurous and expensive policies, especially in foreign affairs and war. While Tudor and Stuart monarchs took care to maintain a decent Royal Navy, having a standing army was beyond their means. Apart from small garrisons at

the Tower of London, Kingston upon Hull and Portsmouth and a small retinue of guards protecting the monarch, England and Wales had no permanent army at this time. Instead, Elizabeth revamped the militia system, in which each county maintained a part-time self-defence force drawn from local able-bodied men and commanded by a lord lieutenant appointed by the Crown; on paper at least, this provided a little over 100,000 men, the vast majority of them infantry. It had the advantage of being cheap and quite simple, but it also had limitations, in terms of levels of commitment, training and military skill. Moreover, as the principal role of each militia was to defend its own county, attempts to march militiamen out of their counties and to bring them together as a national force to fight elsewhere might create tensions.[7] Its effectiveness was never seriously tested during James's reign, as he was careful to keep his kingdoms at peace.

Another problem facing the early Stuart state was the position of England and Wales as just one part of a so-called 'multiple kingdom', for James and Charles were also kings of Scotland and Ireland. A multiple kingdom of this type could foment unease within and between its constituent parts. The monarch was bound to be absent from most of his kingdoms for most of the time and there was great capacity for other component kingdoms to react with suspicion or worse if the Crown was seen to favour the interests of just one. Their different histories and heritages, as well as divergent foreign and commercial interests, could lead to resentment when they found themselves locked together in a single polity. Any attempts to impose overall unity and uniformity, or at least greater congruity, in secular or religious matters risked being seen as riding roughshod over the interests of each kingdom. Given the centrality of religion in the seventeenth century, the strongest reaction was likely to be generated by any attempt to enforce religious uniformity. In this respect, from 1603 James faced a complex and potentially explosive situation, with one Protestant church dominant in England and Wales and also representing a minority, but a very powerful ruling group, in Ireland; a differently organised Protestant church dominant in much of Scotland and also present in the northern part of Ireland; and a third very different faith, Catholicism, dominant in Ireland and with significant support in parts of Scotland and limited support in England and Wales. Thus there were differences within each of James's

three kingdoms as well as between them; most people in each kingdom favoured a religion different from the majority religion in the other two and in each kingdom there existed a minority who favoured the religion dominant in one of the other two. Perhaps wisely, James usually trod carefully after 1603, often letting sleeping dogs lie, preferring moderation and, having failed to secure Anglo-Scottish political union during the 1600s, only in a limited manner moving his three kingdoms closer together or attempting greater congruity [Plate 4]. In 1625 there were apprehensions in both Scotland and Ireland about where things might lead and certainly there remained potential for division and conflict, but they were at peace internally and with England and there was no sign of imminent crisis.[8]

Religion also created divisions within England and Wales. The church of the early seventeenth century was essentially that established by the religious settlement of the beginning of Elizabeth's reign in the wake of the English Reformation. The official and only legal religion of England and Wales was a Calvinist form of Protestantism and the official and only legal church was the Church of England (which also covered Wales). Everybody was required to conform to this and practising any other faith, including Catholicism or clearly different forms of Protestantism, or practising none was a criminal offence; attendance at church was obligatory. But, both in theory and in practice, this settlement had left some things blurred at the edges. The church which emerged from the Elizabethan settlement was a compromise, retaining elements of the pre-Reformation Catholic church, and it did not go as far in removing vestiges of Catholicism as some Protestant churches in Europe. It retained its episcopal structure and continued to be overseen by bishops and archbishops, now directly appointed by the monarch, who became the church's supreme governor. Many of the earlier ceremonies and embellishments were retained, including the wearing of surplices and other clerical vestments, liturgical ceremonies and forms such as bowing, using the sign of the cross and making parishioners kneel to receive Communion, and ornamental features of church buildings such as painted windows, statues, crucifixes and images of the Virgin and the Trinity. To those who favoured a much more thorough Reformation, creating a simpler, more stripped-down and 'lower' church and religion, the Elizabethan settlement had spawned an institution which was a

strange amalgam of old and new, Protestant and Catholic, and which was but half-reformed.

Evidence suggests that by the death of Elizabeth the vast majority of people in England and Wales accepted and happily conformed to the Church of England and many had come to cherish its practices and prayer book. But pressures remained, some springing from the nature of the Elizabethan settlement. Perhaps the least of these was the survival in England and Wales of a small number of Catholics, most of whom were discreet and politically loyal to the English Crown. Catholicism remained a feared religion, associated with enemies abroad, especially Spain, and with plots at home, and there was a strong undercurrent of anti-Catholicism, which occasionally flared up into anti-Catholic panics or scares. The real, if thwarted, Gunpowder Plot of 1605, James's lengthy attempts – also in the end thwarted – to marry his son and heir to a member of the arch-Catholic Spanish royal family, his refusal to go to war in support of what was viewed as the Protestant side and against the Catholic side in the Thirty Years War and the king's warm relations with Catholic diplomats and various Catholic or crypto-Catholic courtiers all served to fuel this antagonism.

Perhaps a greater threat to the stability of the Church of England was the presence of those Protestants who favoured further reform to create a simpler, lower and more strictly Protestant church, those who became known at the time as 'Puritans' and their programme as 'Puritanism', though many referred to themselves, or were referred to, using other terms, such as 'the godly' or 'the hotter sort of Protestants'. Under both Elizabeth and the early Stuarts they were an informal pressure group within the Church of England, pushing for change rather than acting as a separate body or seeking a separate church, though where the local clergyman was not to their taste they might attend more congenial services at other churches in the neighbourhood or support an outside minister paid to give religious lectures in their parish. They were marked out by their emphasis on a stripped-down church, on greater separation between those saved and ensured salvation by God and sinners destined for damnation, on exploring the word of God through sermons, on strict Sabbath observance and on battling sin.

Increasingly during the early Stuart period a third potentially destabilising group gained influence within the Church of England, to some

extent encouraged by and drawing ideas from the teachings of a Dutch theologian, Jacob Arminius, who appeared to suggest that God's salvation was available to all. Although subscribers to this doctrine were sometimes termed 'Arminians', many historians now prefer the broader labels of 'anti-Calvinists' and 'anti-Calvinism' for this strand within the Church of England, which emerged towards the end of James's reign but whose beliefs and practices became clearer during that of his son. They stressed the ceremonial and sacramental side of religion, viewing the minister as an essential and privileged intermediary between God and the laity, emphasising the sanctity of the altar as God's table and seeing a role for the beautification and embellishment of church interiors. In many ways, therefore, they appeared to be the mirror image of the Puritans and to be working to move the Church of England in the opposite direction, one which some people viewed as back towards Catholicism. There was certainly potential here for trouble.[9]

THE REIGN OF CHARLES I, DOWN TO 1642

With few exceptions, modern historians are critical of Charles's kingship and most lay much of the blame, not only for the problems of the later 1620s and 1630s but also for the crisis and descent into war of the early 1640s, on his shoulders. The most recent detailed political biography of Charles paints a more balanced picture than some, stressing his personal virtues, self-control, deep religious faith, hard work and application to government, and noting that many of the problems he faced were not of his creation, while also pointing out that his father managed to cope with them in a way he did not. But it still reaches fairly damning conclusions, seeing Charles as vengeful, prickly and hypersensitive, with an acute sense of personal injury and near paranoia at times, an oversensitivity which repeatedly led him to panic and to take the wrong option. Furthermore, he adopted tactics which most of his subjects did not believe were normal or legitimate; at times he was dangerously overconfident; he was unwilling properly and sincerely to compromise in order to reach a lasting solution, though he was prone to making limited or temporary concessions which he felt might enable him to achieve his inflexible ends, thus making him appear insincere or slippery; and he was unable or unwilling for much of his reign to woo his subjects or

4. *Although repaired and refurbished many times, the interior of the small church or chapel at Langley, probably originally dating from the fourteenth century, reflects the simplicity favoured by many within the Elizabethan and Jacobean church, with its bare white walls and clear glass. Most of the fittings, including the benches and pews, the square moveable pulpit (on the left) and the more conventional pulpit (on the right), probably date from reign of James I.*

5. *Again, although some restoration has been undertaken and the Communion table is a modern replica, the east end at Langley retains an arrangement common during the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I, but now rarely found, not least as it was generally swept away by the changes undertaken by Charles I and Laud during the 1630s. In this pre-Laudian arrangement, wooden benches and kneelers ran around the inside walls and faced a small and moveable Communion table, but there was no altar at the east end or abutting the east wall.*

6. *Like the near-contemporary image of James VI and I in Plate 3, his son Charles I is portrayed in glass in Tremeirchion Church. It appears to show a fairly young man, perhaps as he was in the 1620s, either as Prince of Wales or as the new king.*

actively to seek and to court popular support. Overall, he was not well suited to his kingly role, for he was not a reconciler and a figurehead able to rise above the difficulties he had inherited in order to bring the nation and its people together under him.[10] However, it should be noted that he was not completely hopeless or incompetent, for in 1641–2 he showed sufficient capacity to recover, to make a stand and to win enough support to begin a civil war.[11]

Some of the new king's qualities emerged during the opening years of his reign, 1625–9. He attempted to work with parliament, summoning three of them, and although the parliaments of 1625 and 1626 were short and ended with abrupt dissolutions, that of 1628–9 sat longer and at first seemed more productive; Charles allowed it time and leeway to discuss political grievances and in summer 1628 he approved a reforming

document it had drawn up, the Petition of Right. Charles also oversaw a chaste and dignified court, a change from the rather sleazy court of his father. During the late 1620s he granted various rights to Ireland and the Irish, which particularly benefitted members of the majority Irish Catholic population. On the other hand, there was plenty of evidence of growing problems. Charles's relations with parliament were often fraught – even the third parliament ended in acrimony and recrimination, which marked a parting of the ways between Charles and parliament – and his hasty dissolution of the first meant that it had not granted him customs duties, one of the normal functions of the opening parliament of a reign. Charles nonetheless proceeded to collect customs duties, claiming that he could not do without them, and this turned into a bone of contention with subsequent parliaments. Again acting without parliamentary consent, in 1626–7 he imposed a compulsory financial levy in England and Wales, termed a 'forced loan', though there was no expectation that money would ever be repaid. Financially it was successful, raising around £250,000, but it created unease, all the more so as those landowners who resisted what many saw as an unparliamentary and illegal tax were threatened with further action and some were imprisoned for a time on the king's authority, but without proper charges or a chance to defend themselves in a trial. The king's need for money was great because during 1626–7 he stumbled into cripplingly expensive wars simultaneously against the two major powers of western Europe, Spain and France. The mainly naval but also land operations cost around £1 million per year at their height and were also spectacularly unsuccessful and militarily humiliating. Religion was also a growing issue, for well before 1625 Charles had come to support the high-church Protestantism often associated with Arminianism or anti-Calvinism and from the start of his reign he promoted and empowered like-minded theologians and church figures, tipping the balance of the Church of England decisively in its favour. While he was initially cautious in his handling of Ireland, he was from the outset tactless and heavy-handed in dealing with Scotland, apparently threatening Scottish landowners with the loss of some of their property [Plate 5]. On several occasions during these years, he also displayed a willingness to stretch the rules and to act duplicitously, creating apprehension and distrust in England and Wales.[12]

Having dissolved his third parliament, in spring 1629 Charles made clear that he intended to rule England and Wales for the foreseeable future without summoning another. He felt that parliaments fomented division and conflict and that a substantial period of royal government without parliamentary distraction would enable him to establish order, efficiency and harmony. He was as good as his word and for the next 11 years, 1629–40, there was no parliament in England and Wales, a period generally referred to by historians as the 'Personal Rule'. Charles relied heavily on royal prerogative powers, on the executive arm, especially his Privy Council and council committees, and on a clutch of senior ministers, including Sir Thomas Wentworth, one of his strongest supporters even though he spent much of the 1630s in Ireland as royal governor there, and William Laud, Bishop of London and from 1633 Archbishop of Canterbury. He could also usually rely on the church, royal judges and various regular and prerogative courts, as well as the existing mechanisms of county administration, to support his rule. Without a parliament he could not create new taxes or new laws and in practice Charles was generally careful to abide by the letter, if not the spirit, of these constraints. Although he continued to collect customs duties, he did not impose another forced loan or its equivalent and he often went out of his way to demonstrate that his initiatives drew on medieval precedents, were authorised by existing laws or earlier parliamentary approval and were deemed legal by the judges.

In some aspects of government, such as foreign and commercial policies, there were few initiatives or innovations and Charles acted cautiously. For contemporaries and historians alike, most attention and controversy concentrated on two policy areas, finance and religion. Charles cut royal expenses, not least by quickly making peace with France and Spain and avoiding European war thereafter, and he boosted his income wherever he could, squeezing more from existing sources and reviving several medieval or feudal sources, defunct for decades or centuries. One which had been imposed several times in the fairly recent past was Ship Money, the right of the monarch to call on coastal communities to supply ships in times of war or danger to be used by the Crown for the nation's defence. During 1634, at a time when England and Wales were at peace, though pointing to genuine dangers posed by foreign-based pirates raiding the coast, the king demanded not ships but

their financial equivalent from the coastal areas. In 1635 Ship Money was demanded from all the counties of England and Wales, including those inland, and it became an annual levy, imposed each year down to 1640. In due course, Charles paid a political price for this extension of a hitherto not particularly controversial system, but like most of the king's fiscal ploys of the Personal Rule, it was successful financially. In 1629–30 annual royal income was somewhere around £5–600,000 and Charles had debts approaching £2 million; by the late 1630s Charles had paid off his debts and had an annual income approaching £900,000.

During the Personal Rule Charles worked closely with William Laud to advance their joint religious policy, by this stage best labelled 'Laudianism'. Like-minded theologians were appointed or promoted and new instructions issued in 1633 attempted to ensure full compliance with the new church policy. This included a stress on order and decency in church services and the beauty of holiness; on not only the repair of church buildings but also the embellishment of their interiors with religious imagery and decorations, such as ornate pulpits, pews or benches and bench ends, font covers and screens [Plate 6]; on the provision of fixed, permanent altars at the east end of churches surrounded and enclosed by altar rails, ensuring that only the priest could approach God's sacred table; and on close adherence to the liturgy of the church, emphasising that things like kneeling to receive Communion and making the sign of the cross at baptisms were to be observed. At the same time, the ability of those who did not share this vision to seek a different type of religious experience was restricted, by clamping down upon itinerant religious lecturers and private chaplains. Once more, on the surface this policy appeared broadly successful, with diocesan reports confirming adherence, even if a few bishops and some clergy dragged their feet; very few people, clergy or laity, openly and directly resisted and those who did were harshly punished. But again, although it did not come into the open until 1640, the policy probably created resentment in the country. Many of Laud's innovations seemed to run against the direction which the church had taken under Elizabeth and James and some of them smacked of creeping Catholicism, a particular worry at a time when the king was married to a French Catholic, seemed to be favouring courtiers who were Catholics or had Catholic leanings and welcomed to his court a papal emissary. As the Personal Rule progressed,

7. *In their drive to improve and adorn church interiors during the Personal Rule, Charles I and Laud encouraged the fitting of new and quite decorated pulpits of this sort. Dating from 1630 and installed in Mendlesham parish church, it features an assortment of decorative arches with central knobs and oblong panels carved with leaves and grotesque animals.*

8. *In a similar vein is this pulpit now at Chediston, a church which contains an array of Laudian features. Dated 1637, it is reminiscent of the Mendlesham example in overall design.*

9. *The nave of Worlingworth Church is filled with a complete set of benches and bench ends, dating from 1630 and thus another sign of the drive to improve and to adorn church interiors during the Personal Rule. Although quite restrained compared to some other decoration of the 1630s, the doors feature similar though variably decorated arches, with leaves and foliage in the spandrels.*

10. *This magnificent and very ornate wooden font cover, again from Mendlesham Church, is arranged in distinct tiers, with columns, pediments and obelisks. It was made in 1630 by the same carpenter who created Mendlesham's new pulpit.*

11. *One of the central policies of the church reforms instituted by the king and Laud was the creation of fixed east-end altars, enclosed within wooden rails, so that parishioners as well as dogs and other animals could not approach the altar itself and signifying that only the ordained priest could enter the railed-off area and approach the Lord's table, as an essential and empowered intermediary between the laity and God. This particularly fine and decorative set of Laudian altar rails is again to be seen in Chediston Church.*

not just Puritans but many mainstream, middle-of-the-road members of the Church of England probably became concerned at the path along which their church and religion were being taken.[13]

On the surface, things appeared to be working well and England and Wales seemed to be peacefully accepting Charles's policies. Some contemporaries and a few historians present a broadly or strongly positive interpretation of the Personal Rule, pointing out how governmental records show the successful imposition and implementation of the king's policies and indicate that very few people openly and directly resisted them; thus the Personal Rule might have continued much longer, they argue, and was ended only because of a bolt from the blue delivered from outside England and Wales.[14] However, the majority of the historians who have examined the period suggest that despite the veneer of order and acceptance and as revealed by contemporary letters, diaries, commonplace books and the like, many people were strongly dissatisfied with government during the 1630s, seeing not only specific royal policies but also the lengthy absence of a parliament as fundamentally wrong.[15] Thus, these historians argue, all was far from well at home and that is why,

when a spark ignited nearby, royal government collapsed so quickly and so dramatically in England and Wales. That spark came from Scotland.

Although born in Scotland, Charles had been brought up in and lived in England. He was largely unknown in Scotland and he, in turn, knew little of his native land. What he had picked up, perhaps during his coronation visit in 1633, was how different the Scottish church was from the Church of England. Although Protestant and Calvinist, it was not structured in a top-down manner like its English counterpart – where power rested with the Crown as supreme governor and was asserted through archbishops and bishops which it appointed and instructed – and instead the Scottish Reformation had produced a church over which the Crown had little control. As a Presbyterian church it had a bottom-up structure, where power lay with individual congregations and parishes and their representatives. During the latter half of the 1630s Charles sought to change things, not to remodel the Scottish church to become a version of his English church, but, via a new set of church laws issued in 1636 and a new Scottish prayer book, setting out the forms of services, issued in 1637, to bring it closer to the English church and to introduce some aspects of English practice. Thus the new prayer book was modelled on an earlier English prayer book, though modified to take account of Scottish differences. Many in Scotland viewed this as an unwelcome and ungodly intrusion, perverting their more reformed and more Protestant church, a sign of creeping anglicisation and Anglicanisation promoted by a king careless and ignorant of Scottish ways and rights. It produced a very strong response and unleashed events which bear out all the dire warnings of historians about the potential dangers of attempting to enforce religious congruity in a religiously diverse, multiple kingdom.[16]

The attempt to enforce the new prayer book in July 1637 produced a wave of protests and widespread opposition. The king's agents in Scotland, chiefly his Scottish councillors, lacked the will or means to enforce his wishes and increasingly lost control. When, after months of drift, in February 1638 Charles threatened his opponents with treason, he provoked mass and more organised opposition in Scotland, which coalesced around a National Covenant, a document expressing loyalty to the Crown but pledging outright resistance to religious innovation; its supporters were dubbed the Covenanters. Charles offered some concessions, perhaps in the hope of winning time to organise an armed response, but

they were seen as too little, too late and did nothing to change the tide of events in Scotland, where the king's religious policy and episcopacy were roundly condemned. This, in turn, merely confirmed Charles's decision to seek a military solution.

Charles laid plans for an ambitious campaign in summer 1639 which would deploy the military resources of England, Wales and Ireland in land and naval attacks upon Scotland. Many of these plans never came to fruition, but Charles did gather an English and Welsh army of around 15,000 men in northern England. In early July 1639 part of that army crossed the border and got as far as Kelso, where it encountered what it took to be a much larger Covenanter army and fell back. At that and without a fight the First Scots' or Bishops' War, as it is often known, ended and both sides agreed a truce, signed at Berwick. But this did nothing to settle the key issues and, as both sides probably realised, it marked only a pause in a conflict which would resume the following summer. In the interim, an ecclesiastical and constitutional revolution took place in Scotland during 1639, leaving Charles as king but little more than a figurehead, with almost no power in the religious

The Arch-Prelate of St Andrewes in Scotland
reading the new Service-booke in his pontificalibus
assaulted by men & Women, with Crickets stooles
Stickes and Stones.

12. *As the inscription suggests, this is a contemporary image of the disturbances and riots which ensued in Scotland when bishops and others attempted to use the king's new prayer book. In this case, members of the congregation, women as well as men, are shown throwing sticks, stones, stools and probably early forms of bats at the preacher, the bishop of St Andrews, when he tried to use the new book in St Giles's Cathedral in Edinburgh on 23 July 1637.*

and political running of the country. Charles's response, his plans for war in summer 1640 and the incomplete execution of those plans were very much the same as they had been the previous year, though he had more troops in 1640, perhaps 20,000 men, while on this occasion the Scots took a more active line. In August 1640 the Covenanter army crossed the border and invaded northern England. They brushed aside attempts by part of Charles's army to hold the river Tyne at Newburn and proceeded to take Newcastle and to occupy Northumberland and County Durham. Having thus roundly lost the Second Scots' or Bishops' War, Charles was forced to make a truce with the Scots under which they agreed not to move further south or to occupy more of England, but they were to continue occupying the far northern counties, pending a fuller settlement, and while there were to be paid £850 per day by the English to cover their costs. It was a humiliating end to a military fiasco.[17]

Charles's failed attempts first to introduce religious change in Scotland and then to enforce it through arms and his utter defeat in the resulting wars left him powerless north of the border and in a very weak position south of it. For the first time in centuries, in 1639 the English monarch had gone to war without calling parliament, and although Charles had done so in spring 1640, thus ending the 11 years of his Personal Rule, his impatient requests for money to renew war against the Scots had not been well received and instead MPs had vented a range of pent-up grievances, many of them relating to the Personal Rule; within three weeks Charles had had enough and promptly dissolved what became known as the Short Parliament, before a penny had been voted. But in the wake of a second military defeat in summer 1640, Charles's room for manoeuvre was very limited. The wars had left him with crippling debts, an enemy occupying part of England and a need urgently to find money to pay that occupying force; his standing and authority had been wrecked and, seeing the writing on the wall, many English and Welsh taxpayers were no longer paying Ship Money and other dues. If he was to rebuild his position, Charles had no choice but to summon another parliament, which was bound to be very critical of recent events, and to allow it to air grievances and to undertake reforms. In early November 1640 what became known as the Long Parliament assembled.[18]

Over the next ten months, the Long Parliament undertook a broad programme of reform, most of the initiatives gaining overwhelming

majorities in both Houses; given his weak and isolated position, Charles had no choice but to give royal assent. Most leading personnel of the Personal Rule were removed. Sir Thomas Wentworth, newly ennobled as Earl of Strafford, was swiftly impeached and imprisoned, and although he defended himself very ably against charges of treason in spring 1641, in the end parliament simply declared him guilty by Act of Attainder, to which the king sorrowfully gave royal assent in May 1641, and he was executed. Archbishop William Laud was similarly impeached and imprisoned during the opening weeks of the parliament, although he was simply left rotting in the Tower.[19] Other key royal officials fled abroad. Parliament also moved to cement its own position, passing statutes to ensure that the Long Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent and that in future no more than three years would pass between the dissolution of one parliament and the meeting of the next, blocking any repetition of the Personal Rule; again, Charles gave his assent, thus signing away key royal powers which his predecessors had enjoyed. During 1641 a series of major reforming statutes swept away many of the policies and institutions of the Personal Rule, including prerogative courts and feudal sources of income, and parliament also reached a firmer settlement with the Scottish Covenanters. When parliament adjourned for the summer in September 1641, its reform programme appeared to be bringing positive results and an English settlement seemed to be moving closer.

However, other major issues remained unresolved and outstanding. In religion, there was broad support for expunging the Arminian or Laudian innovations of the preceding 15 years, but many wanted to go no further than that, in effect simply restoring the Church of England of Elizabeth or James. However, others, both inside and outside parliament, wanted to go much further, seeing this as an opportunity to effect more thoroughgoing change via a second Reformation, so completing the half-Reformation of the mid sixteenth century. How far such changes might go was not entirely clear and the reformers themselves were not as one, but some made the complete abolition of the episcopal system their principal goal. This was going too far for many MPs and peers and it risked fracturing the parliamentary consensus for overhauling other areas of royal government and thus stalling that secular reform programme. Secular issues remaining unresolved included the possibility

that parliament might gain control over key parts of the royal executive arm of government, perhaps by vetting or itself appointing Privy Councillors and key officers of state, while at this stage almost nothing had been done about the issue of future military control and command. Lurking behind these issues was the crucial question of how far the king could be trusted and was sincere in supporting the reform programme, for while he had shown no open resistance and had given assent to all parliament's measures, he was reportedly involved in some murky affairs. On several occasions during spring and summer 1641 he was allegedly implicated in unsuccessful or abortive plots against his English parliament and Scottish Covenanters.

In late October 1641, as parliament was reassembling after its recess, news broke of rebellion in Ireland. During the 1630s the country had suffered under Wentworth, who ran it ruthlessly for the king and who was soon disliked and feared by most groups there. His recall to England at the end of the 1630s and then his complete removal left a power vacuum. While strongly anti-Catholic rhetoric emanating from the English parliament during 1640–1 instilled further religious fears in the Irish Catholic population, the way in which the Scots had recently responded when their religion was threatened from England, taking up arms and successfully repelling that threat, might serve as a model. On 22–3 October, in a carefully planned move some Irish Catholic groups rose in rebellion and they were soon supported by most of the Catholic population. Although the English government retained Dublin and its hinterland and a few other fortified towns, and although Scottish settlers also hung on in some northern enclaves in Ulster, most of the island fell to the Irish Catholics. They proclaimed loyalty to the Crown, but seemed determined to take control of Ireland and to throw off English Protestant rule. In the process, large numbers of Protestant settlers, English, Welsh and Scottish, were either deliberately killed during autumn 1641, often very brutally, or stripped of property and possessions and died of starvation or exposure. Very soon, pamphlets were appearing in England greatly exaggerating these atrocities. There was wide agreement that the English government must respond quickly, firmly and militarily to support its compatriots and co-religionists holding out in Ireland, to crush rebellion and to restore order in and English control over Ireland.[20] Thus the Irish Rebellion drew attention to the king's attitude towards Catholics

Companyes of the Rebells meeting
with the English flyinge for their liues,
falling downe before them cryinge for
mercy, thryst theire Pichforkes into
their Childrens bellyes & threw them
into the water.

13. *Although there is no doubt that large numbers of Protestant men, women and children in Ireland were deliberately killed by Catholics there and perished during the Irish Rebellion, it is equally clear that England and Scotland were soon full of highly emotive images of this ilk and equally graphic printed accounts of events, greatly exaggerating the scale and brutality of the killings. They fed and fed into strong anti-Catholicism in general and anti-Irish Catholicism in particular and added urgency to demands for England and Scotland to intervene in Ireland.*

and Catholicism, created for the English parliament a major issue about which it could and must take the initiative and, above all, brought into sharp and urgent focus the question, not yet really broached, of military power and command – for an army would have to be raised in England and Wales, but some doubted whether the king, by right commander-in-chief, could really be trusted with one.

In late summer 1641 civil war was not possible in England and Wales because the king remained isolated and lacked a body of followers willing to support him in opposing parliament's demands; thus he had no choice but to give ground. By spring 1642 the position was very different, for parliament and the broader political nation had split asunder and, although still outnumbered, the king had gathered a party

to him and was able to make a stand. In many ways, this huge change came about because of the determination of the king's parliamentary opponents to push ahead with their reform programme during autumn and winter 1641–2 and the reaction that programme engendered. During November the king's opponents drew up and passed through the Commons a large catalogue of perceived misgovernment and abuses, the Grand Remonstrance; in the wake of the Irish Rebellion, in mid November they began claiming for parliament the right to appoint or to vet the king's councillors and advisors, so taking control of the executive; during the winter they renewed attacks on the episcopal system, in a bill introduced during December focusing on removing bishops from the House of Lords and from the king's administration; and from the introduction of impressment and militia bills in early December onwards, they progressively claimed for parliament the right to raise and to conscript troops and to appoint those who commanded the county militias, thereby challenging the king's monopoly of military power and claiming it for parliament. Together, these measures would substantially reduce the monarch's role and strip away traditional royal prerogatives. The king's parliamentary opponents were determined to push ahead for several reasons. A few had colluded with the Scots in 1639–40 and they knew or suspected that the king had evidence of this; if pressure upon him stalled, they feared that Charles would bring against them and substantiate charges of high treason. Rather more doubted the king's sincerity in and commitment to the reforms he had hitherto made and felt that, if pressure was removed and he regained the initiative, he would reverse and revoke all the achievements of 1640–1 and perhaps revert to another Personal Rule. Many genuinely supported these measures for their own sake, believing that they had a rare opportunity to undertake good and beneficial reforms in the areas of executive government, military command and episcopal powers.

However, the determination of many of Charles's opponents to proceed thus during autumn and winter 1641–2, the scope of their proposed changes and the manner in which they would starkly and significantly change the existing system of government all caused reaction in Charles's favour. Many MPs and peers who had hitherto broadly or strongly supported the reform programme began to have doubts. Some felt that change had gone far enough, that the position reached by late

summer 1641 was satisfactory and that the king should now be trusted with his remaining powers. Many felt that to make further sweeping changes would risk undermining and destroying the whole constitution, bringing disorder in church and state and possibly unleashing social instability and heresy. As these figures, often referred to by historians as 'constitutional royalists', began breaking away from the reformers and rallying to the king, they were able to give Charles better advice and enabled him to promote himself in more subtle and appealing ways. With increasing confidence and assurance, Charles began portraying himself as the representative of the status quo and of the traditional balanced constitution, as a bulwark against potential political, religious and social overturning and chaos. It is a sign of how things were shifting that on 22 November, in a thinly attended House of Commons, the Grand Remonstrance scraped through with a majority of 11. During the closing weeks of 1641 Charles responded very moderately and in some ways positively to the inflammatory Grand Remonstrance, indicating a willingness to consider further reforms. Ignoring his now inconvenient Arminian or Laudian past, he expressed his devotion to the Church of England of his father's day. Although early in 1642 he did pass parliament's bill excluding bishops from the House of Lords and from his council, he continued to stress his support for and determination to defend the episcopal Church of England. He also gave assent to a bill giving parliament greater power in impressing troops for service in Ireland, while also stressing his determination to retain his traditional and God-given royal power of military command.

Yet even this new-style Charles, better supported, better advised and better promoted, bolstered by clear signs that he was winning support and that things were moving his way, could be panicked into rash actions. As the Christmas season approached, London – including the Westminster area, where parliament sat, and Whitehall, with its royal palace – saw increasing disorder on the streets, largely spontaneous, but perhaps with an element of organisation and encouragement from supporters of reform. Some MPs and peers found it difficult to take their seats in parliament and at the end of December a group of bishops claimed that they were being excluded from the House of Lords and that votes taken in their absence should be deemed void. The king's opponents seized upon this, portraying the bishops' claims as a breach of parliamentary

privilege and tantamount to treason; action was started against them and several were imprisoned. Amidst continuing and escalating violence and without the king's consent, his opponents in parliament called out the London militia.

At this point and quite possibly fearing for the personal safety of members of his family, particularly his Catholic wife, Charles overreacted. On 3 January he drew up charges against five prominent members of the House of Commons and one peer, alleging that they had committed high treason, including supporting the Scots in their invasion of England. When parliament refused to proceed with the charges and to arrest them, on 4 January Charles came to Westminster accompanied by armed supporters and entered the Commons chamber in an attempt personally to apprehend the five MPs; forewarned, they had fled. On the following day Charles went into the City of London on a similar quest, but again met a hostile response and left empty-handed. He may well have had evidence to substantiate some of the charges and the exemption of members of both Houses from arrest and prosecution while parliament was sitting did not extend to treason. But it was a huge miscalculation on Charles's part. Even had he succeeded in arresting them, it is hard to see how this would have turned the tide of events and his unsuccessful intervention in the chamber was interpreted as a huge breach of parliamentary privilege and, more widely, as a clear sign that the king could not be trusted; within weeks Charles himself was acknowledging that it had been a mistake. Despite the strong reaction against him, Charles's next move was probably also unwise and an overreaction. Within days he had withdrawn from London, moving first west to Hampton Court, then into Kent to accompany his wife, who took a boat to safety on the Continent. Again keeping out of London, he then turned north and progressed through the East Midlands and into Yorkshire, in March establishing himself at York.

Many contemporaries came to believe that the king's attempt to arrest the 'Five Members', as they are usually termed, and his physical withdrawal from London and from his parliament marked a key turning point, at which civil war became possible or likely; many historians agree with these views. However, war did not begin until high summer. For one thing, in early 1642 neither side possessed an army; both needed to establish mechanisms to raise forces and then to set about finding and

gathering troops. For another, both sides were still hesitant, unsure about how much wider support they would receive and perhaps keen not to take the first nakedly aggressive action. Thus there followed what historians refer to as a 'phoney' or 'paper' war during spring and summer. Each side issued a string of printed declarations and resolutions setting out its case and painting itself as the sinned-against victim, forced to defend itself from the threats and violence of its opponents. Some of these exchanges were a little narrow, almost the political equivalent of name-calling, perhaps aimed at goading the other side into aggression, but others were rather loftier, including parliament's claim to an authority higher than the individual monarch and its overriding duty to protect the people, the nation and the institution of monarchy; this was countered by the king's ringing pledge to defend the established balanced constitution and traditional government against dangerous attempts to tamper with or to destroy existing forms in church and state.[21] Whatever their purposes, these propaganda exchanges continued into late August and a little beyond, but by then the paper war was effectively over, for – as Whitelocke had noted in his parliamentary speech – armies were being raised and a real war was beginning.

CONCLUSIONS: INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR

For much of the past 150 years, down to the late twentieth century, a single interpretation of the origins and causes of the war usually dominated and, although there were always a few discordant voices, the great majority of civil-war historians were either supporting or reacting to that dominant line. Thus in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, historians argued that the war's origins lay in long-term political, constitutional and religious causes. During the middle decades of the twentieth century the predominant view was that it was a class war, caused by divisions between differing socio-economic groups, an interpretation which most historians now believe is incorrect. In the 1970s and 1980s the war was believed to have been caused by very short-term political mistakes, blunders or miscalculations on both sides after 1625 or even after 1640, a view which is also treated with scepticism now. In the twenty-first century we are in a much more complex and confusing phase of the debate, with

no single interpretation dominant. In explaining the origins and causes of the civil war, most historians now take the line found in this chapter, stressing a mixture of long-, medium- and short-term factors, most of them to do with the running of the state and the state church in England and Wales, though incorporating some wider ideological issues and the impact of Scotland and Ireland, all of them shaped by the contributions of the individual monarchs of the period and greatly exacerbated by the personality, policies and approach of Charles I.

2

'And thus innocently began this cursed war': The War Begins, a Nation Divides and the Conflicts of 1642

> I came on Wednesday night last from the court at Nottingham, where I saw the king set up his standard on Monday night before […] His Majesty came into the castle-yard, accompanied with the Prince [of Wales, his eldest son Charles], Duke [of York, his second son James], Prince Robert [Rupert] and Maurice his brother, the Duke of Richmond and diverse other courtiers and cavaliers; and finding out the highest pointed hill in the yard, from whence it might be perspicuous, the standard was brought in and there erected. At which all the courtiers and spectators flung up their caps and whooped, crying 'God save king Charles and hang up the roundheads' and so whooped the king to his lodgings.

This apparently eyewitness account of the raising of the king's standard – described as being 'a long pole like a maypole, dyed red, on the upper end whereof hangs a large silk flag (in the form of a scutcheon) with a red cross and two lion passants upon two crowns' – at Nottingham Castle during the evening of Monday, 22 August 1642 soon appeared in a broadsheet printed in London on 1 September.[1] A second printed account added that the standard included the image of a hand pointing to the Crown, accompanied by the motto 'Give Caesar his due' and, more importantly, gave more information about the numbers in attendance. A few hundred troops, horse and foot, were there, so that, including the lords and gentleman who accompanied the king, around 2,000 were present, though it was noted that that number included very few outsiders, even though the event had been announced and armed attendance strongly encouraged ten days before. With the standard aloft, and before retiring to his lodgings, the king corrected in

his own hand a proclamation which was then, with difficulty, read by a herald. This made clear that the king had raised his standard in order to suppress rebellion fomented by the parliamentarian commander, the Earl of Essex, and his forces and it called upon all loyal subjects to support him.[2] It was presumably a revised version of the proclamation issued from York on 12 August in which the king had condemned those in arms against him as rebels and traitors, 'whereby the common peace is likely to be wholly destroyed and this flourishing kingdom in danger to perish under the miseries of a civil war, if the malice and rage of these persons be not instantly resisted', and called upon his subjects to attend him in arms on or as soon as possible after 22 August at Nottingham, 'whence we resolve to advance forward for the suppression of the said rebellion and the protection of our good subjects amongst them from the burden of the slavery and insolence under which they cannot but

14. *This rather stylised depiction of the raising of the king's standard at Nottingham on 22 August, from a broadsheet of the day, includes an image of the king himself and a sketch of part of the town. The impression of an orderly and militarised event is at odds with some of the contemporary descriptions of the ceremony.*

groan until they be relieved by us'.[3] In his later account of the war and with the benefit of hindsight, the royalist Earl of Clarendon thought the event epitomised the 'melancholy' state of the king's affairs at this time, for attendance was disappointingly thin, there was 'little other ceremony than the sound of drums and trumpets', it had been 'a very stormy and tempestuous day' and the bad weather continued so that 'the standard itself was blown down the same night it had been set up, by a very strong and unruly wind, and could not be fixed again in a day or two'; overall, Clarendon concluded, 'a general sadness covered the whole town, and the king himself appeared more melancholic than he used to be.'[4]

Many historians see the raising of the standard, a theatrical display with more than a hint of the medieval, as a declaration of war by the king upon parliament. Although the king did not view it in that way, seeing himself as standing against rebellion, and although the words used on 22 August did not include an explicit declaration of war, in the manner of Chamberlain's broadcast to the nation on 3 September 1939, the royal proclamation of 12 August made clear that the king did see the Nottingham event as the launching pad from which he would advance with armed supporters to engage his opponents. Accordingly, many contemporaries and most historians see 22 August 1642 as the date upon which the English Civil War began. But in reality and on the ground the position was far more complex. Like most civil wars, there was no single date upon which undisturbed peace gave way to total war. There is plenty of evidence of deep and bitter division, militarisation, armed confrontation and even deliberate killing well before 22 August, although both sides showed restraint and most of this early action tended to be sporadic, small-scale and a touch amateurish. The pattern did not change much immediately after 22 August and the raising of the standard did not at first signal the beginning of major bloodshed. Although it led to what is often termed the 'Edgehill campaign' of autumn 1642, an uneasy peace interspersed with limited or occasional clashes remained the norm for several more weeks and not until late October and early November did the only large-scale engagements and significant killings of this opening stage of the war take place. This chapter charts that slow movement from peace to war during 1642 as a whole, including developments and growing divisions during the first eight months of the year, as well as the campaign and battle of Edgehill of the autumn.

FEARS AND GROWING DIVISIONS

A growing realisation from early 1642 that divisions between king and parliament might not be resolved peacefully but could spill over into war caused deep apprehension. Letters and diaries of 1642 were increasingly filled with gloom and foreboding. As early as January, Henry Oxinden noted:

> I find all here full of fears and most void of hopes. Parents and children, brothers, kindred, I and dear friends have the seed of difference and division abundantly sowed in them. Sometimes I meet with a cluster of gentlemen equally divided in opinion and resolution, sometimes three to two, sometimes more odds, but never unanimous, nay more I have heard foul language and desperate quarrellings even between old and entire friends, and how we can thus stand and not fall, certainly God must needs work a miracle parallel to some of His great ones in the old time.

He added some pointed advice to his cousin. 'I am glad you have got a horse; provide you of arms; it is Mars not Venus that now can help.'[5] During late April and May Sir Thomas Knyvett's letters to his wife were gloomier still, noting how 'the ball is almost now bandied to the height; what the issue will be, God above knows'; how 'I would to God I could write thee any good news but that is impossible so long as the spirit of contradiction reigns between king and parliament higher still than ever; and it is to be feared this threatening storm will not be allayed without some showers (I pray God not a deluge) of blood'; and how 'here's nothing but remonstrances and declarations, one against the other, not a tittle of hope of accommodation, so that we can foresee nothing but a public phlebotomy if God in mercy doth not in time cast out these evil spirits from amongst us'.[6]

Divisions at the centre were increasingly mirrored or exacerbated by divisions in the country. They are revealed and reflected in petitions on a range of issues put out by or in the name of counties and their leading inhabitants. During 1642, many English and Welsh counties petitioned king and parliament to express horror at the approach of civil war and to urge a peaceful settlement. However, examination of their texts reveals clear differences, for they often made partisan cases, suggesting that – to

the extent that the texts truly represented wider provincial sentiments – different counties were moving in different directions. Some struck a genuinely neutral tone, such as a petition from Somerset addressed to parliament, calling for king and parliament to meet and to discuss issues, putting aside mutual fears and jealousies. But many others, the majority of those that survive, were far more loaded and more obviously sympathetic either to parliament – such as those from a swathe of East Midlands counties, which supported parliament's reform programme and suggested that the onus was on the king to return to London, to put his faith in parliament and to accept parliament's advice – or to the king – such as a joint petition to the king from Cumberland and Westmorland which, while expressing some pious hope for future happiness and union, did little more than extravagantly praise the king and past and present royal policies.[7]

Divisions at the centre were also reflected in sharp factional clashes in several counties during the spring and summer. In Herefordshire, for example, there was a dispute between one of the county's MPs, Sir Robert Harley, who strongly promoted parliament's political and religious reforms and who received support from some low-church ministers, and a group of county JPs and landowners, who were increasingly antagonistic towards parliament and sympathetic to the king, as well as resentful of the way in which Harley was not representing their views in parliament. Indeed, Harley effectively spiked a Herefordshire petition in favour of episcopacy, though he could not prevent a supportive county petition going to the king, and instead he presented to the Commons a petition drawn up by his Herefordshire allies expressing loyalty to parliament. The majority of Herefordshire's leading landowners appeared to be shifting towards the king, while the county's leading MP, increasingly and uncomfortably isolated at home, was strongly supporting, as well as representing – misrepresenting, his opponents thought – his county in parliament.[8] Equally, allegiances in Kent appeared divided or uncertain in spring and summer and, despite the energetic attempts of a disgraced and expelled former MP to stir up the county against parliament, most of the Kentish elite appeared to be no more than very mildly pro-royalist and some were pro-parliamentarian. Accordingly, the county drew up and presented to parliament a series of petitions and counter-petitions, setting out very different stances, and over the summer a power struggle

unfolded between existing JPs and a newly appointed committee of Kentish MPs, which led to some seemingly childish pushing and shoving to squeeze into and to secure seats at one overcrowded meeting.[9]

Divisions were also reflected in sporadic violence at county level during the first eight months of 1642, much of it springing from religious differences. There were around 30 localised and generally short-lived Catholic scares or panics, which sometimes involved attacks upon known Catholics and their property.[10] In some areas, high-church buildings were attacked, the principal targets being features condemned by low-church practitioners, such as images and statues of the Virgin and assorted saints, crucifixes, painted windows, organs, altar rails and fixed east-end altars, all of which might be interpreted as Catholic elements.[11] For example, early in 1642 in Norwich it was believed that local apprentices planned to attack the cathedral to remove the altar rails and the organ, in response to which the dean and chapter decided themselves to dismantle the rails but to save the organ. With rumours that the apprentices intended to attack on Shrove Tuesday, they took drastic measures to defend the cathedral, locking the doors and gathering prebendaries and choristers to defend the building, but also bringing in some musketeers, whose weapons were 'ready charged with bullets and one of them had in his musket a bullet split in parts for to shoot the apprentices when they came', some halberdiers, 'expecting to run their halberds in any bodies that dare offer to come', and some 'pistol blades', one of whom drunkenly boasted that he was ready to kill hundreds of apprentices. In fact, none appeared and, according to the mocking printed account of the event, the defenders 'stood like so many Abraham Ninnies doing nothing but tell how many crows flew over the pinnacle', the author concluding that 'they would rather lose their lives than their organs, so fast are they glued to their pipes and popish trinkets'.[12]

Elsewhere, supporters of low-church religion or Puritans found themselves outnumbered and threatened by defenders of the existing church. For example, the Puritan Lady Brilliana Harley – wife of Sir Robert, absent from home in London and in parliament – of Brampton Bryan in north-west Herefordshire, charted growing confrontations in Herefordshire and southern Shropshire during the summer. In early June she noted that 'at Ludlow they set up a maypole and a thing like a head upon it, and so they did at Croft, and gathered a great many

about it and shot at it in derision of roundheads'; in mid June she noted the 'exceedingly rude' comments from the locals as they passed through Brampton Bryan each Thursday en route to Ludlow market, uttering threats that they 'wish all the Puritans of Brampton hanged, and as I was walking one day in the garden, Mr Longley and one of the maids being with me, they looked upon me and wished all the Puritans and roundheads at Brampton hanged'; and around the same time she reported an unpleasant confrontation at Hereford, where a local minister had attempted to preach by invitation in one of the city churches, but when his brief opening prayers had not included a prayer for the king he had been confronted by angry members of the congregation uttering 'pray God bless the king; this man does not pray for the king,' who then caused bells to be rung and a hostile crowd to gather in the churchyard, crying 'roundheads' and 'let us cast stones at him'. By late July, in Herefordshire – at the parish church in Leominster, where the incumbent was conspicuously parliamentarian in his sympathies – and in neighbouring counties, pro-royalist armed groups were intervening at service time in attempts to compel the minister to read proclamations and declarations by the king.[13]

15. *As this engraving from a pamphlet of the opening weeks of 1643 indicates, parts of society quite quickly divided between groups of soberly dressed 'roundheads' and more flamboyantly attired 'cavaliers', leading to confrontations, here represented by snarling, hostile dogs, between them.*

THE MILITARISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE EARLIEST ARMED CLASHES

During the summer, however, a directly military issue came to the fore. On 5 March parliament passed without royal assent a Militia Ordinance, appointing its own lord lieutenant in each county of England and Wales, assisted by deputies, who were to call out, to train and to improve the county militias and to lead them 'for the suppression of all rebellions, insurrections and invasions that shall happen […] as well within their said several and respective counties and places as within any other part of this realm of England or domain of Wales […] according as they from time to time shall receive directions from […] parliament'.[14] After a slow start, during May and June, and significantly later in some counties, the Ordinance began to be executed. This generally involved calling out the militia, taking a roll call, inspecting arms, possibly appointing new or additional officers, perhaps going through rudimentary training and exercising, ensuring that the magazine or store of arms and ammunition was firmly secured and, in the process, checking on the allegiance of the local gentry and making sure that they supported or at least acquiesced in parliament's control of the militia. Increasingly over the summer, especially after parliament voted on 12 July to raise an army,[15] these meetings might take on a broader recruiting role, encouraging further local volunteers to pledge military service.

Meanwhile, by early June the king was issuing formal royal documents to empower his appointees to do very much the same; like parliament, he adopted a county approach and issued to most English counties during June and July and to Welsh counties a little later in the year a Commission of Array. This was a medieval royal document, which had been given statutory authority by parliament in the early fifteenth century but which had largely fallen into abeyance after the mid sixteenth century, though it had been revived and employed by the king only a couple of years before, during the Bishops' Wars. Written in Latin, the Commissions of Array generally appointed in each county a small number of peers with local interests or connections, supported by a dozen or more non-aristocratic landowners, who were empowered to muster and to array all those within the county of sufficient standing or otherwise able to bear arms, to parade and to train them and to lead them for the purpose of

'expelling and overcoming' the king's enemies 'when any danger shall impend', as well as to arrest and to imprison 'all and each whom you shall find contrary or rebellious' and to ensure that the county's beacons were in good readiness. Each Commission was accompanied by a letter from the king, generally reiterating some of its provisions, warning commissioners against employing or arming Catholics and permitting them to accept voluntary contributions, but normally also making clear that for the moment and on grounds of cost their main task should be to summon, to muster and to train the existing county militia. Again, in due course and once both need and financial resources became greater, there was a stronger emphasis on commissioners undertaking a broader recruiting role.[16]

The existence of these similar but rival county-based systems, both aimed at securing the county militia forces and the county's existing military resources, created obvious tensions, potential flashpoints and hard choices. Each side condemned the other system as illegal – the king on the grounds that the Militia Ordinance did not have royal assent and was issued against his will and that military power rested with him, parliament on the grounds that the statute passed during Henry IV's reign had lapsed, that the Commission of Array therefore did not have parliamentary approval or legitimacy and that in any case parliament had an overriding duty to protect the people via its scheme. Each side also condemned anyone who attempted to execute that rival system, who accepted power and exercised office under it or who voluntarily obeyed it.[17] Some people who were undecided or trying to keep their heads down found themselves in difficulties. In July Oxinden wrote: 'Me thinks my condition betwixt the Commission of Array and ordinance of parliament is like his that is between Scylla and Charybdis and nothing but omnipotency can bring me clearly and reputably off,' and he sought advice about the response of 'wiser men'.[18] The Norfolk moderate and royalist sympathising Knyvett found himself in difficulties in May when, walking at Westminster, he was without warning issued with a commission from parliament's lord lieutenant of Norfolk to resume his command in the militia. Taken by surprise and unsure what to do, he decided not to dispute the matter but to take the document, while stressing that he needed 'some time to advise upon it'. Within hours his misgivings had increased when he received a copy of the king's declaration condemning

the Militia Ordinance. Accordingly, Knyvett was in a quandary, wailing to his wife, 'Oh sweet heart, I am now in a great straight what to do,' and he decided to keep his head down for as long as he could: 'I hold it good wisdom and security to keep my company as close to me as I can in these dangerous times and to stay out of the way of my new masters until these first musterings be over.'[19]

There was clearly huge potential for royalist and parliamentarian officials and commissioners, together in many cases with rather broader local committees of JPs, MPs and other landowners, to clash while seeking to secure military resources in the same areas. Although this did happen, in reality it is remarkable that serious and violent clashes were few and far between. In many counties it was fairly clear by summer which side was likely to have the upper hand and there was often no sustained attempt by its opponents to push the issue as far as physical conflict. Thus parliament and its representatives were able to execute the Militia Ordinance in many counties of southern and south-eastern England, while the king's Commissions of Array were executed in some of the counties of northern and south-western England, as well as in several of the border counties of the Welsh Marches; a little later the Commissions were extended to and executed in Wales.[20] However, even in these counties the position on the ground was often complex and the apparently smooth execution of the Militia Ordinance or the Commission of Array did not, in fact, guarantee full and permanent military control. For example, although in early June parliament's lord lieutenant successfully called out and reviewed the Lincolnshire militia and the county's allegiance seemed decided in parliament's favour, in mid July the king encountered a very warm reception when he visited Lincoln, attracting a huge and appreciative crowd drawn from town and county, welcomed by apparently loyal local militia forces and receiving a strong show of support; parliament's lord lieutenant and his cronies had tactfully and perhaps wisely departed ahead of the king's arrival. It is fair to conclude that opinion in Lincolnshire was much more divided or undecided than the initial implementation of parliament's Militia Ordinance seemed to suggest, or perhaps that many people wished to demonstrate support for both king and parliament and so put on a show for whichever party was in town, rather than firmly committing themselves to one camp.[21]

In some counties, minor violence occurred when one side tried to implement its document against overwhelming odds. For example, during August the royalist Lord Chandos attempted to execute the Commission for his native Gloucestershire, much of which was strongly parliamentarian in sympathy. Approaching Cirencester on 15 August, he encountered a hostile crowd, reportedly over 1,000 strong. On claiming that he was not coming to implement the Commission, he was allowed into Cirencester and began a meeting with local JPs and others in town, but there he was soon besieged by 'soldiers and armed men' who demanded that he hand over his Commission of Array and swear never to seek its imposition, but instead support parliament, 'all of which, being in extreme fear, he consented unto'. He was smuggled out of town that night, but the following morning local forces vented their anger on his coach, left behind in his hurry to depart undetected, for they 'drew it themselves to the marketplace, cut it and tore it all in pieces'.[22]

Other counties were more evenly balanced: allegiances were uncertain and attempts by both sides to take control could lead to violence. For example, Lancashire seemed divided and both royalist and parliamentarian representatives were present at a county meeting, at Preston on 20 June, where they tried to put their case. Over the following weeks, much of Lancashire drifted towards the royalist camp, but in the south-east, around Manchester, Salford and their hinterland, there was much stronger support for parliament. The county's parliamentarians concentrated their efforts there, drilling local militia forces and building up stores of arms and ammunition. Although Lancashire's leading royalist, Lord Strange, heir to the earldom of Derby, approached the area several times in early July with armed supporters, both sides held back from fighting. Instead, probably in search of a non-violent compromise, it was agreed that on 15 July Strange would be allowed to enter Manchester unopposed, wined and dined and then lodged there, but that he was to be accompanied only by his personal entourage, not by the larger embryonic army he was assembling. Printed accounts of what followed differ, are sometimes confused and certainly attempted to pin the blame on different groups, but these peaceable plans clearly went badly wrong and an armed confrontation occurred between Strange and his entourage on the one hand and some of the town's parliamentarian militia forces on the other. Shots were exchanged, Strange and his group only

with difficulty got out of town and several members of the militia were wounded, at least one of them fatally. Richard Percival or Parcival, 'a linen webster' of Kirkmanshulme, died as a result and was buried in Manchester three days later. Although in reality others may have been killed in military action rather earlier than this, Percival is often credited with being the earliest civil-war fatality who can be individually identified and to whom a name and a burial entry can be given.[23]

Another county divided in summer 1642 was Leicestershire. The county's leading parliamentarian, the Earl of Stamford, was warmly received in early June when he arrived to execute the Militia Ordinance and on the 4th he reportedly swept aside ineffective royalist opposition in Leicester. According to a highly partisan report, Stamford stopped at The Angel, intending to lodge there, but within the inn he encountered an unnamed 'lord', who had been commissioned by the king to secure the county. The two peers confronted each other, 'sharp and uncivil' words were exchanged and, on being ordered by this lord to depart, Stamford

> drew his sword and wished him to depart or he would make the place too hot for him; the Lord and his servants drew, so did the other, betwixt whom there grew a desperate combat, but it being market day the multitude of people rushing in took the Earl of Stamford's part and made the other leave the town with shame, the people hissing and calling him popish lord and many opprobrious words.

A heart-warming scene reportedly unfolded when Leicester's mayor and aldermen arrived, for they and others pledged support for parliament and for Stamford, which so moved the latter that 'the good Earl was forced to withdraw, tears of joy standing in his eyes, to see his country's love and obedience'.[24]

With the royalists seemingly outfaced and outnumbered, Stamford executed the Militia Ordinance in Leicestershire over the next fortnight. However, his return to London later in June let the initiative pass to the county's other great family, the pro-royalist Hastings interest, represented by Henry Hastings, a son of the Earl of Huntingdon. This led to a power struggle within the county and several tense confrontations.[25] According to another clearly biased parliamentarian pamphlet, the most serious occurred at Leicester on 22 June, when Hastings, clutching the

Commission of Array and referring to himself rather grandly as 'the king's body and soul', together with several of his kinsmen and a body of up to 300 troops, advanced on the town. The main stand-off occurred on the outskirts of Leicester, where the royalists encountered a body of parliamentarian officials, including the sheriff, townsmen and some troops. Hastings attempted to read the Commission of Array, 'which being in Latin and he not being ready therein, [he] did there endeavour to comment upon the meaning thereof in English, which being altogether then unable to do', it was instead read in its original Latin by an amenable clerk, 'to which most of the people gave ear, but answered nothing'. The royalist leaders, accompanied by armed and mounted troops and 24 parsons fully robed in vestments, then sought to ride into the town, shouting 'A king! A king!' as they moved off. A parliamentarian officer readied his troops and at his command they levelled their muskets, preparing to fire on Hastings and his men, but at that stage 'a sudden and extraordinary abundance of rain' prevented them from firing. Hastings's response, aiming his petronel, a type of long-muzzled pistol, at the head of one of the parliamentarian officials, was similarly thwarted, for the weapon misfired and 'did not discharge'.[26] Although – if this account is to be believed – killings were thus only narrowly and fortuitously avoided on this occasion, Leicestershire remained uneasily divided during the summer.[27]

There were similar divisions in Warwickshire, with rival factions again focused on prominent local members of the aristocracy, the royalist Earl of Northampton and the parliamentarian Lord Brooke, but here they led to far more extensive military action during the summer. Despite support from many of the county's largest landowners, Northampton failed to gain entry into the county's principal town, Coventry, in late June and in early July Brooke successfully held musters there and at Coleshill, Stratford and Warwick, raised further volunteers, took control of the county magazine and removed it to his main base of Warwick Castle, which he garrisoned. But in late July the royalists regained the initiative when, on the 30th, in a tense though bloodless confrontation on Warmington Hill near the Warwickshire–Oxfordshire border, they prevented Brooke and his outnumbered supporters from taking control of heavy guns sent to him from London and from transporting them to Warwick Castle. Brooke returned to London and the Earl of

16. *Lord Brooke, who had a long record of active godliness and of opposing the king's policies, was able to thwart his royalist opponents and to gain control of most of his native county of Warwickshire in the early stages of the war, outfacing the king's men who for a time besieged Warwick Castle. His military career was cut short, however, when he was killed while besieging Lichfield in spring 1643.*

Northampton gained the initiative, organising royalist musters, seizing guns from Banbury, taking control of the town of Warwick and besieging and bombarding the castle, whose parliamentarian garrison remained defiant. Meanwhile, both sides sought reinforcements from outside the county. Brooke sought help from troops newly raised in the London area, some of whom began marching out of the capital during the first half of August; at the same time, royalist reinforcements from several counties close to Warwickshire began marching to the aid of the Earl of Northampton.[28]

In a sign of what was to become the civil-war norm, these troops on the move seized arms and supplies and plundered properties of perceived enemies as they passed, in a few cases also indulging in fairly casual killing. Thus having occupied Rugby, early on 9 August a body of royalist cavalry under John Smith descended on the village of Kilsby, close to the Warwickshire–Northamptonshire border, which was believed to be pro-parliamentarian, in search of arms. He and his men encountered a group of locals, many armed with muskets and pistols, pitchforks and cudgels. According to a royalist account, Smith acted with restraint and 'commanded his men not to discharge a pistol upon pain of death' and stressed to the villagers that he meant no harm and merely intended to collect arms for the king. When they attacked his force and fired on them, he did order his men to return fire 'and so presently dispatched three or four of them', which caused the rest to run away, 'except an old man that with his pitchfork ran at Captain Smith and twice struck the tines thereof against his breast, who by reason of his arms [armour] under a loose coat received no hurt, yet could not this old man by any entreaty be persuaded to forebear, until a pistol quieted him'.[29] A parliamentarian account, entitled *A True Relation of the Barbarous Cruelty of Divers of the Bloody Cavaliers*, portrayed the royalists as aggressors and initiating the violence, shooting dead one unarmed civilian merely for saying that he was 'for the king and the parliament' and killing several others, while further locals were threatened at gunpoint or cut with swords.[30]

The rather inactive siege of Warwick Castle began on 4 August and lasted just over a fortnight. An ineffectual royalist bombardment met with counter-fire from the garrison's artillery, which caused rather more damage. There was also exchange of musket shot, in the course of which one pro-royalist local shopkeeper was rather too bold at bragging to the besieged defenders.

> A butcher carrying a shoulder of mutton in his hand, going over the bridge in the sight of the castle, held it up in derision and cried, "Here is meat for the roundheads in the castle," whereupon a musket was discharged out of the castle and gave him thanks for his offer with the depriving him of his life at the same instant.[31]

Although during the third week of August some parliamentarian reinforcements from London began arriving in the region, and although the king himself briefly campaigned in the county, summoning but failing to secure Coventry on 20 August, as yet no major fighting had occurred. Instead, the king departed for Nottingham and the prearranged ceremony on the 22nd to raise his standard and around the same time, with perhaps 6,000 parliamentarian reinforcements massing nearby, royalists lifted the siege and began moving off towards Nottingham. They rode off with a sneer from Brooke, who 'bade them spit their venom, for he hoped that [the Earl of] Northampton should be translated to Warwick and stand sentry upon Warwick Castle to fright crows, kites and buzzards', perhaps gibbeted atop the castle.[32]

On 23 August there was an early-morning clash around Southam, where many of the parliamentarian reinforcements had spent the night, between them and some of Northampton's royalists, though apparently the earl himself was not present. It took the form of a series of confused skirmishes during the morning rather than a single or distinct battle. Parliamentarian accounts probably exaggerated the scale both of the engagement and of the royalist losses, with their talk of the battlefield 'much besprinkled with blood' and of royalist corpses piled up 'on heaps in the corn fields', but the sources do indicate that a significant fight took place there and both contemporary burial records and much later discoveries of human skeletons intermingled with cannonballs and musket balls confirm that fatalities occurred.[33] The parliamentarian Nehemiah Wharton reported seeing 'one drummer being dead at the bottom of the hill, [who] our knapsack boys rifled to the shirt, which was very lousy. Another drummer we found two miles off, with his arms shot off, and lay a-dying. Several dead corpses we found in corn fields, and amongst them a trumpeter, whose trumpet our horsemen sounded into Coventry.'[34] The killings were mounting up.

During August, therefore, there were signs that parts of the country were becoming militarised and placed on a war footing, that in some areas garrisoning and besieging of strongpoints had begun and that in certain regions armies were on the move to focus military resources and to reinforce particularly important or vulnerable spots. In the process, deliberate killings of soldiers and civilians and plundering had begun. On the other hand, there were signs of restraint and reluctance

to provoke violent confrontation and killing. The king was generally accorded a warm welcome as he shuttled around various north Midlands towns during July and August and prominent parliamentarians usually slipped away ahead of his arrival rather than provoke a clash – for example, on hearing that the king was expected in Leicester, two leading Leicestershire parliamentarians 'departed towards London for avoiding blood-shedding, which would have followed […] had they stayed'.[35] The fatal confrontation in Manchester in mid July was the result of an attempt at peaceful compromise which went badly wrong and it led to expressions of profound regret. Brooke and Northampton shied away from violent conflict around Warmington on 30 July and the clash at Southam on 23 August occurred when two forces – one of which had abandoned its siege and was moving away – crossed paths and stumbled into each other rather than because an attempt was made to force an engagement.

Developments in Somerset reveal a similar pattern of restraint. In July the royalist Marquess of Hertford attempted to execute Commissions of Array in Somerset and Wiltshire, counties which formed part of a much larger western command to which he was appointed by the king in early August.[36] Although he owned estates there, his influence was limited and his attempts to execute the Wiltshire Commission in Marlborough, where according to his colleague Sir Ralph Hopton he was met by 'a tumult' and a 'dissembling submission' from the corporation who flatly refused to hand over the county magazine, and the Somerset Commission in Bath on 25 July, where the sheriff displayed his 'treacherous intentions', provoked simmering antipathy.[37] At the end of July he made Wells a more amenable base for royalist recruiting in the area. This compounded hostility towards Hertford, who was viewed as disturbing the peace by many uncommitted inhabitants and as a real threat by pockets of committed parliamentarians in the region. Parliamentarian agents, who Hopton ruefully admitted 'played their game shrewdly', announced plans to hold a counter-rally at Shepton Mallet on 1 August, promising as an added inducement 'several fat bucks'.[38] Hertford dispatched a cavalry force led by Hopton to secure the area, though with orders to act with restraint. Arriving early and well ahead of the planned gathering, Hopton left most of his troops outside the town and entered Shepton with a small personal retinue. There he encountered one of the parliamentarian organisers, William Strode, who rode into town with just a handful of companions,

including his son. An angry confrontation occurred in the marketplace and Strode – who, the royalists alleged, drew a pistol on Hopton – was either pushed off his horse or forced to dismount at sword point and was arrested. However, the approach of a much larger parliamentarian crowd, many of them armed, compelled Hopton to vacate the town and to rejoin his cavalry. The two forces, Hopton's well-armed cavalry and a much larger body of at least 1,200 parliamentarian soldiers and civilians, drew up outside the town and glared at each other for several hours, without exchanging fire or engaging. At length, Hopton withdrew and returned to Wells. 'And thus innocently began this cursed war in those parts, this being all that passed that day,' recalled Hopton.[39]

Mass gatherings seemed to be achieving parliament's aims without a fight and so a larger meeting was planned for Chewton Mendip on 5 August. Not everything passed off peacefully, for one body of parliamentarian troops, moving up from the south, was ambushed on 4 August. Seeing around 600 enemy infantry under John Pyne approaching and knowing they would be taking the road up a steep incline at Marshall's Elm, the royalist Henry Lunsford deployed and largely concealed his much smaller body of royalist horse near the top of the hill, with his dragoons – troops who were mounted but who, having taken up forward positions, generally dismounted and fought on foot as musketeers – well hidden in ditches or old quarries beside the road further down the hill. The parliamentarians stumbled into the ambush, hit in the side by volleys of musket fire, and then charged, 'quickly broken and routed' by the royalist horse, losing 'seven killed upon the place' and more who died later of their wounds.[40] Despite this setback, the planned parliamentarian gathering around Chewton Mendip went ahead the following day, with at least 12,000 people present – some contemporaries put the figure significantly higher and their royalist opponents claimed an improbable 40,000 – a mixture of soldiers and lightly armed civilians, some men and women carrying simply pitchforks, in a show of force. Some of them moved forward during the day, planting artillery on the escarpment overlooking and so more obviously threatening Wells. They stayed in position overnight, their spirits kept high by 'prayers and singing of psalms', amply provided with a hearty breakfast the following morning by sympathetic locals who sent cartloads of food. Hugely outnumbered, the 900 or so royalists down in Wells had no real choice but to negotiate,

although Hertford prevaricated when his opponents demanded that he and his men withdraw the Commission of Array, disband all their troops, dispatch those who were MPs to London to 'answer for their delinquency', return seized arms and release all prisoners. But unable to resist such overwhelming numbers and with his own men deserting, Hertford withdrew on 6 August and pulled away across the Somerset–Dorset border to Sherborne.[41] Once more and despite the large numbers involved, major bloodshed had been avoided.

Two other centres, both of them English coastal towns and ports, saw significant military action in the period before the formal outbreak of war. Of the country's three main pre-war arms depots, the Tower of London was firmly under parliament's control throughout this period, one of the many prices the king paid for leaving the capital to his opponents in January.[42] But Kingston upon Hull in the East Riding of Yorkshire was much closer and more vulnerable to the king's new political and increasingly military base at York. Parliament installed a new governor, Sir John Hotham, and enlarged the garrison to around 1,000 men, and this, together with the natural and man-made defences of the town, proved sufficient both to prevent the king from entering and taking control when he arrived at the head of a body of armed supporters on 23 April – although refusing him admission, Hotham did provide the angry and frustrated monarch with food, lowered from the walls – and to see off a 4,000-strong royalist force under the Earl of Lindsey, which attempted to capture the place by siege during July. Lindsey's plan to surround the town on its landward side and to construct earthwork artillery forts overlooking the walls was thwarted when Hotham broke the earthen banks along the Humber and Hull rivers, allowing tidal waters to flood the low-lying area outside the town walls, while royalist attempts to control the river approaches were brushed aside by parliamentarian warships. The royalists abandoned the operation by the end of July.[43]

England's other important military centre, the fortress, arsenal, naval base and port at Portsmouth in Hampshire, was also very well protected. However, it passed to royalist control in July when its governor, George Goring, whose allegiance had worried parliament during 1641–2, came out for the king. Parliament responded by ordering troops south to besiege and to recapture it and by the second week of August Sir William Waller commanded around 800 men in the area, with naval support, against



17. *On the Humber estuary by its confluence with the river Hull, Kingston upon Hull was strongly protected by a circuit of walls, wall towers and gatehouses and by further Tudor works on the other side of the river Hull. They enabled the parliamentarian governor and garrison both to rebuff the king's attempt to enter the town at the Beverley Gate (at the bottom of this image) in spring 1642 and to see off a more organised royalist siege during the summer.*

the 3–400 men Goring had in Portsmouth. On 12 August Waller overwhelmed royalist troops trying to hold the Portsbridge, the only land route onto the large isthmus or island upon which Portsmouth stood. Over the next few days the parliamentarians took control of most of the island, penning up the royalists within Portsmouth and the stronghold of Southsea Castle nearby. By early September Portsmouth was not only besieged but also under bombardment from parliamentarian cannon stationed on the island and from batteries across the river at Gosport. However, probably more damaging to royalist morale was a surprise parliamentarian attack on Southsea Castle during the early hours of 4 September, launched on the seaward side as well as at the main gate, which overwhelmed the 12-man garrison and induced the commander, Captain Challoner, to surrender; Waller quickly garrisoned the place and turned its guns on the town, reportedly with the approval of the

drunken and dispirited Challoner. With troops and civilians deserting him, Goring opened negotiations and on 7 September Portsmouth surrendered to parliament.[44]

THE WAR BEGINS AND THE EDGEHILL CAMPAIGN

The raising of the king's standard on 22 August marked a key staging point on the road from peace to war, but it did not immediately change the piecemeal nature of the contest and a further two months passed before the armies of king and parliament gave battle at Edgehill. For one thing, in the latter half of August the king certainly and parliament probably did not yet possess a sufficiently strong principal field army with which they could confidently launch a full-scale campaign, and both sides spent the next few weeks continuing to build up their forces, the king remaining at Nottingham until 13 September, while parliament's commander-in-chief, Essex, did not even leave London to join his army until 9 September. The pattern already noted, of the mustering and training of men in many towns and counties, of local power struggles and occasional confrontations and minor clashes, of newly raised troops on the move living off the land and plundering, continued in most areas.

In just a few areas some rather larger and more significant actions occurred at this stage. In Lancashire, for example, local royalists attempted to capture Manchester in late September, Strange bringing up at least 2,000 troops against the town on the morning of the 25th. But the parliamentarians had expected this and had not only built up and trained their own forces, so that by late September there were at least 1,000 parliamentarians in arms there, but also strengthened Manchester's defences, throwing up mud walls and fixing chains across the roadways leading into the town to disrupt cavalry. Strange initially attempted to take control via negotiations with menaces, but when these failed, on the afternoon of 26 September he began an artillery bombardment and also attempted to storm the town via Salford Bridge. The royalists deliberately set fire to barns and houses nearby, both as a show of force and to use the smoke to cover their attack and to hinder the defenders, though a change in wind direction then worked against them: 'God that rides on the wings of the wind did very seasonably turn the wind,' as one parliamentarian

lyrically put it. Parliamentarian musketeers defending the bridge beat off the assault. On the morning of 27 September the royalists bombarded the area around Salford Bridge, while a party of infantry sought to enter the town on its northern side, but they, too, were firmly repulsed. Strange, now the new Earl of Derby on the death of his father, sought a compromise, requesting the right merely to parade through Manchester and then to leave either with cash or arms, but this was rejected by the defenders. Although the royalist bombardment continued intermittently on 29 and 30 September, including the use of case shot or grapeshot – Strange 'commanded the ordnance to be charged with small bullets to the end to scatter amongst us', as a parliamentarian put it – and the attackers began digging trenches, parliamentarian counter-attacks were increasingly effective. On 1 October the demoralised royalists departed, a parliamentarian account claiming that many of them wept as they left. Several parliamentarians ascribed the victory to God and to the godly high morale of the defenders, claiming: 'our soldiers from first to last had prayers and singing of psalms daily at the street ends, most of our soldiers being religious honest men.' Bad weather and heavy rain had also hindered the royalist operation and aided the defenders by causing rivers to burst and low-lying ground around the town to flood.[45]

There was also further action in the South West, for the Marquess of Hertford and his royalist force at Sherborne began recruiting there, gathering men and supplies and rebuilding the army. To counter this, parliament dispatched troops from London under the Earl of Bedford and by the end of August he had around 7,000 men in Dorset. Bedford approached Sherborne on 2 September, camping on a hillside outside the town, while Hertford massed his men in and around the medieval castle and Hopton occupied the town itself. On 3 September the parliamentarians tried to bombard the castle, though their batteries were too distant and most of their shot fell short, while attempts to take the town were beaten off by Hopton, who had lined the hedges and 'the little gardens that flanked their ways' with musketeers, whose 'volley of shot […] sent many of them into the other world and caused diverse […] to enter into consideration of the calamities of war';[46] conversely, a parliamentarian account of the incident, while admitting that they failed to take the town, claimed that no one was killed on their side except 'one that was [accidentally] shot by his next fellow, who shot him

through the back'.[47] The inexperienced and unwary parliamentarians were also unnerved when Hopton attacked and beat in their camp guard that night. The following evening sowed further confusion amongst the parliamentarians, several hundred of them falling back in disorder when a new battery which they were trying to establish closer to the castle came under heavy and sustained royalist fire. Although massively outnumbered – Hertford had probably fewer than 1,500 men in total – he had outfaced and demoralised Bedford's parliamentarian army, which was rapidly shrinking, for many of the local men were deserting and going home.[48] As one report commented, the royalists were 'warm and their bellies full, lying in their beds, and they knew very well that our country fellows that were wont to have their bellies full of good beef and then to their beds would not long endure hunger and cold on a bleak hill.'[49] In his own account of 'this perplexed business […which] hath given me so much trouble', Bedford blamed his cowardly troops, saying of them: 'when they heard the bullets whistle about their ears […] we were forced to hazard ourselves very much to make them stand and all

18. *Sherborne Castle, really a fortified palace of a medieval bishop of Salisbury, was in reasonable repair at the time of the civil war and served as the base of the royalist Marquess of Hertford during the opening weeks of the conflict and as a royalist garrison from summer 1643 to summer 1645. Finally retaken by parliament in August 1645, most of the castle buildings, including the great tower (on the right), were wrecked and partly demolished later in 1645 to render them untenable.*

to little purpose; and when the cannon began to play on them, they ran as if the devil had been in them.'[50] On 6 September Bedford broke camp and began drawing off westwards, although on the following afternoon he had a minor success when part of his army approaching 'out of Yeovil by a secret way that they had made over the fields', surprised and routed a body of around 350 royalist horse and foot under Hopton on Babylon Hill, near Yeovil.[51]

Despite this, Hertford appeared to be in the ascendant, having seen off Bedford's army. However, the increasingly exposed position of royalists in central southern England as September progressed, underlined by news that Goring had surrendered Portsmouth and also that others had abandoned Oxford, caused Hertford to question the wisdom of remaining in the Sherborne area. In mid September he called 'his court of war together upon a very solemn and long debate', which concluded that they should evacuate the area on the 19th. Marching back through Somerset, they eventually decided to head for the coast at Minehead, shadowed at a safe distance by Bedford. There, on 22 September, Hertford and most of his infantry took boat and crossed the Severn to royalist South Wales, while Hopton led a body of horse and dragoons into Cornwall.[52]

Despite these northern and western confrontations, in the weeks after the king raised his standard most military developments and major actions were focused on the build-up and deployment of the two principal armies and upon their autumn campaign. The parliamentarian lord general, Essex, joined his army in and around Northampton on 10 September. He carried or soon after received several sets of instructions from parliament, which directed him

> to march with such forces as you think fit, towards the army raised in His Majesty's name against the parliament and kingdom […] to fight […] by battle or otherwise to rescue His Majesty's person and the person of the Prince [of Wales] and Duke of York out of the hands of those desperate persons who are now about them

and which also gave him powers to command, to supply and to control his forces, to apprehend leading 'traitors' and 'delinquents' as well as to accept submission from lesser enemies. However, Essex was also instructed to seek a peaceful solution by presenting to the king

a parliamentary petition which, even at this late stage, urged him to abandon the military option, to 'withdraw himself from the forces now about him' and to return to London and parliament.[53] Essex's apparent caution over the next fortnight or more may in part have sprung from the knowledge that further parliamentarian recruits were still to reach him and that it might be better to await their arrival – especially of more cavalry – before seeking battle, but also perhaps in part from a desire to let this second strand of his instructions play out and to give the king time to respond to parliament's eleventh-hour petition. Essex did lead his army out of Northampton on 13 September and seemingly advanced towards the king's base at Nottingham, but he soon halted and returned to Northampton on receiving news that the monarch, too, was on the move. As it turned out, battle was still over five weeks away.

At this stage the king was playing catch-up in raising military forces, the number of men and quantity of arms and supplies at his disposal gradually increasing during his time at Nottingham but lagging behind those of parliament. Some of his advisors reportedly feared that, had the parliamentarians been able to mount an attack at this stage, they would have been hard put to hold them off. In search of a stronger base and one more convenient for the recruits who were being raised in heartening numbers in Wales and parts of the Welsh Marches, on 13 September the king quit Nottingham and headed west, travelling via Stafford and entering Shropshire. En route, somewhere outside Wellington, on 19 September the king gave a rousing speech at the head of his army, announcing that 'the time cannot be long before we come to action', expressing his confidence in his troops' 'courage and resolution', reminding them to obey orders and to maintain discipline and assuring them that 'you shall meet with no enemies but traitors, most of them Brownists, anabaptists [both radical religious groups often viewed as heretics] and atheists, such who desire to destroy both church and state and who have already condemned you to ruin for being loyal to us'.[54] The following day he and his men arrived in Shrewsbury, which served as his military base and rendezvous point for the next three weeks.

Having waited in Northampton to see where the king was heading, on 19 September Essex led his army westwards, moving roughly parallel to the king's route rather than closing upon him. The parliamentarians

travelled via Coventry towards Worcester, a large town surrounded by rich agricultural land and so able to serve as a temporary base for the army. Like Shrewsbury, it lay on the Severn and should the king decide to move south along the Severn valley, a parliamentarian army based in and around Worcester would be ideally placed to block his route. While his main force was still en route to Worcester, Essex learned that a royalist detachment conveying and guarding a rich consignment of bullion and plate, donated to the king by the University of Oxford, had halted in Worcester and was persuaded by one of his colonels, John Brown, to sanction an advanced expedition by mounted troops, which might serve both to pin down the royalist treasure convoy and to prevent royalist reinforcements getting into Worcester. The resulting military action fought outside Worcester on 23 September was small, involving at most 1,000 mounted troops on each side, and of little significance to the main campaign. However, the action at Powick Bridge was the first armed clash between elements of the principal armies and so is usually accorded close attention.[55]

Surviving sources for events on 23 September are not plentiful and by far the most detailed contemporary account, published a few weeks later, is problematic, as it was written by or for one of the parliamentarian officers who fought there and is both critical of what happened and keen to throw the blame on one of the other senior officers, conveniently dead and unable to defend himself or to question this version by the time it appeared.[56] Written from a particular parliamentarian perspective, it colours the whole operation as amateurish and ill-conceived, though its principal story is consistent with briefer royalist reports. Approaching the Worcester area without incident late on 22 September, Brown conferred with other officers and decided that their best move was to secure the next bridge across the Severn south of the town. This was quickly achieved, but rather than halting there, the senior officer upon whom most blame was attached in the printed account, not Brown but his fellow colonel, Edwin Sandys, decided 'to march straight on to Worcester lest the troops there should make an escape before we came'; he also reportedly argued that they 'must make haste to seize upon a bridge called Powick bridge', which crossed the river Teme west of its confluence with the Severn and south of Worcester. On arrival at Powick, the troops spent the rest of the night and much of the following day on horseback, 'in a meadow behind

19. *The late-medieval bridge over the Teme at Powick, now bypassed by vehicular traffic and tranquil once more, played an important part in the first significant engagement of the civil war proper. The parliamentarians crossed the bridge to attack a body of Rupert's cavalry, but were mauled and fled back over the bridge and away south.*

the bridge', reportedly doing little. Around 4 p.m. Brown and Sandys decided to advance and Sandys hastily led the way, over the bridge, 'up a narrow lane and after crossed a little close and then […] to a gate through which we could not pass above three abreast'. A little beyond that they ran into a royalist cavalry unit led by Prince Rupert, which had been dispatched from Shropshire to protect the Oxford treasure and to reinforce its convoy. Although probably aware that an enemy force was in the area, which is why he had taken up position on the Worcester side of Powick, Rupert was nearly taken by surprise by the precipitate parliamentarian advance and had to respond quickly.

A confused engagement ensued, with the royalist cavalry and dragoons disrupting, halting and then throwing back the parliamentarian cavalry, which was emerging 'out of narrow lanes and passages', while the parliamentarian dragoons could not give support as they had been left behind through the eagerness of the cavalry to push forward. The parliamentarian assault also suffered because Sandys was seriously, and as it turned out mortally, wounded quite early in the encounter, causing

his own troop to fall back prematurely, and because their opponents had the advantage 'of the wind, which was a double advantage unto them, not only in respect of the smoke [from the firing of muskets] but also of the dust which was blown upon us in great quantity from the fallow lands where we fought'. Some parliamentarian dragoons succeeded in making a temporary stand on Powick Bridge, which allowed much of the cavalry to get away southwards, and in any case Rupert did not give chase beyond Powick [Plate 7]. The account written by or for the parliamentarian Nathaniel Fiennes claimed that both sides lost around 30 dead, though other reports put the number of parliamentarian losses a little higher, and several officers were captured. The parliamentarian pamphlet did not pull any punches in condemning the whole operation, claiming that 'it was out of rashness and presumption that the enemies' troops were flying from us' and that it was undertaken because 'some had also entertained a conceit that they might get some glory and profit to themselves by taking in of the town or cutting off those troops that were in it before my Lord General came'.[57]

Even in the short term, the engagement did not alter plans on either side. Aware that the main parliamentarian army was approaching, Rupert made no attempt to hold Worcester, and instead, having seen the treasure convoy safely away, he too made his way quickly back to Shropshire. Thus Essex and his army were able to roll into Worcester unopposed the following day and they made it their base for the next four weeks, gathering further recruits – unlike the king, who was initially short of infantry, Essex may still have been looking particularly to strengthen his cavalry and was awaiting the arrival of Bedford's mainly mounted force moving up from south-western England – and coordinating activity in the surrounding area. Essex sent out bodies of troops to hold or to reinforce Coventry, Banbury, Hereford and Kidderminster, a forward base to watch for signs of the royalist army moving south-south-eastwards along the Severn valley.

In fact, the king did move during the second week of October, but rather than proceeding down the Severn valley his army took a more easterly route, dividing into two around either side of strongly parliamentarian Birmingham and reuniting on 19 October on Meriden Heath, not far from Coventry. The king continued in a broadly London-ward direction, intending to travel via Banbury and Oxford and then down the

Thames valley. Probably anticipating a conflict around parliamentarian-held Banbury and leaving some men to hold Worcester, Essex marched eastwards to intercept the king. But he waited a curiously long time to move, for he did not quit Worcester until 19 October and so allowed the king's army to get to the south-east, that is to the London side, of him. Marching towards Banbury and expecting to encounter the king somewhere there, Essex's advance scouts and the rearguard of the king's army became aware of each other's presence during the evening of 22 October, around the village of Kineton on the Warwickshire plain, ten miles or so north-west of Banbury. Initially surprised that Essex's army was so close, the king issued orders during the evening and overnight for his army to halt, for advanced units which had gone ahead towards Banbury to return and for his army to rendezvous on the morrow and to prepare for battle at Edgehill.[58]

20. *The parliamentarian commander-in-chief, the Earl of Essex, was portrayed on horseback in several engravings of the war years. This example, from early in the war, is particularly interesting, as it also shows in the background part of his army deployed at Edgehill.*

The engagement, fought on 23 October, was one of a small number of set-piece battles during the war, in which the principal armies engaged each other having carefully deployed in two parallel and similarly organised lines. It took place quite late in the year, beyond what became the usual campaigning season for major armies, and it was also unusual in being fought on a Sunday. The battle occurred not on Edgehill itself, a steep-sided hill and prominent landmark in south Warwickshire, which served instead as the royalist rendezvous point before the battle and their refuge after it, even though in modern histories the engagement is invariably referred to as 'the battle of Edgehill'. Nor was it fought in and around the village of Kineton, closer to the position of the initial parliamentarian deployment, even though in contemporary accounts it was generally dubbed 'Kineton fight'. Instead it took place on a fairly flat and featureless expanse of open ground between the two, then as now sometimes referred to as (part of) the Vale of the Red Horse. There were some enclosures and rougher ground to the sides of the battlefield, but the fighting itself ranged over an area of meadow and arable, some of which had been given its autumn ploughing – there is passing reference in accounts to cannonballs falling short of their targets and instead falling into 'ploughed land'[59] – but which was largely devoid of features which might disrupt or shape the fighting, such as woods, ditches, hedges, walls, buildings or major watercourses.

Our knowledge of what occurred at Edgehill is good. Although, as usual for a civil-war battle, no reliable contemporary sketches, maps or plans of the initial deployment or the ensuing engagement survive,[60] 20 or more accounts of the battle are extant, written by participants or eyewitnesses or in some cases by others with access to those who had been there. Their value and probable reliability vary considerably. Some are found in broader biographies or semi-biographical accounts written well after the event by the participants themselves or by their secretaries, most of which subsequently found their way into print, though sometimes in edited, enhanced or repackaged formats.[61] Although they occasionally add colourful stories and personal vignettes, the difficulties with texts which were written much later, when hindsight, personal justification and hazy or false memories may have played a large part, as well as with those where later editing or rewriting preceded publication, are obvious. It may be safer to privilege accounts definitely written at the

time and therefore strictly contemporary with the event, quite a few of which appeared in print before the end of the year. They vary in tone and length, some being short and breathless letters apparently written overnight on 23–4 October, when it was far from clear whether battle would recommence on the morrow,[62] while others have a slightly more polished air and were evidently produced at least a day or two after the battle, including two pamphlets which gave what may be seen as the semi-official parliamentarian and royalist version of events.[63] They may contain elements of personal or political bias and there are undoubtedly places in which the parliamentarian or royalist outlooks of the known or anonymous authors become evident and their stories diverge. Both sides tended to emphasise and to detail phases of the battle in which they had success and to cover more briefly those aspects in which part of their army performed poorly. Both also stated or implied that they were gaining the upper hand at the end of the day and that, had nightfall not intervened, they would have secured clear victory; were keen to stress that they remained on the battlefield the following day and that it was their opponents who pulled away first; and suggested that they had lost far fewer dead and injured than their opponents, though few gave precise figures and most confessed that it was hard to quantify the dead and injured with certainty. In the main, however, these strictly contemporary and often printed accounts tell a reasonably consistent story of what unfolded on and below Edgehill on 23 October.

The royalist army rendezvoused on Edgehill during the morning and early afternoon, with infantry and cavalry units arriving at different times. With a good view of the parliamentarian army deploying on the plain below and wanting to give battle, the royalists descended the escarpment and also deployed on the flatter ground below it. Both sides were clearly seeking battle and gave each other time to deploy. Most historians suggest that the royalists deployed along a north-east to south-west alignment, parallel with Edgehill and perhaps half a mile or more in front of the foot of the escarpment. The village of Radway was therefore to their immediate rear. The royalist infantry occupied the centre of the line, arranged in a number of distinct blocks, though it is unclear whether there were five or nine of them; the principal commanders of the royalist infantry were Henry Wentworth, Richard Fielding, Charles Gerrard, Sir Nicholas Byron and John Belasyse. The majority

of the royalist cavalry were deployed on the right wing (at the north-east end of the line) in two blocks, a front line under Rupert and a smaller rear or reserve unit under Sir John Byron. A somewhat smaller body of royalist cavalry deployed on the left wing (at the south-west end of the line), again in a front and a rear block; Henry Wilmot commanded the front block and Lord Digby probably the rear. At the extreme ends of the royalist line were stationed bodies of dragoons. The length of the royalist line was probably up to two miles.

Most historians suggest that the parliamentarians, who had begun gathering from early morning, also deployed along a north-east to south-west alignment, parallel to the royalist line and around a mile from it, so that Kineton village was some way to the rear. Essex's troops deployed along a slight ridge which ran across the plain roughly midway between Edgehill and Kineton – several accounts refer to parts of the parliamentarian army taking up position on a small hill or rising ground and to the royalists having to attack up a slight incline as they closed on them. The infantry were in the centre, arranged into three large blocks or brigades, two at the front under Sir John Meldrum and Charles Essex and a third at the rear under Thomas Ballard, probably intended as a reserve. Partly reflecting but apparently going further than the uneven distribution of the royalist cavalry, most parliamentarian cavalry were stationed on the parliamentarian left (at the north-east end of their line) commanded by Sir James Ramsey, together with a mixed body



21. *Although it is clearly stylised and cannot be regarded as a completely accurate representation, this enlargement shows part of an army, presumably the parliamentarians, deployed before or during the battle of Edgehill. Two blocks of pikemen are clearly shown, apparently set amidst units of musketeers, while two units of horse are also depicted close by.*

of dragoons and musketeers who took up an advanced position, lining hedges and enclosures on and in front of the parliamentarian left flank. A much smaller body of cavalry under Lord Fielding, again with dragoons beyond, was stationed on the parliamentarian right (at the south-west end of their line). The entire length of the parliamentarian line was probably also approaching two miles.[64]

Contemporary accounts of the numbers of infantry regiments and cavalry troops which each side possessed and deployed at Edgehill vary and historians have drawn sometimes starkly different conclusions about overall numbers, but many suggest that the armies were fairly evenly matched, with around 14–15,000 men apiece, or that the parliamentarians had a slight numerical advantage.[65] This was almost all the troops which the king had available in the region. On the other hand, this certainly did not represent all of Essex's potential troops, as he had left garrisons in several towns in the region and other troops were guarding some of his heavy artillery, which had fallen well behind the main army as it moved from Worcester to Edgehill. Possibly up to eight infantry regiments and ten cavalry troops which were potentially available to Essex in the region were not present at the battle.

Several contemporary accounts suggest that the engagement started in the early afternoon, between 1 and 2 p.m., with an exchange of artillery fire, which did little damage. The main battle lasted around four hours, until darkness fell at around 6 p.m. It began with dragoons on the royalist right clearing parliamentarian dragoons and musketeers from their advanced position and from enclosures on the north-east side of the battlefield. This allowed Rupert to lead forward his front line of the right wing of the royalist cavalry unhindered, picking up momentum as they did so, charging at speed and crashing into Ramsey's cavalry on the parliamentarian left, who had held their position and were stationary to receive Rupert's charge. The parliamentarian cavalry crumpled, broke, turned and fled. On the royalist left, that is the parliamentarian right, much the same thing occurred at much the same time, albeit on a smaller scale, as fewer men were deployed on that wing in both armies. Royalist dragoons cleared some parliamentarian dragoons from advanced positions, the front line of the royalist cavalry charged forward under Wilmot and they broke and put to flight their mounted opponents on the parliamentarian right, though it is not entirely clear how many

parliamentarian cavalry were stationed on the right by this stage and it is possible that some had been moved elsewhere, so that the force that Wilmot swept away may have been mainly dragoons. On both the royalist left and right, the second or reserve lines of cavalry, under Digby and Byron respectively, charged forward to complete the rout and to join the victorious front lines in pursuing their fleeing opposite numbers, 'contrary to order, thinking the day was won', as the official royalist account put it.[66] Within the first half-hour of the battle, therefore, the royalist cavalry attacks had succeeded in breaking both wings of the parliamentarian line, in putting much of parliament's cavalry to flight and in the process disrupting the parliamentarian infantry. Although some infantry units were swept away by Wilmot and Digby on the parliamentarian right, most stood firm; instead the real damage to the parliamentarian foot occurred at the other end of the line, as the more north-easterly of the two large infantry blocks which had been deployed in the front line, under Charles Essex, collapsed, broke and fled at around the same time as the parliamentarian left wing of cavalry did likewise. With both wings of his army, most of his cavalry and one of his three infantry brigades broken, collapsed and fleeing, the Earl of Essex appeared to be facing defeat.

But in the centre, the parliamentarians had the better of an infantry engagement which unfolded when the royalist foot moved forward and took up an advanced position within musket range of the parliamentarian line. The parliamentarians were able to bring their rear or reserve infantry brigade under Ballard into the front line, to replace Charles Essex's brigade. After the musketeers on both sides poured fire into their opponents, the two lines closed and close-quarter combat began. But the royalist infantry had little or no cavalry support, the victorious front lines and reserves of their cavalry on both wings having galloped off the battlefield in pursuit of the fleeing parliamentarian cavalry and also to pillage the parliamentarian baggage train and supplies, left near Kineton, in the process killing men, women and boys as young as 12, the parliamentarians alleged.[67] Conversely, the surviving parliamentarian cavalry, including Essex's own mounted lifeguard and a very dynamic body comprising five troops of horse led by Sir William Balfour, now gave strong and decisive support to their infantry, tearing into the front and flank of several royalist infantry units, as well as at one stage getting behind the royalist line, overrunning the royalist artillery and killing the

gunners, though they lacked equipment to disable the guns permanently or resources to carry them off. As the afternoon wore on, part of the royalist infantry was badly mauled, crumpled or broke, particularly in the centre and left of the royalist line, while those towards the royalist right probably suffered more lightly and fell back in good order, closer to the foot of Edgehill and regaining control of the royalist artillery position. In late afternoon, as light began to fade, some royalist cavalry returned to the battlefield and helped to shore up and to stabilise the royalist position; several royalist officers who had been captured earlier in the battle were rescued and the king's royal standard, which had also temporarily fallen into parliamentarian hands, was recovered. As darkness fell, 'the armies were both in a confusion', as one contemporary put it,[68] and a mixture of exhaustion, lack of ammunition and the inability to identify enemy forces and to continue fighting in darkness compelled both sides to disengage, many of the king's forces drawing back to the foot or slopes of Edgehill.

Although some on both sides quickly claimed victory, most historians see Edgehill as a drawn battle. Contemporaries were cautious or imprecise in estimating the death toll, but it was probably fairly equal, with each losing a few hundred men. There was no strategic value to the battlefield itself, so after an unseasonably cold night – 'we were almost starved with cold on that bitter night,' as the official parliamentarian account put it[69] – the surviving forces glared at each other but, despite some calls on both sides to attack, battle was not renewed. Even though some fresh troops joined Essex on the 24th, he probably lacked the will to

22. *This stylised contemporary image of part of the battle of Edgehill shows a close-quarter pike engagement – the so-called 'push of pike' – in the foreground, with other units of pikemen waiting to give support, and beyond and less distinct two bodies of horse engaged, with their unit flags or ensigns particularly prominent.*

resume and he could not have contemplated an attack upon the royalists while they occupied the slopes of Edgehill. Accordingly, without further fighting, both sides began moving away in different directions that night and on the 25th, the king's men southwards towards Banbury, the Earl of Essex's men northwards towards Warwick.

Overall, the battle had revealed good and bad on both sides. The comment in the official parliamentarian account, that 'some on both sides did extremely well and others did as ill and deserve to be hanged for deserting and betraying as much as lay in them their party',[70] seems fair. The parliamentarian cavalry and part of the infantry had performed poorly, but then much of the infantry and some cavalry units and commanders had saved the day; at least part of the credit must go to Essex, who averted what in the early stages appeared to be a looming defeat, though his decision before the battle to leave significant bodies of troops elsewhere as guards and garrisons rather than concentrating all his forces in pursuit of a decisive victory can be criticised. Indeed, in a sometimes defensive speech at the Guildhall just four days after the battle, Lord Wharton – who had been present and whose troops had run away – laboured to explain 'why so many of the [parliament's] forces were not then upon the place', emphasising the importance of holding Hereford, Worcester and Coventry.[71] On the royalist side, the cavalry were both saints and sinners, supreme against their mounted opponents on the wings, but then both the front line and, worse, the second or reserve line left the main battlefield, thus squandering a good chance of complete and decisive victory and leaving their infantry, whose performance was mixed, exposed. Some historians also suggest that the overall direction of battle was rather slack on the royalist side and that either the king or a lord general acting under him should have provided stronger control and coordination of cavalry and infantry.

The king soon reverted to his pre-Edgehill plan. On 27 October his army appeared before Banbury, whose parliamentarian garrison, numbering between 600 and 1,000 men, surrendered pusillanimously. As one parliamentarian bitterly commented, 'the captains did run away and the soldiers did deliver the town up without discharging one musket'.[72] Two days later the king's army rolled into Oxford unopposed. Moving slowly down the Thames valley, plundering properties of parliamentarians en route, the army entered Reading on 4 November; advanced units were

in the Windsor area by the 7th and by the 11th the king and most of his army were in Colnbrook, 20 miles west of London. At some point during this royal advance, probably around the time the army entered Oxford, Rupert had suggested a more vigorous approach and proposed dispatching a mounted force of cavalry and dragoons to raid London; the king rejected the plan. Although criticised for sticking to his slower and more cautious approach by some historians, who suggest that a lightning attack on London was the king's best chance of winning the war and that his rejection of it squandered that golden opportunity, other historians have been less convinced and have pointed to major disadvantages. Even had royalists been able to launch perhaps 3,000 mounted troops against London at the beginning of November, they would almost certainly have been repulsed or defeated by the forces parliament could muster in the capital – perhaps 8,000 men of the London militia – and in any case, lacking artillery, they would have found it hard to breach the capital's formidable physical defences. Moreover, dividing his main army in this way, with the royalist infantry left sitting in or moving slowly along the Thames valley with greatly reduced cavalry cover, would have been a huge risk considering that parliament's principal army was in the field.[73]

Historians also question Essex's actions and movements in the aftermath of Edgehill. Several parliamentarian accounts of late October stressed the exhaustion in the parliamentarian army in the immediate wake of battle and references to the need to spend 'a day or two […] refreshing our army hereabouts' and 'of pure necessity [to] refresh our men for 3 or 4 days' crop up repeatedly.[74] But even allowing for this, it is noticeable that Essex neither shadowed the king nor contemplated intercepting his forces and offering battle as his army moved along the Thames valley. Perhaps shortage of provisions in that area, as the royalists both scooped up supplies and broke down bridges as they proceeded, deterred him. Instead, Essex decided to pull his army ten miles back to Warwick, in the opposite direction from his opponents, thus positioning himself significantly further from London than the king, puzzling some historians; it has even been suggested that Essex may have temporarily lost his nerve.[75] By late October he and his army had moved to the Northampton area, from where they turned southwards and, travelling via St Albans, reached London by 8 November, ahead of the king.

In order to counter the king's approach, Essex massed his enhanced army in the Hammersmith area, west of London, his forces comprising not only his Edgehill army – swollen by troops which had joined him in the fortnight since battle as he moved through the Midlands – but also fresh London reinforcements. He anticipated that the king would approach London directly from the west, keeping north of the Thames, but took care to guard key bridges, such as that at Kingston upon Thames, to ensure that royalist forces could not easily cross the river and approach the capital from the south. To slow and to hinder the royalist advance and to keep them out of Brentford, Essex stationed two regiments a little to the west of the small town, guarding a bridge where the main road crossed the river Brent. This proved woefully inadequate when a large royalist infantry force under Rupert smashed its way into Brentford on the misty morning of 12 November, first taking the bridge and then sweeping through the town, driving on with 'push of pikes and the butt-end of muskets', as one royalist officer recalled.[76] The parliamentarian infantry were driven back and many drowned when they were forced into the Thames or sought to escape by swimming. Even a royalist eyewitness felt that 'it was a heartbreaking object to hear and see the miserable deaths of so many goodly men […] But what was most pitiful was to see how many poor men ended and lost their lives striving to save them, for they ran into the Thames.'[77] A parliamentarian account alleged that many of their soldiers were bound and deliberately drowned by the king's men, forced into deep water by royalists who taunted them by 'saying to them (in a jeering manner) swim for your lives, when it was past all possibility to escape', while others were used as human shields, 'pinioned in front of their men to be as a breastwork to receive the bullets that came from [remaining parliamentarian defenders]'. The same account also claimed that the royalists plundered the town bare, taking everything they could find of value or use, 'leaving scarce one piece of bread or meat in all the town', and deliberately destroying other items, such as 'nurseries of fruit trees', which were no use to them. They harassed the inhabitants, threatening 'to cut off their noses and pull out their eyes, calling them parliament dogs, round-headed rogues, beating and wounding some of them (one of them being a lame cripple)' and carrying off many townsmen as prisoners.[78] The people of Brentford later petitioned

parliament, seeking compensation for their material losses, which they reckoned totalled £4,000.[79]

The storming of Brentford did not alter the main course of the anticipated confrontation west of London, which occurred the following day, 13 November. Essex deployed his army of 24,000 men on heathland around Turnham Green, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on both wings, but also possibly with forward units ahead of the main line, including musketeers, designed to prevent a rerun of the devastating royalist cavalry charge at Edgehill; Essex also had strong artillery support. The king's troops drew up and faced their opponents for several hours but, unwilling to risk a frontal assault on a numerically superior army – probably outnumbering the king's forces by roughly two to one – deployed in such a commanding way and in the knowledge that his own troops were tired, the king pulled his army back westwards shortly before dusk. Turnham Green was a stand-off, not a battle. For his part, Essex made no effort to pursue, still less to attack, the departing royalists, either immediately through the fading light or over the following days. The royalists pulled back unhindered, first to Hounslow Heath and then, in quite a leisurely fashion, along the Thames valley, passing through and occupying Reading, though the king and his main army returned to Oxford.

Neither principal army undertook active campaigning for the remainder of the year. Instead, both went into winter quarters, the king's troops in and around Oxford – but holding a circuit of outer strongholds, defending the approaches to what became the king's wartime capital – parliament's in and around London but occupying a circuit of outer strongholds defending the western and north-western approaches to the capital. Essex was in cautious mood during the late autumn, ordering the evacuation of isolated garrisons at Hereford and Worcester, abandoning them to the royalists and pulling his troops back into Gloucester and Bristol. When royalist units began harassing parliamentarian-held Marlborough, in Wiltshire, nearly 40 miles south-west of Oxford, Essex dispatched a couple of specialists in defensive works to help the townspeople and the small garrison to throw up defensive earthworks, but he was tardy in sending reinforcements. According to a parliamentarian account, royalist forces approached the town several times in late November and early December, though they fell back in the face of withering musket

fire, 'so that we could see many of their men topple down like trees new cut off'. However, a combined force of up to 7,000 royalist infantry and cavalry eventually overwhelmed the defenders and took the town on 5 December, reportedly 'cutting and slashing' all they encountered as they entered, 'whether soldiers or not', and then unleashing an orgy of violence, plunder and destruction, mistreating the townspeople as well as the 140-strong parliamentarian garrison, taunting them as 'round-head rogues and round-head whores, you take up arms against your king, you fight against the king, you rogues, you deserve to be hanged every man and to be killed, both man, woman and child, and your town to be burnt to ashes'. This highly emotive account, which explicitly likened the behaviour of the royalists who took Marlborough to that of the Irish Catholic rebels, claimed that over £50,000 in cash, goods and wares was taken by the king's men.[80]

Although Essex did too little too late to save Marlborough, during the closing weeks of 1642 he did dispatch Sir William Waller – the conqueror of Portsmouth – to bolster parliament's position to the south-west of London. In late November Waller stormed and retook Farnham Castle, in west Surrey, which had been seized by a group of local royalists earlier in the autumn. During the second week of December he brushed aside a royalist unit near Andover, in north Hampshire, and then assaulted Winchester, weakly held by the king's men; his troops first forced back royalists who came out to defend the town and then quickly carried the partly ruinous town walls, before surrounding and accepting the surrender of enemy forces who had withdrawn into the castle but who lacked artillery to defend it. Waller then turned south-east into western Sussex, blowing in the gate of Arundel Castle and capturing the fortress with remarkable ease. From 21 December, he besieged royalist-held Chichester, bombarding the walled town for several days and opening breaches in the walls and gates which the defenders attempted to close with earthen banks, before accepting its surrender on the 27th just as his men were preparing to storm it.[81]

During late autumn there was also jockeying for position in Cornwall and along the western fringes of Devon, and in Yorkshire, but those developments are better viewed as the opening phases of much longer campaigns by which the royalists took control of those areas during the opening months of the following year and as part of the unfolding

1643 campaign (explored in Chapter 4). Other regions saw small-scale military actions, particularly areas which were divided or where civil-war allegiances remained unclear. For example, in Lancashire the royalists under Derby were dominant in much of the northern and western parts of the county, fortifying bases in and around Warrington, Wigan, Ormskirk and Preston, while parliamentarians controlled the Manchester area and had pockets of support in the east of the county. There were minor skirmishes during October and November, mainly squabbles for control of arms, and sparring, raiding and counter-raiding between Wigan royalists and Mancunian parliamentarians, but this was generally small-scale: it has been suggested that during the closing months of 1642 the royalists only had between 1,000 and 1,400 troops in total within the county.[82] However, the first phase of the war effectively came to a close shortly after Turnham Green and thus several weeks before the end of the year, as campaigning by the main royalist and parliamentarian armies paused late in 1642 and did not resume until spring 1643.

CONCLUSIONS

Although a semblance of peacetime conditions persisted in some areas, by the end of 1642 England and Wales had become semi-militarised, placed on a war footing and already suffering the miseries of war. Political and religious divisions had given way to raising troops, to organising field armies and garrisons and to the battles, skirmishes, raids and sieges which were to become the civil-war norm. Probably somewhere around 30,000 troops had confronted each other at Edgehill, and during the autumn both sides raised more men and had significant numbers of troops in the field and in garrison forces over and above those present at that first major battle. Leaving aside the casual killing of civilians caught up in the fighting and focusing instead upon troops killed in direct military action, by the end of the year there must have been at least 2,500 lives lost and, given the incomplete nature of surviving records, probably rather more.[83] For a time it had looked as though the war might be concluded quickly, over by Christmas in the all-too-familiar and usually over-optimistic outlook, with two principal field armies being raised and an expectation that they would clash in a single huge and decisive battle, determining the outcome of the conflict in a single cataclysmic event.

Given the significant numbers of parliamentarian cavalry and infantry not present at Edgehill and the potential for an additional force, several thousand strong, provided by the London militia, that may never have been realistic, for even a clear royalist victory may not have ended the war straight away in the king's favour; a decisive parliamentarian victory, however, especially if it destroyed most of the king's forces and involved the capture of the king himself, just might have ended the war. But none of this came about, for Edgehill was indecisive, its immediate aftermath did nothing to resolve matters, both sides survived largely intact and pulled back to focus upon recruitment, and it soon became clear that, rather than end in 1642, the civil war would drag on into and perhaps through the next year and also expand in scale and reach. In reality, it continued for a further three and a half years. Knyvett's prayers of summer 1642 that all might be resolved with just a shower of blood were not answered; instead, his fears that only a deluge of blood would serve proved much closer to the mark.

3

'A time […] when brothers killed brothers, cousins cousins and friends their friends': The Nature of the English Civil War

> Thou wouldest think it strange if I should tell thee there was a time in England when brothers killed brothers, cousins cousins and friends their friends. Nay, when they conceived it was no offence to commit murder. To murder a man held less offence than to kill a dog, and they would glory in their actions as if they had done a pious deed. When thou wentest to bed at night, thou knewest not whether thou shouldest be murdered afore day.

In his commonplace book, Sir John Oglander roundly deplored both the civil war in general and the wartime parliamentarian dominance of his native Isle of Wight in particular. His account abounds with descriptions of the disruptive and destructive nature of the war, which he portrayed as a period not only of casual, unpredictable, unnatural and interfamilial violence and murder but also of theft, sacrilege and social overturning, leading to the widespread fall of hundreds of landed gentlemen.[1] In fact, from his royalist perspective, Oglander was almost certainly exaggerating the effects of the civil war, both nationally and perhaps especially on the Isle of Wight, in reality a rather quiet backwater, cushioned from most of the fighting. The war was not a period of anarchy, militarily or in other respects, and instead, amidst undeniable violence and bloodshed, several wartime patterns, methods and types of organisation can be discerned – in the nature, location, focus and timing of the fighting and in the raising, training, deployment and employment of troops.

As a preliminary to examining in the next three chapters the course of the main civil war from winter 1642–3 through to its conclusion in summer 1646, this chapter explores the nature of the conflict and the 'nuts and bolts' of the fighting. Once it became clear that the war would not be decided in a matter of weeks in a single battle, as some expected – the parliamentarian minister Richard Baxter later reflected on his and his friends' naivety in autumn 1642, for 'so wise in matters of war was I, and all the country besides, that we commonly supposed that a very few days or weeks by one other battle would end the wars'[2] – and would continue during 1643 and almost certainly intensify, the overall nature and shape of the conflict became clearer. Some traits apparent during the Edgehill campaign became stronger thereafter, while others emerged as both sides geared up for a longer and wider conflict. Key themes and facets explored in this chapter can best be introduced as a series of wide-ranging questions, to be addressed in turn. What sort of war did England and Wales experience? Where was the fighting? When was the fighting? What types of fighting took place? Who did the fighting, how were they raised, armed, equipped and organised and what did they do on the battlefield and in other operations? The chapter concludes by examining the territorial position reached by spring 1643, when most of England and Wales had been secured for king or parliament and major campaigning was about to resume, and by assessing the division of the country at that point.

TERRITORY AND GARRISON WARFARE

The war quickly developed into a territorial conflict, in which the two sides vied to control, to hold down and to draw resources from the towns and countryside of England and Wales. During winter and spring 1642–3 both sides began preparing for a lengthy war and war effort, calling for substantial and sustained supplies of men and horses, arms and ammunition, food and drink, other military supplies and cash. Securing and controlling territory would enable one side steadily and repeatedly to draw off those resources, while denying them to the enemy. Control of key transport and communication hubs and highways, on land and on water, would also make it easier for that side to move resources around the country and to focus them on areas of fighting and military need, while again denying them to the enemy.[3] Accordingly, as 1643 progressed

the two sides took militarised control of most of England and Wales. In some areas, such as Lancashire, Somerset, Staffordshire and Yorkshire in England and Pembrokeshire in Wales, both sides had interests in, and reasonable hopes of securing, the same county, together with the ability to put troops into the field there during the first half of 1643, and this process generated some of the earliest fighting. In other areas, such as most of northern and south-eastern England, East Anglia and Wales, one side was clearly dominant and, even though there were pockets of support for the other side in those places, the process was achieved quickly and without much armed resistance. Some counties or wider regions fell quite neatly and wholly under the control of one side, though others – including Buckinghamshire, Cheshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Yorkshire in England and Pembrokeshire in Wales – were at this stage divided and had a new frontier running through them, along and across which armed forces might clash.

Garrisons were the chief means by which territory was secured and controlled. These were bodies of troops stationed in strongpoints from which they could control wider hinterlands. The area which a garrison could reasonably oversee and from which it could collect resources varied, depending upon the size of the garrison, the size and density of the surrounding population, the local topography and transport network and the presence of hostile forces nearby, but a key limiting factor was the distance which garrison troops could cover from and back to their base in a day. A large, active and well-manned garrison could control a hinterland extending up to ten miles in each direction, an area of well over 100 square miles and encompassing dozens of villages and townships. The number of garrisons in an area also varied. If a county was firmly held and not disputed or threatened, just a handful of strongpoints acting as military and administrative bases might suffice. Conversely, if a county was divided and actively contested, each side would generally maintain a much larger number. For example, in a county like Shropshire or Staffordshire, divided and contested for most of the war, there could be over 30 garrisoned strongholds.

If the garrison was urban-based, there would generally be an attempt to fortify the town. Any surviving Roman or medieval stone walls and gates would be repaired, strengthened and possibly extended, perhaps with additional earthworks to protect vulnerable stretches of wall and

gateways or extramural suburbs. For example, the royalist garrison at Chester was protected by a surviving circuit of stone walls, repaired and revamped and with the main gates strengthened by recutting ditches and restoring drawbridges; by newly built lengths of earthwork banks and ditches snaking around the eastern and northern suburbs which lay outside the stone walls, complete with arrowhead-shaped projections or bastions for mounting artillery; and by newly constructed, detached earthwork artillery forts defending vulnerable spots and approaches. If there were no masonry defences, earthwork banks – often referred to by contemporaries as 'mud walls' – and ditches might be dug, either encircling the town or at least defending approaches and vulnerable points. Several garrisoned towns which played an active role in the conflict were defended in this way, including Newport Pagnell in Buckinghamshire, Nantwich in Cheshire, Lyme Regis, Tewkesbury, Gainsborough in Lincolnshire, Taunton in Somerset, Evesham in Worcestershire and Tadcaster in



23. *The existing defences around London were greatly enhanced during the opening months of the war, so that by spring 1643 the capital, including the City, Westminster and Southwark south of the Thames, was encircled by a line of bank and ditch, strengthened by over twenty earthwork artillery forts either within or just in front of the line. Although it was not drawn and published until the mid eighteenth century and some points of detail are unclear or disputed, this plan of London's civil-war defences is generally accepted as fairly accurate.*



24. *This contemporary engraving shows one of the earthwork artillery forts in London's civil-war defences, Mount Mill, which lay along the northern line, somewhere in the area of modern Finsbury. It was mainly an earthwork and timber construction, the bank protected by a row of horizontal wooden spikes projecting outwards to deter scaling and surmounted by artillery pieces.*

Yorkshire. Additionally, or as a minimum source of protection, chains, moveable barricades or turnpikes could be placed in readiness to be run across the main streets, particularly at the entrances to towns, to hinder enemy cavalry and to serve as defensive lines. Some towns, such as Bristol, Chester, Gloucester and Oxford, were also defended by natural or partly artificial waterways. In some garrisoned towns, the strongpoint was a particular building within them, generally the castle, or a particular area. Garrisons based at Sherborne, Clitheroe in Lancashire, Farnham, Arundel and Warwick, as well as Pontefract, Scarborough and Skipton in Yorkshire, made medieval castles in or adjoining the urban centre their strongpoint, while the cathedral close – the walled and gated area around the cathedral – at Lichfield in Staffordshire and the high ground around the church and churchyard at Alton in Hampshire served as strongpoints for garrisons there.

Key locations and territory could not be controlled by urban-based garrisons alone. Generally smaller and sometimes shorter-lived garrisons

were scattered in villages and the countryside, many of them in scores of medieval stone castles, hastily repaired, usually by reinstating roofs, floors and gates and sometimes by throwing up earthworks around them, providing extra protection and defending approaches and vulnerable points. A few sites still show evidence of such earthworks, especially the circuit around Donnington Castle outside Newbury in Berkshire and more fragmentary remains around castles at Pendennis in Cornwall, Carew in Pembrokeshire and Cambridge. In the absence of a suitable castle, a stone manor house, again often strengthened by surrounding earthworks, might be garrisoned. The best known, though atypical, are the strong royalist garrisons which held out until late in the war at Lathom House in Lancashire and Basing House in Hampshire; perhaps more typical is the Tudor mansion adjoining the ruins of a medieval castle at Moreton Corbet, Shropshire [Plate 8]. Occasionally, churches might be garrisoned or used to support the main stronghold, such as those adjoining Hillesden House in Buckinghamshire, the Abbey House at Abbotsbury in Dorset and Stokesay and Tong castles in Shropshire. Far from evidence of irreligion or deliberate sacrilege, in some places the church stood so close to a garrisoned castle or house that of necessity it became caught up in the military action, while in others, especially small villages without a manor house, the church was the only substantial stone-built structure with defensive capacity; that it generally possessed a tower, thick doors and small or high windows and was surrounded by a stone-walled churchyard added to its military potential. A large or important urban garrison would usually acquire and operate in conjunction with a clutch of smaller, generally more rural outer garrisons, guarding approaches and screening it from attack. For example, the main royalist bases and garrisons at York, Newark on the Nottinghamshire–Lincolnshire border and Oxford were each protected by a ring of outer garrisons, as for a time were important or threatened parliamentarian garrisons such as Gloucester, Lyme Regis and Pembroke.

CONTESTED TERRITORY AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS

Once it became apparent that it would be a lengthy conflict, tapping and drawing off resources useful to the war effort became a priority. Both sides looked to control centres of population, marketing and manufacture,



25. *Although drawn and published long after the civil war, in the late eighteenth century, in this case the accuracy of the image of civil-war earthworks can be confirmed by surviving evidence on the ground. It shows the line of earthwork bank and ditch thrown up around Donnington Castle by its royalist governor and garrison in 1643, in the shape of a star formed by a number of projecting bastions, mainly arrowhead in design, in which defensive artillery pieces would have been mounted.*

26. *The late-thirteenth-century castle at Stokesay, perhaps better seen as a fortified manor house, was garrisoned for the king for much of the civil war and eventually fell to parliament in 1645. Although it survived the conflict in reasonably good order, the adjoining church, just out of the picture to the left, sustained significant artillery damage and was repaired after the war.*

including areas making cloth, clothes and boots, and arms and armour, all of which made towns particularly valuable; they also needed agriculturally rich areas to supply food and drink, horses and fodder; and they wanted areas which might provide more specialised material, including iron and gunpowder. Another priority was controlling transport and communication highways and centres, including main roads, crossroads, bridges, navigable rivers, river valleys and ports. All this made some areas far more valuable and important than others and is one reason that during the war fighting was far more intense in some areas than in others. Thinly populated backwaters, on a road to nowhere, with no towns, a rural sector based on rough grazing and with mountain sheep far outnumbering people, were not particularly valuable or sought after. Thus although modern maps of the changing territorial possessions of king and parliament invariably show all of England and Wales carved up between the two, in reality much of the high moors of the South West, the Pennine spine, the dales and moors of Yorkshire and County Durham, the Lake District and the Cheviots of Northumberland were of little value and not really contested.

This becomes clear if we focus on Wales and on a map depicting main rivers and valleys and land over 200 metres (around 650 feet) and then plot onto it urban and rural garrisons, together with the handful of field engagements which occurred there [Map 1]. It is immediately apparent that those garrisons and engagements were concentrated in the lowland zone, especially along the northern and southern coastal strips; in Monmouthshire, with its towns, valleys and better agricultural land; in southern Pembrokeshire, the most hotly contested part of Wales and also the principality's most urbanised region at this time and its largest non-mountainous and productive agricultural zone; and to the west of the Dee and Dee estuary and along the Clwyd valley. Although Anglesey and the Lleyn peninsular in the far north-west also possessed low-lying land, they were not so contested, perhaps because they were so remote and thinly populated. So in Wales, as in England, areas which were agriculturally productive, quite urbanised and populous or easily accessible and possessing decent roads and navigable waterways were valuable in war, tended to be garrisoned and were worth fighting for. Conversely, most of the Welsh interior, an upland zone of lofty hills and mountains, agriculturally difficult and poor land of rough

grazing, few towns and crossed or penetrated by drovers' routes but by few significant roads, while notionally royalist for most of the war and then notionally falling to parliament in 1645–6, in reality possessed neither the human, animal, material and monetary resources nor the transport and communication facilities to make it attractive to the warring parties. Like most of the higher uplands of England, it was largely ignored or bypassed.

However, other factors shaped and determined different levels and intensities of fighting seen on the ground. By spring 1643, sometimes quite peacefully and with little violence, as in much of East Anglia and the South East, sometimes in the wake of armed jockeying for position and significant fighting, as in parts of Lancashire and Cheshire, parliament secured a swathe of territory in England, which it then retained for the remainder of the war [Map 2]. It comprised most of the South East, London, the London area and much of the Home Counties, East Anglia and a band of territory running across the Midlands and ending in large parts of Cheshire and Lancashire. There were royalist civilians and troublemakers aplenty within these areas and they were occasionally attacked around the landward edges. But while they saw some fighting around the peripheries, were certainly put on a war footing, were garrisoned and suffered burdens and impositions to support the parliamentarian war effort, there was very little fighting there and direct military action generally remained at arm's length. Equally, the far South West of England, principally Cornwall, and almost the whole of Wales except Pembrokeshire, came out for the king without a fight during the opening months of the war, while by spring 1643 the central Marches had been secured by the royalists after some military action. Thereafter, those areas remained under royalist control, with little more than minor parliamentarian incursions around the landward edges, until quite late in the war, when they fell quickly and in the main bloodlessly and with little opposition in the field. Again, most people living in Cornwall and in most of Wales and the central Marches would have seen little fighting from spring 1643 onwards; indeed, much of the population of Wales would have lived through the entire period 1642–6 without coming near any fighting. As in securely parliamentarian areas, people there were neither ignorant of the war nor immune to its demands and depredations, but they may well not have seen or heard a shot fired in anger.

Conversely, some counties and areas saw major, lengthy or repeated fighting and their inhabitants endured direct and intense experience of war. Yorkshire was divided and hotly contested during the opening two years of the war, until secured by parliament in the latter half of 1644, after its great victory at Marston Moor. Most of western and central southern England changed hands twice, secured by parliament at the outset, but captured by the king during summer 1643; during 1645–6 the position was reversed, as the parliamentarians swept across the area and recaptured it. Much of the Midlands was divided and contested, with particularly intense contests in Lincolnshire, until parliament gained the upper hand in 1644; in Gloucestershire, as the royalists isolated and squeezed the county town in 1643 and as the Gloucester parliamentarians fought back and began regaining the county thereafter; in and around Oxfordshire, as parliamentarians sought to isolate the king's capital and to drive in or to capture the garrisons screening it; around Newark, as parliamentarians sought to isolate and to pressurise that major royalist

27. *Like many of the castles, towns and other strongholds in the southern half of Pembrokeshire, the medieval castle at Carew – this photograph shows the southern face of the broadly quadrangular fortress – which had been remodelled in the sixteenth century and was in fairly good order at the outbreak of the civil war, changed hands repeatedly during the ensuing conflict, as royalists and parliamentarians vied to control the county and as the balance of power in the area repeatedly changed.*

garrison; and in counties such as Staffordshire and Shropshire, which were divided for most of the war and which endured very active and lengthy contests between local royalists and parliamentarians, before the latter gained the upper hand. Major towns were so valuable that they often acted as foci for military action and, in addition to the contests for and around Gloucester, Newark and Oxford, the areas around Bristol, Kingston upon Hull, Lichfield, Lyme Regis, Plymouth, Reading, Winchester, York and other towns suffered when they were besieged, attacked or stormed. Although Wales, secure for the king until the closing stages of the war, largely escaped this level and intensity of fighting, the southern half of Pembrokeshire was an exception, enduring a long and wildly fluctuating local contest, such that many towns, castles and other strongholds changed hands four, five or even six times.

In some areas, the war was in part shaped by transport and communication factors. Ports had great potential value and Bristol, Chester, Gloucester, King's Lynn, Kingston upon Hull, Liverpool, Lyme Regis, Newcastle upon Tyne, the Pembroke and Milford Haven area, Plymouth and Weymouth were hotly contested. The king was particularly keen to retain one or more west-facing ports such as Bristol and Chester as potential landing places for reinforcements from Ireland, while parliament was keen to regain Newcastle upon Tyne, for London relied heavily upon coal from the productive Tyne-side collieries shipped out of Newcastle by coastal vessels. It may be that the king's desire to capture Gloucester in 1643 sprang in part from his wish to clear this last remaining parliamentarian blocking point from the lower Severn valley and thus to open up the whole of the navigable stretch of the Severn, Severn valley and its estuary to royalist ships and to trade and commerce, so rivalling parliament's firm possession of the lower Thames valley, the Thames estuary and the port of London. Some key bridges were repeatedly contested, such as that at Holt–Farndon across the Dee south of royalist Chester and those at Upton and Tewkesbury spanning the Severn between royalist Worcester and parliamentarian Gloucester. Very occasionally, a key transport hub was so valuable that it was worth defending, even if there was no existing building there and the nearest town or village was too far distant. In those cases, a new, isolated and stand-alone fortification might be erected, usually an earthwork artillery fort, such as those overlooking rivers and bridges in Cambridgeshire, near but outside the settlements

of Earith [Plate 9] and March and at Horsey Hill between Peterborough and Whittlesey. A handful of towns around the Cotswolds and the north Wiltshire downs, including Cirencester, Devizes, Evesham, Marlborough and Stow, witnessed frequent fighting, largely because they lay on key roads westwards to the South West or South Wales and both the king in Oxford and parliament in London were keen to control these lines of communication and to deny them to their opponents.

THE TIMING OF FIGHTING AND CAMPAIGNING

Although neither side observed a campaigning season for all forces, because of the climate and the state of the roads major campaigning generally took place between spring and early autumn. The king's main Oxford army and the army of the parliamentarian lord general usually did not take to the field until late April or early May and retired to winter quarters in October, so they were actively campaigning for less than half the year. Exceptionally, the main parliamentarian army did not go into winter quarters in 1645–6 and continued to campaign, though it was at that point engaging a much-weakened enemy in the far South West, climatically the most benign region of England; in practice, even in that region the winter of 1645–6 proved very harsh and the New Model Army's operations were disrupted by bad weather. In contrast, smaller and regional armies generally remained quite active during the winter, unless a heavy fall of snow, such as that which landed across much of southern England during the third week of January 1644 and stayed for several weeks, or a prolonged period of very severe cold, effectively brought proceedings to a halt. Campaigns of the late autumn and winter were often shaped by the changing weather. Unseasonably good weather in January 1643 enabled the Yorkshire parliamentarians to launch a surprise and very successful attack on a royalist garrison in Leeds, while in November 1643 the Cheshire parliamentarians undertook an invasion of north-east Wales, initially very successfully, and while it then stalled and failed that was not due to deteriorating weather. Waller was chancing his arm in beginning a siege in the open against the mighty stronghold of Basing House in November 1643 and the gamble did not pay off, as one 'evening about three of the clock the winds began to rise and it rained so that it did much hinder the army, which rain increased

so much that the army sounded a retreat […] the rain fell and the cold winds blew […and eventually], seeing the weather cross', even Waller had to accept defeat.[4]

While in many ways a deterrent to military activity, a prolonged spell of cold winter weather could cause muddied roads to freeze hard and so facilitate movement, as well as giving attackers a chance to surprise opponents. In December 1645 the parliamentarian John Birch [Plate 10] certainly felt that God was helping in sending 'a great frost, without which it had been impossible to have marched at that time of the year', so facilitating his midwinter attempt on royalist Hereford. Although Birch found that his army's movement was slowed by 'the deep snow, where some of your men ended their days in the extremity of the frost and snow', advancing on Hereford through 'a terrible night of frost and snow' when not even a dog barked because none were out on such a night certainly provided the element of surprise he was seeking, and his dawn attack on the town was also helped by the weather, as he found few guards on duty, for 'that terrible cold morning of frost and snow had sent them to a fire'.[5]

Conversely, fine weather was far from guaranteed during spring, summer and early autumn and there are many accounts of operations being disrupted or halted by bad conditions. The Earl of Derby's siege of and attacks upon Manchester in late September 1642 were disrupted by heavy rain, while similar conditions blunted the king's siege of Gloucester during August and September 1643, causing royalist trenches to flood and the operation to be abandoned; a royalist officer reported that as he and his colleagues marched off, 'the unceasing winds next morning soon dried up our wet-through clothes we lay pickled in all night.'[6] Most day-to-day accounts written by soldiers or junior officers about their experiences on campaign refer to spells of unseasonably bad weather, to cold, wind and rain, or worse. Thus in a series of letters by an officer marching with Essex's army during late summer and early autumn 1642, the writer made repeated reference to inclement weather. In late September, 'this day we had such foul weather that before I marched one mile I was wet to the skin,' and shortly after, forced to spend a wet night in the open, he and his colleagues 'pulled up the hedges, pales and gates and made good fires' to try to keep themselves warm; at the beginning of October he marched to Bromyard, 'the weather wet and

the way very foul', and continued so as they moved towards Hereford, where en route, 'by reason of the rain and snow, and extremity of cold, one of our soldiers died by the way'; and on arriving outside Hereford he and his colleagues were held up for two hours, standing 'in dirt and water up to the middle leg'.[7]

Hot weather could also affect civil-war operations. We have already seen how dust thrown up from dry ground by horses and carried on the wind hindered the parliamentarians at Powick Bridge in September 1642. Sir Thomas Fairfax ascribed the defeat of his Yorkshire parliamentarian army on Seacroft Moor, outside Leeds, in late March 1643 and the associated loss of so much of his infantry in part to the unseasonably hot weather that day, which had caused some of his infantry units to break ranks and to drift away to nearby houses in search of drinks.[8] Richard Baxter noted that the parliamentarian attack on royalist forces around Langport in Somerset in July 1645 took place 'in the very hottest time of the summer', so that as a party of parliamentarian horse pursued some fleeing royalist horse up a lane and onto more open ground on a hillside, 'the dust was so extreme[ly] great […] that they that were in it could scarce[ly] see each other', and in consequence the parliamentarians went too far in their pursuit and found themselves engaging the main royalist body.[9]

Fighting was also restricted by available daylight. It was perfectly feasible to march by night and many armies and their commanders did so, especially but by no means exclusively the parliamentarian Waller, who during the first year of the war was dubbed the 'night owl', as several times he marched his troops undetected overnight and then swooped down at dawn on an unsuspecting royalist base. Armies might get away from battle under cover of darkness, including the withdrawal of Waller's parliamentarians from Lansdown in Wiltshire and that of royalist armies from the second battle of Newbury in Berkshire and the battles of Nantwich in Cheshire and Cheriton in Hampshire. However, embarking upon or continuing a substantial fight in full darkness involved such risks and uncertainties that both sides generally avoided night-time engagements. Several battles, including Edgehill, Lansdown, Nantwich and both battles of Newbury, were effectively brought to a halt by nightfall, even though one or both sides may have been able and keen to continue. A few night-time attacks upon or engagements in and around

towns occurred, such as when parliamentarians repulsed royalists from Nantwich in January 1643, the parliamentarian recapture of Modbury in Devon in February 1643 and the failed royalist assault on Weymouth in Dorset at the beginning of March 1645; the parliamentarian attack on Shrewsbury in February 1645 and the royalist attack on Leicester in late May 1645 also both involved overnight actions.

THE TYPES OF FIGHTING AND THE NUMBERS INVOLVED

Fighting took several different forms and typically involved different numbers of troops. At what might be seen as the highest level of military activity and certainly involving the largest concentration and numbers of troops, there were the main field armies and their national and regional campaigns. As well as the king's own Oxford army and the army commanded by parliament's lord general, both sides maintained several large regional armies. These could be drawn upon to reinforce and temporarily to enhance the principal armies – for example, in this way the king was able to enlarge his army from around 9,000 men to around 15,000 men in the fortnight after the second battle of Newbury – just as units from those principal armies might be temporarily 'lent' to regional armies to enhance them for particular campaigns – for example, early in 1644, before the main armies had taken to the field, the king and the Earl of Essex dispatched a few thousand troops from their armies to support the regional armies of Sir Ralph Hopton and Waller respectively as they sparred in central southern England. The distances involved in fighting the war within England were quite modest and it was often possible to move troops around the arena of war quite quickly and easily, in a way that was often impossible in geographically larger and more extended wars, such as the later campaigns against Louis XIV on the Continent or the American Civil War. In reality, therefore, it is not always possible or helpful to distinguish too precisely between the principal armies of the king and parliament's lord general on the one hand and their main regional armies on the other, as in operational terms there was no unbridgeable distinction or absolute boundary between them.[10]

During the opening two years of the war, the king possessed a northern army, commanded by the Earl of Newcastle, based in Yorkshire,

which at its height was 12–15,000 strong. The king's main southern force, his own Oxford army, was generally a little smaller than this and often numbered around 10,000 men. However, he also possessed several regional armies in the Midlands and the South, commanded by his nephews the princes Rupert and Maurice, by Sir Ralph Hopton, later Lord Hopton, and in the latter half of the war by Sir George Goring, later Lord Goring, each around 3–6,000 strong. Thus without running down these regional armies too far, it was usually possible for the king to draw on other troops in order to bring his Oxford army up to 14–15,000 men. From autumn 1643 into and through 1644, but only intermittently and in quite small and decreasing numbers, the king also received reinforcements from Ireland, a little under 10,000 men in the course of the war, most of them absorbed into existing regional armies.

Until spring 1645, parliament's lord general, Essex, commanded his own army of 9–14,000 men, but he too could draw upon regional armies, including those possessed by the parliamentarian Associations – regional groupings, each of a handful of neighbouring counties, established by parliament during the opening years of the war and designed to pool financial, military and other resources – of which the Eastern Association army of up to 15,000 men became by far the most effective. During 1643 and 1644 Waller generally operated in a semi-independent manner in southern England with an army of around 5–6,000 men. The creation in spring 1645 of a new parliamentarian army, the New Model Army, numbering 22,000 men, curtailed or ended the activities of many but not all of these parliamentarian regional armies. Parliament could also call upon the support of London's own well-trained militia, the London trained bands, numbering 8,000 men. Several thousand might temporarily support and serve with field armies, including that dispatched to relieve Gloucester in summer 1643 and others campaigning closer to London, in the South East or the Home Counties. From early 1644 parliament was also supported by a Scottish Covenanter army, a little over 20,000 strong at its height, which campaigned in the North and in smaller numbers in the Midlands.

The easiest way to get a feel for the contribution of the bigger armies and the consequences of occasional engagements between them is to explore the numbers involved in key battles. In only a handful were more than 20,000 men engaged on the battlefield – at Marston Moor around

46,000, at Edgehill 30,000, at each battle of Newbury 28,000, at Naseby 24,000. Although more than 20,000 men were present at other confrontations, such as Turnham Green, Langport and the closing stages of the Cornish campaign of summer 1644, either no full-scale battle ensued or the engagement involved only parts of the armies and so smaller numbers. At a further handful of battles, 10–20,000 men were present, including Adwalton Moor, Cheriton, Cropredy, Lansdown, Newark and Torrington, although again, given the limited nature of the engagements at Cropredy, Newark and Torrington, by no means all of them actually engaged and took part in the fighting. Battles such as Gainsborough, Nantwich, Ripple, Rowton Heath, Seacroft Moor, Stow, Stratton and Winceby involved 4–10,000 men. Thus an army of 3–6,000 men was a good and respectable operational size for a regional force and could make a significant contribution to the war.

The next type of operation in terms of size, complexity and overall scale was that involving garrisoned strongholds. Although most garrisons contained quite modest numbers of troops, just a few dozen or into the low hundreds, a few 'super-garrisons' were much bigger, comprising thousands of men; bases such as Newport Pagnell, Newark and, until summer 1644, York would hold 2–3,000 troops, sometimes more. Forces attacking such garrisons and strongly defended towns could also be huge. On the royalist side, during 1643 Rupert had 15,000 men for his attack on Bristol, the king employed 12–13,000 for his siege of Gloucester, and Newcastle had 15,000 for his siege of Kingston upon Hull, while on the parliamentarian side a combined English and Scottish force of 30,000 men besieged York in 1644 and over 5,000 men besieged Chester in autumn and winter 1645–6. While a battle was over in a single day, often in just an hour or two, operations against garrisons could last for several weeks or months – such as the sieges of Basing House, Carlisle, Chester, Exeter, Gloucester, Kingston upon Hull, Lathom House, Lyme Regis, Newark, Oxford, Pontefract Castle, Worcester and York, as well as several parliamentarian sieges of royalist-held castles in Wales and the South West during the closing phase of the war. Complex offensive operations might involve encircling the garrisoned town or stronghold in order to isolate it completely and so starve it out, constructing earthwork artillery forts or a circuit of bank and ditch, referred to by contemporaries as 'lines of circumvallation', around it, or digging tunnels up to and under

the defensive line with the aim of placing a charge of gunpowder under it and bringing it down by 'springing the mine', as this was termed. If these approaches were employed – as they were by the king in his siege of Gloucester in summer 1643, as well as by parliament against isolated royalist strongholds during the last year of the war – of necessity the operation would be quite lengthy and involve large numbers of men.

Operations of this size, length and complexity were not very common, however. Of the scores of small towns, garrisoned castles and manor houses and the odd church besieged or attacked during the war in just about every contested part of England and Wales, most involved a few hundred or just a few score men on each side and lasted perhaps a few days and generally no more than two or three weeks. In these smaller, quicker operations, it was common for besiegers to soften up defenders with an artillery bombardment, directed against vulnerable stretches of walls or gates, which might open a breach through which they could stream; perhaps to blow in gates using petards, mobile bombs on legs propped up against a gate; or to employ ladders to scale outer walls. Having weakened defenders and defences, attackers could attempt to storm the stronghold, often at dawn or dusk, in order to afford a little extra protection in half-light and perhaps an element of surprise. This was the type of operation seen, for example, in the royalists' storming of Birmingham, Bolton and Bristol and in the parliamentarians' storming of Basing House, Bridgwater and Bristol, as well as in many smaller and more typical sieges of the war.[11]

A variant on this was a rather looser blockade, in which the opposing force could not completely surround and isolate a stronghold, but stationed troops close by to harass and to disrupt its main supply lines and, more importantly, to prevent garrison troops campaigning too far afield. This type of blockade was maintained by royalists against parliamentarian Gloucester once the tighter siege had been abandoned, by royalists against Plymouth for much of the civil war and by parliamentarians against Chester for long periods before they could more tightly besiege it.

Most civil-war fighting involved neither battles nor sieges, for in most contested areas for most of the war the fighting was small-scale and sporadic. Although recorded only poorly in most surviving sources, the normal experience of war at a local level was of raiding and counter-raiding, skirmishing, plundering, harassment and opportunistic attacks.

This might involve a few dozen garrison troops out plundering, raiding and attacking any enemy soldiers they encountered, or small county-based forces numbering just a few hundred troops, perhaps a small local army or more often a scratch force drawn from a handful of local garrisons. This low-level, small-scale but in some areas quite disruptive war of raids and skirmishes was the normal, typical and most prevalent type of fighting in many areas. It was the type of warfare which most people would have experienced most directly and for most of the time within contested areas.

There was another, much more specialised type of fighting. The civil war was almost entirely a land war and it did not involve royalist and parliamentarian fleets engaging in naval battles. If Naseby was the king's and the civil war's Waterloo, there was no equivalent to Trafalgar. That could not happen because the existing Royal Navy came out almost to a ship for parliament at the start of the war and was placed under the command of the Earl of Warwick as parliamentarian lord admiral [Plate 11]. Thereafter, the royalists struggled to put together and to maintain even a plausible naval presence. Although during 1643 the king gathered, initially in ports in south Cornwall and then, following the capture of Bristol, in the Bristol Channel, a force of up to 18 armed vessels under Sir John Pennington, it was poorly trained and equipped and no match for parliamentarian warships; many crews soon defected to parliament. More troubling for parliamentarian naval control was the activity of pirates or privateers operating throughout the 1640s from Flanders, Ireland and some royalist-controlled ports in England and Wales, some of them acting purely for their own gain, others claiming to support and to be aiding the king.[12]

Parliament employed its navy to patrol home waters, with a large summer guard – in 1644, 30 warships supported by 22 armed merchantmen, in 1646, 44 warships and 21 armed merchantmen – and a smaller winter guard, much of it based off the Kent coast, but with squadrons patrolling the western approaches, the Irish Sea and the North Sea. The parliamentarian navy played several roles during the war. It brought reinforcements or supplies to hard-pressed parliamentarian ports or coastal towns besieged on their landward side, generally successfully, as at Kingston upon Hull, Lyme Regis, Plymouth, Weymouth and around Pembroke and Milford Haven, occasionally unsuccessfully, as at Exeter

and Dartmouth in 1643; where possible, the ships would also use their guns to bombard the royalist positions. It supported parliamentarian operations against royalist-held ports, coastal towns and coastal strongholds, including Portsmouth in summer 1642 and Dartmouth and Pendennis in 1646, bringing in and landing troops, supplies and heavy guns, as well as employing the ships' own guns against the strongholds. It blockaded royalist-held ports, including Bristol, Chester and Newcastle upon Tyne, to prevent vessels and supplies getting in or out. Perhaps most importantly, it disrupted or prevented royalist reinforcements being moved around and landed by sea. The biggest such threat began in autumn 1643, when reinforcements from Ireland started being shipped across the Irish Sea to fight for the king in mainland England and Wales. To counter this, parliament stationed one squadron usually based at Liverpool, to cover the northern part of the Irish Sea, including the Dublin and Dublin Bay area and the North Wales coast, and another squadron usually based around Pembroke and Milford Haven, to cover the southern part of the Irish Sea, including southern Ireland, the South Wales coast and the Bristol Channel. From early 1644 onwards, they proved effective at intercepting royalist reinforcements trying to cross from Ireland and very brutal in dealing with them, literally as well as metaphorically killing off this potential supply of royalist troops.

RAISING TROOPS

Many soldiers did not have to agonise about whether to fight or for whom. From autumn 1643 both sides employed conscription or impressment and thereafter that became a major means by which fresh troops were recruited. A quota of conscripts was set for each county and it was the responsibility of local officials to meet it. There were guidelines about those to be conscripted. They were to be fit – it was not acceptable to conscript the mentally or physically ill or disabled – and of normal fighting age, often reckoned between 16 and 60, occasionally between 18 and 50. Generally exempt from conscription, at least on paper, were clergymen, students at university or at one of the inns of court, members of existing county militias, sons or only sons of widows, mariners, seamen and fishermen, and the richer members of society – those rated for tax purposes above a certain level or deemed to be gentlemen – and

their sons.[13] But within those guidelines, local officials had excellent means of getting rid of adult male troublemakers, petty criminals and vandals, the undesirables and the unemployed. One parliamentarian officer reported that 'most counties press the scum of all their inhabitants, the king's soldiers, men taken out of prison, tinkers, pedlars and vagrants that have no dwelling, and such of whom no account can be given', going on to note that, not surprisingly, many sought to desert at the first opportunity – 'it is no marvel if such run away.'[14]

Existing county militias or trained bands made only a limited contribution to the field armies of king and parliament. Although some may have chosen to join new regiments early in the war, only rarely did militia forces choose or prove willing en masse not only to commit themselves to one side but also to support wider campaigns and military operations outside their home counties. Much of the Cornish militia did support the royalist war effort and campaigned with royalist field armies both in neighbouring Devon and through the South West and the South during 1643. On the parliamentarian side, the London militia or trained bands were equally committed to the cause and willing to support some operations in southern and south-eastern England. However, accounts of these campaigns reveal that there was often tension, that commanders emphasised to them that their contribution was temporary and held out the prospect of returning to London in the near future and that the militiamen were keen to go home.[15] Similarly, some units from the pro-parliamentarian Somerset militia campaigned as part of Waller's army outside their home county in spring and early summer 1643, but they did not perform well and tended to desert or run home. Even in areas which strongly supported king or parliament – such as most of Wales and East Anglia respectively – there was little appetite amongst county militias to serve in field armies and to fight away from their home patch.

In contrast, during the first year or so of the war, large numbers of Englishmen and Welshmen did voluntarily sign up for military service and joined the armies of king and parliament – certainly, well over 100,000 and probably nearer 150,000 in total by autumn 1643. Some joined as a consequence of and at general recruitment meetings, such as the royalist recruiting event which many years later Richard Gough recalled watching in his home parish of Myddle in northern Shropshire sometime quite early in the civil war:

> Sir Paul Harris sent out warrants requiring or commanding all men, both householders with their sons and servants and sojourners and others within the hundred of Pimhill that were between the age of 16 and three score, to appear on a certain day upon Myddle Hill. I was then a youth of about eight or nine years of age and I went to see this great show. And there I saw a multitude of men and upon the highest bank of the hill I saw this Robert More standing with a paper in his hand and three or four soldiers' pikes stuck upright in the ground by him; and there he made a proclamation that if any person would serve the king as a soldier in the wars, he should have fourteen groats [4*s.* 8*d.*] a week for his pay […] And out of these three towns, Myddle, Marton and Newton, there went [as volunteers to fight for the king] no less than twenty men.[16]

Others were recruited specifically to join new regiments which the king and Essex commissioned, authorising prominent individual supporters – who would become the colonels of those new regiments – to raise from scratch an infantry or cavalry regiment. The colonel often had to dip into his own pocket quite deeply to cover initial costs, as in principle he would be responsible for all the expenses of raising, paying, equipping and training his men until they joined the main royalist or parliamentarian army. He also selected his principal officers – that is, the lieutenant colonel, sergeant major and captains who would command the regiment's companies or troops – quite often choosing members of his own family, other more distant kin and personal friends and contacts. They in turn sought recruits to fill their own companies or troops, launching recruiting drives in their home areas, as well as mobilising support from friends and contacts in their wider gentry networks. A whole regiment could not be recruited from tenants, servants, dependants and personal contacts alone and to gather the numbers required the net often had to be cast more widely, both geographically and in terms of the type of people sought.[17]

SOLDIERS, THEIR ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND ORGANISATION

Most civil-war troops served either in the cavalry, fighting on horseback, or in the infantry, fighting on foot. The proportion of the two in a field

army varied, but infantry often outnumbered cavalry, not least because they were cheaper to equip, to supply and to maintain. Contemporaries believed that an effective army needed to have both types of troops available in order to fulfil all the tasks and to meet all the threats which might face it, though there were specialist operations in which a commander might want a force largely or wholly comprising just one type of soldier. For example, very mobile short campaigns, in which the emphasis was on quick movement, might be conducted by cavalry alone. Conversely, mounted troops were generally of limited value in a besieged stronghold and the presence of horses served to deplete precious supplies more quickly. Thus some garrison commanders about to come under close siege might send most or all of their horse away – as did Newcastle in spring 1644, sending his horse off from York before the city was besieged.[18]

The infantry comprised two types of soldiers: musketeers and pikemen. Musketeers were armed with long-barrelled muskets, up to four feet in length. Most civil-war muskets were matchlocks [Plate 12], with a slow burning match – a cord soaked in saltpetre – fixed into a moving metal arm or serpent which, when the trigger was pulled, lowered into an external pan to ignite a charge of gunpowder there; this, in turn, ignited the primary charge within the barrel, which caused a round lead musket ball to be discharged, along with large quantities of acrid smoke [Plate 13]. Matchlocks had clear limitations. The match was difficult to keep burning in wind or rain, it had to be repeatedly adjusted in battle, the glow of the match would give away the presence and location of troops in the dark and there was an obvious danger in having a soldier holding a lighted match in one hand while handling gunpowder with the other. On the other hand, matchlocks were fairly cheap and easy to make and could still be fired even if the trigger and serpent mechanism failed, with the musketeer simply dropping the end of the match into the pan by hand. A less common type of civil-war musket was a flintlock, in which, on pulling the trigger, a piece of flint held within a metal arm forcibly struck a piece of steel to produce a spark or shower of sparks, and it was this which ignited the powder in the pan. Often referred to during the civil war as 'snaphances' or 'firelocks', they were more complex and expensive and were employed only selectively, particularly at times or in places where the use of a

slow-burning match would be unhelpful or dangerous – in an overnight operation involving an element of surprise or by soldiers guarding a store of gunpowder. Both types of musket fired a single round ball. In order to fire again, the musket needed to be cleaned, to ensure that no smouldering matter or embers remained, and reloaded via the muzzle with a new main charge of gunpowder, a new musket ball and perhaps some wadding; a new secondary charge of powder also went into the pan. Only then was the musketeer ready to fire a second time. The whole process could take a minute or so from firing one bullet to being ready to fire the next, though experienced musketeers might proceed at twice this rate or even a little faster.

Civil-war muskets and their smooth barrels discharged a bullet with an initial velocity of up to 500 miles per hour and had a range of over 300 yards, though at that distance the musket ball had lost much of its power and was also following a downward trajectory, so that aiming became very difficult. Modern re-enactment experience suggests that the large recoil made musketeers, especially inexperienced men, fire too high, and that to stand a good chance of hitting and killing an enemy it was best to fire when they were no more than 100 yards away. Contemporary accounts confirm this, as they often refer to musketeers firing too high, over the heads of their opponents, or too early and at too great a distance, with little effect, as well as to officers encouraging them to hold their fire until the enemy were closer. Even over shorter distances, accuracy was limited and civil-war musketeers usually worked together to fire volleys of shot into bodies of enemy horse and foot. The most sophisticated and effective way for musketeers to operate, though one requiring training, was for them to present and to fire by rank or row, with the front row presenting, firing and then retiring to begin the cleaning and reloading process, the next row presenting, firing and then retiring and so on, such that the overall unit maintained a fairly steady round of volleys, with just a short interval between each. With well-trained and experienced musketeers, reloading quickly, this might be achieved by deploying them in just six rows.

Musketeers usually wore no body armour of any sort, not even helmets. As well as their muskets, they would, however, carry on them other specialist equipment, generally on a bandolier, a leather band which went over one shoulder and hung across the torso. From it would be

suspended a number of wooden flasks – often 12 of them, from which they have been nicknamed 'apostles' – each containing a measure of powder sufficient for a single shot, and a leather bag containing around a dozen musket balls, while a single larger priming flask for replenishing the powder in the pan might be hung from the bandolier or carried separately [Plate 14]. Musketeers might have a broad-bladed sword, carried in a scabbard by their side, which could be used in close-quarter fighting. However, just as popular, and referred to in many accounts, was for musketeers, having fired their muskets, then to reverse them and to use them as large wooden clubs as they closed on their opponents.

The other type of infantry were pikemen. Again, they might carry a sword, but their principal weapon was the pike, a long wooden pole, often of ash and between 16 and 18 feet in length, tipped with a steel point. Unlike musketeers, pikemen could wear body armour, including a metal backplate protecting the upper half of the body, a metal breastplate from which were suspended further plates protecting the midriff down to the upper thighs, perhaps a separate metal gorget protecting the neck and a helmet protecting the top of the head and with a wide metal brim, often called a pot or pott [Plate 15]. However, there is little evidence of new pikemen's armour being manufactured and supplied in the course of the war, and so it may be that as the war progressed armour became less common. Like the musketeers, they did not fight alone – an individual pikeman had little protection – but together as a unit, in close formation of perhaps six to eight ranks or rows. They would lower their pikes to form a solid mass or 'hedgehog' bristling with deadly points. As such, they might receive and break up an enemy charge, especially a cavalry charge, which was thought to be particularly vulnerable to being disrupted or repulsed by pikemen, or move forward actively to engage enemy forces, particularly the opposing infantry, in a close-quarter confrontation, referred to as 'push of pike'. In battle, blocks of pikemen would generally deploy either side of blocks of musketeers, so providing their unarmoured colleagues with greater protection from enemy cavalry or pikes. In some armies, particularly early in the war, pikemen and musketeers were present in roughly equal numbers, but the latter came to be seen as more valuable and effective in operations and some commanders sought a ratio of two to one for musketeers to pikemen in their armies.



28. *This detailed depiction of part of the centre of the royalist army at the start of the battle of Naseby gives a good indication of how infantry generally deployed in battle, with blocks of pikemen alternating with and flanked by units of musketeers. The engraving also suggests that in this instance the infantry deployed in two principal lines, with reserve units and life guards to the rear (at the top), that the royalists had placed some small field guns amidst both lines, set in pairs and with barrels of gunpowder by them, and that a couple of horse units had also been placed within the second infantry line.*

Cavalry also came in two types, depending upon the type and extent of body armour which they wore, though one quickly superseded the other. Cuirassiers were in some ways a relic of medieval mounted knights, as they wore full body armour from head to knee or in some cases down to foot and toe, including a fully enclosed helmet and metal gauntlets. However, full armour of this sort was heavy and expensive, it was rather cumbersome – as the parliamentarian Edmund Ludlow discovered at Edgehill, once unhorsed he could not 'without great difficulty recover on horseback again'[19] – and by the seventeenth century it was not certain defence against musket balls, which could penetrate plate armour. This style continued to be employed by some cavalry, particularly during the opening years of the war by a parliamentarian regiment of horse commanded by Sir Arthur Hesilrige, who were often nicknamed 'lobsters' from their retention of articulated plate armour, and by some officers, including the king himself, who sometimes appeared on the battlefield in

this kind of armour or chose to be depicted in this manner in equestrian portraits [Plate 16].

However, from the outset of the war cuirassiers were almost entirely superseded by what became the typical civil-war cavalryman, the harquebusier. These were much more lightly armoured. Some wore partial body armour, including a backplate, breastplate and metal gauntlet protecting the lower arm and hand of the bridle arm. For others, their principal or only body protection came from a thick leather, three-quarter-length coat, extending to just above the knees, made of cow or bull hide and often referred to as a buff coat, which had some ability to deaden a sword blow or a musket or pistol ball if fired from some distance. Harquebusiers also wore metal helmets, encasing the top of the head, with an articulated tail protecting the back of the head and the neck, smaller side panels protecting the ears and cheeks but largely open at the front, with just a single bar or three bars to give some protection to the face. They also often wore thick boots extending up above the knee and a leather gauntlet on their non-bridle hand and lower arm.

Cavalrymen had a pair of pistols slung in front of them on either side of the saddle, either flintlocks or wheel locks, in which the spark was provided by a piece of flint or pyrites grating against the serrated edge of a revolving metal wheel which had been wound up against a spring by using a special key or spanner and which was released when the trigger was pulled. However, if left wound up too long they tended to jam, as Ludlow found at one point when under attack: 'my pistols being wheel locks and wound up all night I could not get to fire, so that I was forced to trust to my sword.'[20] Pistols had a much slower muzzle velocity and much shorter effective range than muskets and to ensure a kill or debilitating injury they needed to be fired with the muzzle close to or even touching the intended victim. In the heat of a cavalry charge or fight, it was generally impractical for a cavalryman to reload his pistols, so they were carried into battle ready loaded and, if wheel locks, ready wound and then fired just once. Equally, cavalry could use neither cumbersome matchlock weapons nor full-barrelled muskets on horseback, though some might possess and fire carbines – with a barrel length of two feet or a little more, they were a compromise between a musket and a pistol, longer-ranged and more powerful than the latter, with an accurate and deadly range of up to 50 yards – with a flintlock

or sometimes a wheel-lock mechanism and carried by the side, slung from a bandolier. However, the main cavalry weapon was a slashing broadsword, carried by the side in a scabbard slung from a bandolier across the shoulder.

Like both types of infantrymen, cavalrymen did not operate alone on the battlefield, but together, in distinct blocks or units. Following precedents and advances seen in Continental warfare, the use of cavalry in larger or formal engagements quickly moved away from the old style in which rows or ranks of horse would ride up to their opponents, discharge pistols or carbines at fairly close range and then wheel away, hoping that firepower would disrupt and disorder the enemy. Instead, both sides quickly adopted the tactic of charging their opponents in close formation, ideally with the knees of one cavalryman locked behind the knees of his colleagues, so that the horses were moving forward very closely together, perhaps discharging their pistols or carbines once and at close range, but more importantly changing home and using their



29. *Again enlarged from a contemporary depiction of the two armies arrayed at Naseby, the parliamentarian cavalry on the right of their army, commanded by Cromwell, is show deployed in distinct troops or units of horse, each apparently six or seven horses wide and between four and six deep, arranged in three main lines.*

slashing broadswords, as well as the weight and shock of their impact, to unhinge and to break enemy cavalry. Both sides, but particularly the royalist Prince Rupert, occasionally interspersed their blocks of horse with some musketeers, who by getting off several volleys of shot might offer greater protection by firing on approaching enemy cavalry or greater attacking power by firing on opposing cavalry before their own mounted colleagues closed in on them.

There was one other type of civil-war soldier, a sort of hybrid between infantry and cavalry. Dragoons possessed horses and began an engagement or operation on horseback, though they were often allocated second-rate nags. Their role was to move forward on horseback and to take up an advanced position, perhaps lining a hedge or ditch or occupying a building ahead of the main line, from which they could disrupt an enemy advance, or perhaps moving forward to clear advanced locations held by enemy troops. However, having got into position they would generally dismount and fight on foot, using either ordinary muskets or carbines. They generally seem to have worn the buff coats and at most partial body armour of the cavalrymen, but, unlike them, they were expected to reload and to fire repeatedly, so they also carried the bag of bullets, powder flasks and so on employed by musketeers. Of the three main types of civil-war soldier, dragoons were almost always by far the smallest element, with generally no more than a few hundred of them in an army of several thousand men.

A civil-war army might also have with it and employ a small number of more specialised weapons. Long-barrelled firearms, which were more accurate than the standard-issue musket, including fowling pieces and weapons with a grooved or rifled instead of a smooth interior to the barrel, might be used by snipers to pick off particular opponents. They were often entrusted to gamekeepers and wild-fowlers. For example, the parliamentarians admitted that, at the siege of Sherborne Castle in summer 1645, 'the greatest hurt they [the defenders] do us is by two keepers of parks they have in the garrison who in long fowling pieces take aim through the loopholes in the wall, for the most part at commanders'.[21] Some troops carried and used halberds, poleaxes or partisans, all of them hand weapons comprising staffs tipped with blades and spikes.

The other component of a civil-war army was the artillery, often under specialised gunners. The larger artillery pieces, generally made

of iron and bronze and mounted on wheeled, wooden gun carriages, might be employed on a battlefield to blow a few holes through enemy lines as a preliminary to the main attack, but their principal role was as siege pieces, to bombard and to open breaches in defences. Some of the biggest attracted individual names, including 'the Queen's Pocket Pistols', 'Gog and Magog' and, supposedly named after a local prostitute, 'Sweet Lips'. A large artillery piece might fire eight or ten balls per hour, but it could not continue that rate indefinitely, as the metal would heat to such a point that the gun could not safely be reloaded and needed to cool. The smaller, lighter and more mobile artillery pieces possessed by most armies during the war probably had a greater anti-personnel role and, as well as discharging solid balls, they might be loaded with and fire a variety of case shot, including canisters full of lead balls, smaller metal pieces and assorted shrapnel to cause greater death, injury and human carnage. That was also the main purpose of mortars, including the largest and most famous of the civil war, 'Roaring Meg', large, squat, short-barrelled artillery pieces firing hollow iron balls, generally known as grenades or 'grenadoes', packed with gunpowder and perhaps shrapnel and with their own fuse, which could be lobbed on a high trajectory over enemy defensive lines so that they would explode and the outer case shatter, causing death or injury and perhaps starting fires, too. Much smaller versions, made of metal or clay and packed with gunpowder and shrapnel, were also available, lit and thrown by soldiers as primitive hand grenades. While bows and arrows were not generally employed, they were occasionally fired between opposing lines or camps carrying messages – such as an exchange between the besiegers and defenders of Gloucester in summer 1643, the former declaring that Waller had deserted them and that Essex had been beaten, the latter responding in doggerel that they were determined to resist whatever the truth of the claims[22] – and they were also used in sieges or as a preliminary to attack, the arrowheads covered in flammable material, lit and aimed at thatched roofs, haystacks, and suchlike in order to start fires. There are occasional references to musketeers attempting something similar, firing 'hot bullets' or 'fiery bullets',[23] probably heated musket balls covered in small pieces of leather or cloth.

In battle, artillery – assuming it was present and played a role – usually deployed behind the main line and close to its centre. In set-piece

battles, where both sides possessed large armies and had time to deploy fully, it was standard practice to arrange troops with infantry in the centre, comprising alternating blocks of musketeers and pikemen, cavalry on both wings and dragoons, if present, at the extreme ends of the line. But in many battles the arrangement was not so clear or so neat, because of the rushed nature of the initial deployment, the ground and topography over which the battle was to be fought and key points on it or the overall offensive or defensive tactics deliberately adopted by the armies. Very occasionally, one or both armies possessed or chose to engage with infantry alone – such as the Earl of Stamford at Stratton – or with cavalry alone – such as Rupert's initial attack at Newark and the royalist army at Roundway Down.

Just as civil-war soldiers did not fight alone, but in blocks of men or groupings of similar troops, so within armies they were organised in larger units. Infantrymen were organised into regiments, commanded by a colonel – or occasionally a more senior officer – and subdivided into a number of companies. Although practice varied, an infantry regiment often comprised ten companies of foot, one commanded by a captain lieutenant acting on behalf of the colonel, one by a lieutenant colonel, one by a sergeant major and the remaining seven by captains [Plate 17]. Each company had an ensign or flag-bearer, two or three sergeants, three corporals, two drummers and its ordinary soldiers, numbering perhaps 100 in the captains' companies but rather more in those of more senior officers. A regiment also possessed a small number of regimental staff, including a quartermaster, a provost martial, a surgeon and maybe one or two surgeon's assistants, a chaplain or preacher, a waggon master, a drum major and one or more clerks. In total, therefore, a complete foot regiment might number well over 1,000 men – perhaps even over 1,200 – at its height at the start of the campaigning season, though death or injury in operation, disease and desertion usually then took their toll and numbers drifted downwards. Cavalry were organised in a broadly similar manner, though in their case a regiment, again commanded by a colonel, was subdivided into troops of horse and the numbers were generally more modest. Typically a cavalry regiment might comprise just seven or eight troops, with 60–80 ordinary cavalrymen – or troopers – per troop, so that even if it was at full strength and including officers and regimental staff, it might well number 5–600 in total.

Civil-war soldiers, especially infantrymen, were issued with much of their clothing, including boots or shoes, breeches, stockings, shirts, a coat and possibly a cap, together with a snapsack for carrying their essential supplies. However, particularly in winter, this would not meet all the soldiers' needs and they probably wore some of their own clothing under or as well as that officially provided. From early in the war, both sides attempted to achieve an element of uniformity of clothing, especially in colours of coats issued to the infantry. Sometimes the infantry of an entire army was clothed in coats of the same colour, but more often this was done on a regimental basis, so that at least everyone in that regiment would be wearing a coat of the same main colour, perhaps lined in another colour showing at the cuffs, collar and edges, and so would recognise each other in battle. A variety of colours were employed during the war, including red, blue, grey, white, yellow, green and tawny orange. Although some cavalry regiments were issued with coloured cloaks, there was far less use of coloured coats amongst the cavalry, many of whom wore the ubiquitous buff coat, and instead there was much greater use of sashes, bands or scarves of a particular colour in order to identify each other – the parliamentarians generally adopting tawny orange, the royalists red.

However, such uniformity was far from complete and could easily break down in a battle or large operation in which the army comprised several different regiments, perhaps drawn from different forces, or included special units of 'commanded men', such as bodies of a few hundred or more musketeers drawn from several regiments to undertake a special role. In any case, coat or scarf colour alone might be insufficient for a soldier to distinguish between someone on his own side and an enemy. Accordingly, it was common before a battle or operation for each side to adopt a particular emblem, such as wearing a sprig of foliage or a piece of paper in their hats or helmets, and a particular call sign, such as an easily remembered word or short phrase, by which in the heat of action friend could be distinguished from foe. For example, in the parliamentarian attack and royalist defence of Alton in December 1643, the royalist word was 'Charles' and the parliamentarian 'truth and victory'.[24] However, it was easy for one side to spot the emblem and to discover the call sign of the other and then to adopt them in order to lure opponents on or to evade capture. Thus the parliamentarian

commander Sir Thomas Fairfax, finding himself isolated amongst royalist soldiers at Marston Moor, was able to pass unchallenged through enemy lines and to return to his colleagues simply by 'taking the signal out of my hat, [whereby] I passed through them for one of their own commanders', while later in 1644 a royalist unit moved unchallenged through parliamentarian territory simply by adopting parliament's colours, 'passing through the country for parliament men, with orange tawny scarfs and ribbons in our hats'.[25] By sheer coincidence, the two sides sometimes adopted the same or very similar emblems and signs, making it very difficult to tell friend from foe and potentially unleashing chaos. For example, at Marston Moor the royalists chose 'God and the king', the parliamentarians 'God with us'.[26]

Soldiers were also provided with food and drink and at least rudimentary shelter. The basic diet, particularly when on campaign in the field, was based upon a daily ration of bread or biscuit and cheese, supplemented by meat and perhaps some mashed pulses or cereals, including peas, which went under the general label of 'pease', washed down with beer; those garrisoned in a market town or amidst productive farmland might expect a richer and more varied diet. As for shelter, again garrison troops would generally have a better time of it than colleagues out on campaign, for they would often have some sort of a roof over their heads. Officers in a marching army might also expect to be billeted in weatherproof buildings at their various overnight halts, often in domestic houses in towns and villages en route. Junior officers and ordinary soldiers would more usually spend the night in barns, storehouses, stables, churches, and the like or simply on the ground in the open air.

CONCLUSIONS: ALLEGIANCE, NEUTRALITY AND CONTROL, SPRING 1643

With the expansion of the royalist and parliamentarian war efforts, the increasing militarisation of the country and the greater control on the ground achieved by both sides through garrisoning, it becomes possible to draw a map of England and Wales in spring 1643, depicting the whole country divided between king and parliament [Map 3]. Of course, such a map is problematic, even misleading. Firstly, as already noted, parts of both England and Wales, mainly the high uplands and mountainous

areas, were not really contested. Although they can be included as part of royalist or parliamentarian blocks of territory, in fact they were only loosely held. Secondly, a map of this type shows all royalist and parliamentarian territory in the same colour, shading or style, suggesting a uniform level and strength of control. On the ground, that was not always true and certainly was not the case in spring 1643, with the war still at an early stage. It might, therefore, be more accurate to portray both royalist and parliamentarian territories in different tones or intensities of shading or colour, to give an impression of differing strengths of control, though such a map would be difficult to construct and might confuse as much as clarify. Thirdly, maps of this type tend to show crisp, sharp borders around and between royalist and parliamentarian territories. Again, in reality and on the ground the position was generally rather different, with lots of overlaps, disputes, uncertainty and at least small-scale fluctuations around frontiers, a sort of civil-war version of the Debatable Lands. It would, therefore, be more accurate to portray royalist and parliamentarian territories in subtle and perhaps pastel shades, overlapping and bleeding into each other along such frontiers, though that could create confusion and is not a style much favoured by professional cartographers. Lastly, given the volatility on the ground and changes in territorial control, especially at this early stage of the war, it is difficult and would be very foolish to put a precise date on a map of this ilk and to claim that it accurately portrays the territorial divide found on a particular date. It is safer to stick to the broader, if vaguer, time span of a season, in this case spring.

This is not a map of elite allegiance and of the loyalties of the great territorial magnates and peers in England and Wales, as that would look very different. Historians now suggest that in 1642–3 many aristocrats were hesitant and uncertain and that even those who firmly committed themselves to one side could not always ensure that their home patch came out for the same side. Blind deference did not generally determine local allegiance and control. On the other hand, elite allegiance might in some areas have had an impact. For example, the unswerving royalism of the rich and powerful Somerset family, including the Marquess of Worcester and his son Lord Herbert, probably partly shaped the nature and strength of royalism in south-east Wales, given their wealth, influence and huge landed possessions there. Equally, it was noted in

Chapter 2 how rival royalist and parliamentarian peers and noble families clashed in but also helped to shape control in Leicestershire and Warwickshire.

More importantly, this is not a map of popular allegiance in England and Wales, as that would look very different and would be far more complicated, with pockets of royalism and parliamentarianism sitting alongside each other in many counties and most regions. Historians who have explored determinants and patterns of popular allegiance, notably David Underdown in the three south-western counties of Somerset, Dorset and Wiltshire, and Ann Hughes in Warwickshire, have suggested that within all of those counties wood-pasture and dairying regions, with large parishes, dispersed and quite fluid populations and limited control from the parish clergyman and large resident landowners, tended to support parliament, while areas of arable or mixed farming, with smaller parishes and nucleated settlements under greater control by the clergyman and the local landowner, tended to support the king – an interpretation which Underdown terms 'an ecology of allegiance'.[27] Another historian, Mark Stoyle, working on Devon, has portrayed popular allegiance there as largely shaped by religious and religio-cultural factors, with parliamentarianism stronger in the northern and southern coastal areas and parts of the east – areas with ports, coastal trade and a fluid population receptive to new ideas in religion – while the more central and inland parts of the county and the area of the east influenced by Exeter Cathedral had a more static or conservative population and showed evidence of popular royalism.[28] In other areas, popular allegiance may have been more pragmatic or functional – the royalism of the lead-mining districts of Derbyshire perhaps resulting from the king's pledge to support the miners in long-running disputes with local landowners and to exempt them from some taxes, the parliamentarianism of the iron-making district of the Forest of Dean in western Gloucestershire from the miners' long-standing antipathy to the most powerful landowner and iron-master of the area, who was firmly royalist during the war.[29] Equally, there is plenty of evidence of uncertainty, antipathy to war and active neutralism, at both elite and popular levels, in many areas during this early stage of the war. Although they had everywhere collapsed or been overwhelmed by the war machines by spring 1643, during winter 1642–3 there were attempts by members of local elites in Cheshire,

Cornwall, Devon, Staffordshire, Yorkshire and elsewhere to keep the war away and to demilitarise those counties via neutrality treaties.

While strong popular support for the king in the far South West, much of Wales and parts of the North and for parliament in East Anglia and parts of the South East probably played a part in shaping the territorial divisions, areas of royalist and parliamentarian control were not determined by popular allegiance alone. For example, royalist control of Oxfordshire probably owed far more to the king's decision in late autumn 1642 to make Oxford his wartime capital and headquarters, to the large army he then maintained there and to the network of garrisons he established in the area to protect the approaches, than to any strong support for or popular allegiance to the king's cause shown by the inhabitants of the county at the outbreak of war. Indeed, there is little evidence of burgeoning or dominant popular royalism amongst the people of Oxfordshire in summer or early autumn 1642 and in the opening weeks of the war the parliamentarian Bulstrode Whitelocke not only easily crushed attempts to execute the king's Commission of Array there but also reported significant support for parliament amongst the ordinary people – distinct from the university faction – in Oxford and suggested that the town might easily be secured for parliament.[30] Conversely, there is plenty of evidence of quite pronounced support for the king in Kent at that stage, but it was squashed firstly by the prompt action of local parliamentarian military figures, who moved quickly during August 1642 to secure key Kentish strongholds, and then by the neighbouring presence of the parliamentarian capital and of the large numbers of troops maintained in and around the capital. As the military historian Peter Young reportedly put it, colourfully and succinctly, if Oxford had been where London was, Kent would have been royalist;[31] or as the royalist officer Sir Richard Bulstrode put it at the time, 'the country people' were 'usually for the strongest party' in their area.[32]

The divisions shown on this map probably therefore had their roots in a variety of factors, including to a limited degree elite allegiance and to a larger degree popular allegiance; the military decisions and initiatives taken and military concentrations put in place during the opening months of the war; and also quite a lot of regional campaigning which had occurred by spring 1643. The map reveals the land mass of England

and Wales divided more or less equally by area, while also confirming that parliament held by far the more populous and prosperous half, including London and many of the largest provincial towns – such as Bristol, Coventry, Exeter and Norwich – and many of the biggest ports and coastal towns – such as Boston, Bristol, Dover, Exeter, Gloucester, King's Lynn, Kingston upon Hull, Plymouth, Pembroke and Milford Haven, Portsmouth and Southampton. The king held Chester, Newcastle upon Tyne and York and a clutch of Marcher towns, especially Hereford, Shrewsbury and Worcester, as well as Oxford itself, but in most ways he had come off a clear second best in the opening stages.

4

'War is a womb big with many miseries': The Fighting and Campaigns of 1643

> England is not without doors of hope, though it be in a state of danger […] This present unhappy civil war sets its several counties in unwonted postures and renders them in various shapes to all beholders, now quiet, now troubled, yesterday in plenty, today in want, every day in fear and no day under security […] War is a womb big with many miseries […] it swells envy, quickens malice, begets jealousies, separates friends, undoes families and kingdoms; its anger is fierce, wrath cruel, instruments of cruelty are in its habitations […] doth nothing in measure or with mercy, but fills the eyes with miserable spectacles and loads the ears with sad relations.

This lamentation for a country being torn apart by civil war was published during the opening weeks of 1643, as campaigning was resuming in some areas after a midwinter lull. It highlights important aspects of the fighting, apparent even at this early stage, including how war had changed things on the ground, setting counties in 'unwonted postures', though its manifestation at local level was also diverse, for despite all-pervading fear and insecurity, different counties were being affected in different ways. But the situation was fluid, so that an area which at one time was quiet and prosperous could quickly become 'troubled' and 'in want' as the malign influence of war spread. The conflict was also having an impact at a more personal and interpersonal level, bringing envy, malice, jealousy and cruelty, dividing families and former friends. Even before the main campaigns of 1643 were under way, England was becoming a country of sad and miserable sights and sounds.[1]

The first full year of the conflict, 1643, explored in this chapter, was the most complex and confusing of the war. Several historians have commented that at first sight armies were roaming around with the coherence and coordination of ducks on a pond. However, there are some patterns to the war during 1643 which, with the benefit of hindsight, can be discerned. Firstly, the conflict became geographically more widespread, with many more parts of England and Wales actively militarised and either contested and fought over or suffering a much greater military presence. Counties and regions which had remained at least semi-detached from the fighting during autumn and winter 1642–3 experienced the full force of war as the year progressed. Secondly, the scale of war greatly increased, with many more men in arms in 1643 than during the Edgehill campaign and its outliers. In the course of the year, both king and parliament created regional commands, empowering senior military figures to take control of regions and to raise troops there. Both sides, particularly the king's, may at first have hoped that most of these would be dispatched to the centre to join the principal field army. In reality, although some newly raised regional regiments were sent to Oxford or London, many remained in their local areas and formed regional armies. The effect was to fragment the military campaign and to 'regionalise' or 'provincialise' the war, creating new regional commands and field armies, as well as an increasing role for and number of garrisons. Thirdly, in almost all contested regions the royalists made significant advances during 1643, greatly expanding their territory and taking thousands of square miles from parliament by the end of the year. Although this trend started slowly, as the two sides jockeyed for position and struggled firmly to control several regions, from early summer onwards royalists gained the upper hand in most contests and began rapidly taking territory hitherto weakly or firmly held by parliament.[2]

During the late nineteenth and for much of the twentieth century it was asserted that the king had a clear plan for 1643, focused on a coordinated triple advance on London. According to this plan, its existence supposedly corroborated by some royalist correspondence and reported conversations, the king's northern commander, the Earl of Newcastle, would consolidate his hold there and from a secure Yorkshire power base drive south, though Lincolnshire and the East Midlands, to attack London from the north, while at the same time the Cornish royalists, led

by Sir Ralph Hopton, would break out and drive eastwards, through the South West and across swathes of southern England, to attack London from the south. The king's main army around Oxford would keep the Earl of Essex's army occupied and perhaps draw in other parliamentarian forces, before attacking London from the west, along the Thames valley, supplying the third prong of the triple advance. The rather scant contemporary sources upon which this supposedly rests have, in fact, been shown either not to support this line or to be unreliable. In any case, given the extended supply lines upon which royalist armies operating close to London and deep within hostile territory would be relying, it would have made more sense for the king, should he have the opportunity seriously to attack London, to combine his troops and resources in a single major thrust.[3] Harassing, threatening, attacking and capturing London, knocking out parliament's headquarters, would have been one way for the king to win the war and this may have been in his mind or his dreams during 1643 and later. Similarly, there is no doubt that royalist consolidation in northern and south-western England followed by advances southwards and eastwards respectively formed elements of the 1643 campaigns. But none of this supports or should breathe life into the 'triple advance on London' thesis.

The campaigns of 1643 began slowly and in a fragmented manner. The main royalist and parliamentarian armies remained inactive and in winter quarters until mid April. Both the king and Essex thought their armies undersupplied and sought to strengthen them. Essex looked for additional funding from parliament, while the king pinned his hopes on a large consignment of arms and ammunition which his wife, Queen Henrietta Maria, had acquired on the Continent, especially the Netherlands, and which, with Dutch naval support and despite harassment from parliamentarian vessels, she landed at Bridlington on the Yorkshire coast in late February; the munitions convoy faced a long and vulnerable overland journey before the king's army around Oxford could be resupplied. Thus it suited both the king and Essex to hold back from major campaigning during the opening months of 1643. In addition, rather desultory peace negotiations were under way in Oxford and, although the two sides were far apart, there was little prospect of settlement and after several weeks negotiations duly collapsed, the two principal armies observed formal or informal truces while they were under

way. Hence the 1643 campaign began, not with action by or between the principal armies in the Thames valley, Home Counties or southern Midlands, but with smaller-scale regional struggles further afield.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE WINTER AND SPRING

In the North to the east of the Pennines, Newcastle's royalists dominated Northumberland and County Durham, but Yorkshire was divided. In the East Riding parliamentarians under Sir John Hotham controlled Kingston upon Hull and its hinterland, while the clothing towns of the West Riding, especially Halifax and Bradford, also inclined towards parliament and the two Fairfaxes, Ferdinando, Lord Fairfax, and his son Sir Thomas Fairfax, bolstered parliament's standing there. But there was significant royalist support in Yorkshire and at the beginning of December 1642 Newcastle pushed south into the heart of the county, on 1 December brushing aside feeble parliamentarian opposition to cross the Tees at Piercebridge, quickly taking most of the North Riding and establishing his base at York by 4 December. Two days later he attacked Tadcaster, west of York, and although Lord Fairfax's outnumbered forces held their own for a time and counter-attacked, in the process firing two houses occupied by Newcastle's men, 'where they burnt to death about twenty of the popish soldiers', as one parliamentarian account put it, Fairfax had to pull back.[4] Newcastle garrisoned Leeds and secured Pontefract Castle, increasingly driving a wedge between the West Riding clothing towns and Kingston upon Hull, and he dispatched troops 40 miles or more south to secure Newark.

The royalist campaign then stalled. On 18 December an assault on Bradford was fiercely rebuffed by the townspeople, hastily reinforced by men from Halifax and Bingley, who barricaded the streets, defended the church and its steeple from royalist bombardment by hanging out large sacks of wool to deaden the impact of cannonballs and armed themselves with whatever came to hand. Their furious counter-attack put the royalists to flight, killing many of them, often brutally; according to one account, a cornered royalist officer 'cried out for quarter and they, poor men not knowing the meaning of it, said "Aye, they would quarter him" and so killed him'.[5] Moreover, soon after, Newcastle ceased campaigning and went into winter quarters. This allowed Sir Thomas

Fairfax to seize the initiative, taking advantage both of popular support for parliament amongst Yorkshire cloth-workers and of unseasonably benign weather. On 23 January he marched to Leeds and stormed it. As one account put it, even though many of Fairfax's soldiers were 'but unexperienced freshwater soldiers taken up about Bradford and Halifax but upon the Saturday before', they attacked resolutely against a royalist defence which lasted two hours, during which 'bullets flew about our ears as thick as hail'. A Todmorden minister roused the parliamentarians attacking royalist artillery by loudly singing a psalm to encourage them. At length, 'by dint of sword and force of arms' the town was taken, and with it both prisoners and supplies.[6] In fact, neither the fall of Leeds nor the defection of the governor of Scarborough to the king shortly afterwards changed the balance of power in Yorkshire. In any case, during late February and through much of March Newcastle focused on conveying the queen and her munitions through the region.

At the end of March Lord Fairfax, short of supplies, abandoned Selby, south of York, his base for the past few months, and withdrew to Leeds, now more securely held for parliament. Sir Thomas Fairfax and his troops covered his father's march but, having destroyed royalist defences around Tadcaster, on 30 March Sir Thomas's forces, comprising infantry and with meagre cavalry, were pursued by royalist horse under Sir George Goring, which caught them on Seacroft Moor, east of Leeds. Fairfax was able to get his outnumbered horse to safety, but he lost much of his infantry wounded or captured. Fairfax blamed them for being 'careless in keeping order' and especially for seeking drinks in nearby houses, 'it being an extreme hot day'.[7] Nonetheless, the Fairfaxes were able to regroup and, although outnumbered by Newcastle's troops, they continued to hold their own. Newcastle failed to take Leeds in early April and, while he did capture Sheffield and Rotherham over the following weeks, in the early hours of Sunday, 21 May, Sir Thomas Fairfax launched a daring attack on the royalist garrison at Wakefield. Fairfax's forces marched there overnight, en route stumbling into a small group of royalists, most of whom they captured, though they 'laid four asleep for ever more', and arrived before the town at around 4 a.m., 'by the time the lark began to sing'. Forewarned, the royalists were on guard but their outer defences, a mixture of cavalry and musketeers lining hedges, were beaten in and then, despite 'thick volley of small and great shot

from the enemy', the parliamentarians stormed the town in two places, overrunning the defenders' artillery and turning one of their brass guns upon them. Many prisoners, including Goring, were taken. Fairfax made no attempt to hold Wakefield and instead carried prisoners and supplies back to Leeds. His father, Lord Fairfax, accounted this success against a much larger force more 'a miracle than a victory'.[8]

Lord Fairfax correctly predicted that this would stir Newcastle into seeking revenge, while his pleas to parliament for reinforcements went unanswered. During June Newcastle campaigned in the clothing district, probably intending to force the Fairfaxes to give battle. Lord Fairfax noted how parliamentarian areas were suffering:

> a mountainous, barren country, the people now begin to be sensible of want, their last year's provisions being spent and the enemy's garrisons stopping all provisions both of corn and flesh and other necessaries that were wont to come from the more fruitful countries to them, their trade utterly taken away, their poor grow innumerable, and great scarcity of means to relieve them.[9]

He had little choice but to attempt to halt Newcastle. On 30 June father and son led out of Bradford 4,000 regular troops plus lightly armed townsmen, hoping to surprise Newcastle's army of at least 12,000 deployed on Adwalton Moor, south-east of the town. The terrain, rolling moorland crossed by ditches and hedges and with many enclosures, offered the parliamentarians some hope, as it would make it more difficult for the royalists to use their numerical superiority to best effect. Indeed, for two hours the armies charged and counter-charged without either gaining clear advantage; the parliamentarians 'kept the enclosures, placing our musketeers in the hedges next the moor'.[10] At length, the royalists' numerical advantage and possibly the inexperience of some parliamentarians tipped the balance, though one account alleged that treachery played a part, for at a prearranged point the 'keeper of the ammunition' began withholding supplies from parliament's troops, forcing them 'to slacken their firing'.[11] The parliamentarian left wing broke and a royalist flanking attack upon Lord Fairfax's centre caused it to crumple and to fall back upon Bradford, pursued by royalists who 'fell on hacking and hewing down the foot'.[12] Sir Thomas Fairfax on the

parliamentarian right, perhaps initially not seeing his father and most of the army retreating as he was deployed on lower ground, was unable to fall back on Bradford and instead pulled away southwards towards Halifax. The Fairfaxes lost half their regular forces killed, wounded or captured and in the face of a royalist bombardment Bradford fell the following day.[13] Leeds and Halifax fell soon afterwards. Although the Fairfaxes reached safety in Kingston upon Hull, Newcastle now controlled almost all of Yorkshire. During the spring, with Newcastle's support, the royalists had built up their position at Newark and, despite a setback in a skirmish at Grantham on 13 May, by June they also controlled northern and central Lincolnshire. Although Kingston upon Hull remained a thorn in his side, Newcastle seemed well placed to push southwards and to threaten parliamentarian heartlands.[14]

30. *In his late fifties when civil war broke out, Lord Fairfax nonetheless quickly took the lead in defending his native Yorkshire in the parliamentarian cause, 'our new Joshua of the north' as one pro-parliamentarian minister dubbed him, for a time holding out against the superior resources which his royalist opponent, the Earl of Newcastle, had at his disposal. Although by summer 1643 he and his elder son, Sir Thomas, had been forced to fall back into Kingston upon Hull, they rebuilt their forces, harried the royalists and in 1644 played a leading role in the siege of York, the battle of Marston Moor and the capture of York, whereupon Lord Fairfax became its governor.*

In the South West, a similar story unfolded. Although both king and parliament had support there during autumn 1642, in Cornwall the royalists gained the upper hand, especially once a body of cavalry, under Hopton, entered the county, while neighbouring Devon was predominantly in parliamentarian hands. During winter and spring Cornish royalists made three failed attempts to push eastwards and overrun Devon, succeeding only at the fourth. Firstly, during the closing weeks of 1642 they crossed the Tamar and threatened parliamentarian Plymouth by establishing garrisons on the western (Cornish) side of Plymouth Sound and at Plympton to the east. On 6 December they held a large rally at Modbury, though it attracted a crowd in search of enjoyment instead of royalist recruits, 'rather like a great fair than a posse', as Hopton put it; Devon parliamentarians under William Ruthvin immediately counter-attacked and easily retook the town, the royalist gentlemen there 'being so transported with the jollity of the thing, that no man was capable of the labour and care of discipline'.[15] Despite this, royalists remained active within Devon for a while and later in December even briefly tested parliament's hold on Exeter, capturing Topsham and occupying other nearby villages. According to a fanciful parliamentarian account, Cornish miners were called up to dig trenches, but many perished in a counter-bombardment, 'the rest wishing themselves again digging of tin rather than be exposed to the danger of iron and lead', while a night-time sally by the defenders was equally destructive, 'our men like hungry lions, bearing their prey before them, with halberds, poleaxes and butts of their muskets beating out those wretches' brains, that certainly deserved no better'.[16] As Hopton ruefully admitted, hopes of support and supplies in Devon did not materialise and, with royalists suffering 'in that bitter season of the year', the king's men fell back into Cornwall.[17]

The royalists' second attempt was prompted by a failed parliamentarian attempt to move into Cornwall. Having bombarded though not captured Saltash, on the Tamar estuary, during January Ruthvin moved his troops over the Tamar further north, near Tavistock, and advanced to Liskeard. But the king's men regrouped and made a stand and on 19 January Hopton engaged Ruthvin on the rolling downland of Braddock Down, between Liskeard and Lostwithiel, in a poorly documented battle. The armies drew up on ridges separated by a boggy valley. An exchange of artillery fire and musket shot and minor skirmishing proved

inconclusive, but when Hopton charged the parliamentarians quickly broke and fled, though the cavalry may have done so in part to lure the royalists forward in disorder, for a royalist account noted that 'on a sudden the whole body of their horse turned back upon us'; however, Hopton had kept men in good order and, seeing this, the parliamentarian horse joined the foot in full flight, 'as if some tempest had driven them'.[18] Over 1,250 fell prisoner before the survivors reached safety east of the Tamar. The victorious royalists divided their army. One part under Hopton retook Saltash – evacuated upon the parliamentarian invasion – and 'beat the enemy out […] with considerable loss, many of them being drowned in the river';[19] the other occupied Tavistock. However, another attempt to blockade Plymouth failed, not least when parliamentarians recaptured Modbury on 21 February, while strikes further afield soon faltered, with stiff rebuffs around Okehampton and in Chagford. Once again, the royalists fell back into Cornwall.

Their third attempt followed the pattern of the second, triggered by a failed parliamentarian advance. On 23 April 1643 James Chudleigh's parliamentarians attacked Launceston, but were eventually driven off after a day-long struggle. However, they were able to pull back into Devon in good order under cover of darkness, while the royalists suffered an expected blow when powder and arms stored 'in a little barn that they had possessed suddenly blew up and scalded many of the Cornish officers and soldiers'.[20] Nonetheless, the royalists pursued their opponents eastwards, advancing towards Okehampton around the north-western fringes of Dartmoor. But on a night march across Sourton Down, they were surprised and ambushed by the parliamentarians, who had deployed undetected 'under the side of the hill and by many small divisions with great space betwixt, [so] we spread more ground than the enemy's whole body'. They routed Hopton's men, especially the dragoons, who 'being many of them new men took fright'. According to one report, Hopton himself was nearly killed or captured, for he 'had his head-piece taken from him and was almost choked thereby, [but he] begged for his life and so escaped unknown but very narrowly'. Although the royalists rallied and withstood a renewed parliamentarian assault, during which some of Chudleigh's musketeers left glowing match 'in the furzes' so they would be seen in the darkness and confuse the royalists, Hopton's men fell back into Cornwall through a night of 'extreme weather, lightning

and thunder and much rain', one prominent royalist reportedly making good his escape by dressing 'in a woman's apparel'.[21]

The Earl of Stamford, parliament's commander in Devon, learned from papers captured at Sourton that Hopton intended to move east and to rendezvous with royalists in Somerset. This he was determined to prevent. Accordingly, advancing from Torrington with a mainly infantry force and perhaps unwisely taking few horse, in mid May he entered north-eastern Cornwall to block the path of Hopton's 3,000-strong army. Although outnumbered, short of supplies and facing an opponent who had occupied a very strong position, on a small hill just north of Stratton, Hopton gave battle. He attacked at dawn on 16 May, dividing his army into several columns and launching attacks up the southern, western and northern slopes of the hill. Although repeatedly repulsed, in mid afternoon, after ten hours of fighting and running low on ammunition, a substantial royalist force managed to reach the hilltop and 'fell upon the rebels with their swords and pikes and fought it out so manfully that at last they wholly routed the rebels' army'. The parliamentarians lost perhaps 300 dead but over 1,700 captured. As the royalist account put it, 'and now let the reader judge if ever the rebels had a more shameful defeat.'[22] Although Stamford reached Exeter with part of his army, he was a broken reed. For the moment, the parliamentarians retained Plymouth, Exeter, Dartmouth, Bideford and Barnstaple, but the royalists controlled the field and Tavistock, Okehampton, Tiverton, Crediton and several other towns quickly fell to them. Hopton and his Cornish royalists were free to push eastwards and to rendezvous with colleagues in Somerset.[23]

In the North West, Cumberland and Westmorland were firmly royalist. Lancashire and Cheshire had contributed royalist troops to the Edgehill campaign, but this weakened effective royalist power there. Perhaps as a result and in contrast to most regions, the balance tipped decisively in parliament's favour there during spring 1643. In southern Lancashire, Manchester parliamentarians sparred with royalists holding Wigan and Warrington. Further north, the position was unclear. At dawn on 9 February parliamentarians attacked the rather lacklustre royalists holding Preston, at one point daring 'to take hold of their enemies' muskets put through the loopholes' of the defensive works. Within an hour the outnumbered royalists were overwhelmed and most fled the town, which was extensively plundered.[24] The parliamentarians then took

nearby Hoghton Tower, though it proved an expensive victory, for the royalists' gunpowder store blew up as the parliamentarians were taking possession and several dozen were killed or maimed. A parliamentarian account attributed the disaster not to royalist treachery but to the failures of the parliamentarians, who were 'burdened with the weight of their swearing, drunkenness, plundering and wilful waste at Preston', to their carelessness in handling powder and lighted match and to 'that great soldiers' idol, tobacco'.[25] In any case, parliamentarian success was short-lived, for on 18 March the royalist Earl of Derby attacked Lancaster, captured and then plundered the town, burning property and killing any men found in arms. When the parliamentarians in Preston marched north to retake it and to relieve their colleagues holding out in the castle, Derby marched south via another route and on the evening of 20 March he retook Preston without much of a fight. The impression that neither side was yet dominant was underlined in late March when the royalists tried but failed to take Bolton and the Manchester parliamentarians attacked and captured Wigan but almost immediately fell back upon Derby's approach, while a parliamentarian operation against royalist-held Warrington in early April failed.

The decisive engagement, a running fight between Derby's royalists, at least 3,000 in number, and up to 1,500 parliamentarians, occurred on 20 April 1643 around Whalley. Advancing from Preston and crossing the Ribble at Ribchester, Derby's force spent the afternoon of the 19th plundering around Whalley. Alerted, parliamentarians gathered a sizable though greatly outnumbered force, which set an ambush close to Reed Bridge, where the road taken by the royalists crossed Sabden Brook in a steep-sided valley. Lured forward by some apparently retreating parliamentarian cavalry – as a parliamentarian officer recalled, 'I made as though I fled, they pursued me, when I knew they were in the command of our men, I advanced again and shot off my pistol (being the sign for our foot)'[26] – the royalist horse stumbled into the ambush and were hit at close range by musket fire. Quickly routed and put to flight, they were pursued westwards towards Whalley, where Derby attempted to make a stand around the abbey with infantry and some artillery. However, the determination and noise of the parliamentarian pursuit appeared to unnerve the royalists, who turned and fled. As a parliamentarian account put it, the fleeing royalists 'often turned their

faces, but as often turned their backs, and hasted away, till they had quit the hundred and no more infested it'.[27] Although the royalists lost fewer than 200 dead, Derby's shortcomings as a commander were clear and royalists lost heart, either going on the defensive or moving away to fight for the king elsewhere. Derby retreated to the Isle of Man and although his property of Lathom House near Ormskirk held out as a major royalist base, it was increasingly isolated and by the end of the year almost the only royalist stronghold left in a parliamentarian county.[28]

In Cheshire, control of most of the county turned on a couple of small engagements, involving just a few hundred men, fought in late January and mid March 1643. The indecision and neutralism which had hitherto characterised the county were ended by the arrival of a determined and energetic parliamentarian MP, Sir William Brereton, in late January, with a body of 500 mounted troops and also a supply of arms and ammunition with which to equip infantry. His first objective was Nantwich and he sent ahead some of his men, who occupied that town without opposition on 28 January. However, the leader of royalist forces, based mainly in and around Chester, within the county, Sir Thomas Aston, immediately sought to counter the threat and moved on Nantwich later that day. The initial parliamentarian force held Aston's 400 men outside the town until late afternoon, where they bumped into Brereton's main force in a lane. As the parliamentarians noted, 'it being dark, near six of the clock, they discerned them more by the enemies' whispering than by their own eye, but God to whom the light is all one as the day was a pillar of fire unto them and gave them so much light as served to the obtaining of a glorious victory.' The inexperience of both sides showed, but it was the royalists who panicked and broke first, for when Brereton fired one of his small field guns, it 'wrought more terror than execution', and 'the enemy cried, let us fly, for they have great ordnance'; some loose parliamentarian horses reinforced their decision to flee. Parliamentarians colourfully claimed that Aston ran away three miles on foot before finding a horse and riding to Whitchurch in Shropshire, that another prominent royalist 'crawled away on all four[s] lest he should be discerned', that the royalists lost many dead and 120 prisoners and that only a few dozen made it back to Chester.[29]

Brereton quickly secured most of central and eastern Cheshire, fortifying Nantwich, taking other towns and recruiting troops. Aston

attempted rather feebly to disrupt him, during the second week of March occupying Middlewich and campaigning around the town including, the parliamentarians alleged, plundering and leaving in the houses of known parliamentarians 'ratbane […] wrapped in papers for the children' mistakenly to eat as sweets.[30] Determined to root him out, on 13 March Brereton attacked Middlewich, leading around 200 parliamentarians out of Northwich to assault the west side of the town, joined a little later in the day by a larger body of parliamentarians out of Nantwich who assaulted the southern and south-eastern approaches. Repeated parliamentarian attacks forced the royalists back into the town centre, where they tried to make a stand in and around the church, though Brereton's men 'fired the church door and thrust at them with their swords as they looked out of the windows', so that they 'cried for quarter, which was

31. *Although rebuffed in his attempts to secure Chester for parliament in summer 1642, Sir William Brereton returned to his native Cheshire early in 1643 at the head of a small military force, raised further men and quickly overwhelmed and defeated his royalist opponents to take control of most of the county. Thereafter he became Cheshire's parliamentarian military and political county boss and, while he failed to secure north-east Wales or to take Chester until the closing stages of the war, unlike some county-based commanders Brereton took a strongly regional view of the conflict, diverting Cheshire men and resources to support, and often himself playing a leading role in, parliamentarian campaigns in south Lancashire, Staffordshire and Shropshire.*

granted them'.[31] Aston and some of his cavalry were able to get away but his command and with it royalism in much of Cheshire was at an end. He was withdrawn by the king soon after and although the royalists retained control of the western fringes of the county, including Chester, until the closing stages of the war, from spring 1643 onwards most of Cheshire was parliamentarian.[32]

The allegiance of Staffordshire was also in doubt during winter 1642–3, but the southern and central parts of the county were secured for the king without much fighting during the opening months of 1643, while the northern and upland part was retained by so-called 'moorlanders', local men who supported parliament. From his Warwickshire base, at the beginning of March Lord Brooke led parliamentarian forces into south Staffordshire to dent royalist control. His first target was Lichfield, which he besieged and bombarded during the opening days of March, quickly overrunning much of the town and attacking the defended and fortified area around the cathedral, the cathedral close, where the royalist garrison was based. Brooke was killed early in this operation, when 'standing in a window on the street side, [he] was shot through the head by an unfortunate bullet discharged against him out of the minster by one of those bloody cavaliers, one known to be a most disloyal, wicked fellow';[33] another contemporary account, this time anti-parliamentarian, claimed that he was shot through the eye, whereupon he 'fell prostrate on the ground and poured out his hatred with his very last breath'.[34] However, parliament's commander in Derbyshire, Sir John Gell [Plate 18], completed the operation, employing 'fireballs' – mortars – against the close, which surrendered to him.[35]

Gell's next target was Stafford and on 18 March he rendezvoused with some of Brereton's Cheshire forces on Hopton Heath, north-east of the town. Hoping to catch this army before further reinforced, on the afternoon of 19 March a royalist army of around 1,200 men, led by the Earl of Northampton and Henry Hastings, marched out of Stafford; against them, Gell and Brereton had 1,800 troops. The royalists were thus significantly outnumbered and also had very few infantry; they did, however, have more cavalry than their opponents. The parliamentarians deployed with infantry and cavalry in the centre, together with artillery on a hillock, while dragoons, musketeers and small field guns lined enclosures on both wings. Having exchanged artillery fire – the royalists

claimed that they were so close to their enemies' guns that 'their great pieces shot over us', while their own cannon 'did great execution, for the first shot killed six of their men and hurt four and the next made such a lane through them that they had little mind to close again' – the royalist cavalry charged and put most of their opponents to flight; the parliamentarian cavalry tried to rally, but were pushed back at the second attempt. The royalist victory came at a price. Northampton was killed – he was unhorsed, continued fighting on foot but was then knocked down, his helmet removed and, scorning quarter, was struck 'a blow with a halberd on the hinder part of his head, receiving at the same time another deep wound in his face', which together proved fatal – while another senior royalist officer, Sir Thomas Byron, was badly wounded, struck by a bullet from a carbine which 'went through his body from the bottom of his armour and out at the groin'. The failing light ended the fighting and the surviving parliamentarians departed overnight. Royalist accounts condemned Gell and Brereton as cowards, noting that 'they lost ten men for one of ours, but true it is that one of ours is worth 100 of theirs'.[36]

In spring 1643 Prince Rupert marched through and briefly campaigned in the region. On Easter Monday his army of over 2,000 stormed the small and almost undefended town of Birmingham, easily overwhelming the 100 musketeers who attempted to resist, and then sacked it. A parliamentarian account claimed that the royalists 'shot at every door or window where they could espy any looking out', 'hacked, hewed or pistolled all they met with without distinction', 'blaspheming, cursing and damning themselves most hideously' as they went. 'They beastly assaulted many women's chastity and impudently made their brags of it afterwards how many they had ravished.' Although the death toll seems to have been modest, the town was reportedly thoroughly plundered and then fired by the royalists as they moved on.[37] Capturing a couple of minor parliamentarian garrisons en route, Rupert's real objective was the recovery of Lichfield. He quickly retook the town and laid siege to the close, bombarding the walls, attempting to scale them with ladders and springing a mine under the walls which brought down a mural tower and opened up a breach through which his forces attempted to storm. But such was the determined resistance of the parliamentarian garrison that all these attempts failed – according to a parliamentarian account, a frustrated Rupert 'swore God damn him many times together, he would

have the close or else he would stay until Michaelmas', his mood probably not helped by the bragging response of the parliamentarian commander who enquired 'why Prince Rupert did shoot no faster, and if he wanted powder, they would lend him a barrel', and even a pro-royalist account admitted that Rupert lost patience with the defenders, 'bellowing at them like a lion'. Besieged and heavily outnumbered, the parliamentarians eventually surrendered on terms later in April.[38] Lichfield was then strongly garrisoned for the king and remained a royalist base until late in the war. On the other hand, in late May the parliamentarians retook Stafford, overwhelming the reportedly negligent royalist garrison, and after further resistance captured Stafford Castle. Unlike the North, the South West and the other counties of the North West, the position in Staffordshire remained in the balance.[39]

32. *Published in London in late April 1643, the strongly pro-parliamentarian pamphlet* The Bloody Prince, or a Declaration of the Most Cruel Practice of Prince Rupert *condemned Rupert in particular and royalist troops in general as brutal and wicked, as oppressing the godly and acting in a devilish way. The title page carries an image of Rupert in full armour on horseback, pistol in one hand and poleaxe in the other, his pet dog running beside his horse, while in the background Birmingham is shown in flames, deliberately fired by Rupert after he stormed and captured the town on Easter Monday 1643.*

The final area which saw substantial fighting during winter and spring 1642–3 is less obviously a distinct region. It comprises Wiltshire, parts of Somerset, Gloucestershire, parts of Monmouthshire and Herefordshire. It was important to the king, as he wished to open or to maintain communication through it to royalist forces in the South West and South Wales; parliament was keen to break these lines and so isolate Oxford. With Stamford bogged down in the South West, in February 1643 parliament created Sir William Waller major general of the west and he campaigned there over the following months. Royalist pressure on the eastern flanks of the area had already increased with the capture of Marlborough in Wiltshire and in early February 1643 royalists attacked Cirencester in eastern Gloucestershire. Returning from the Midlands, Rupert marched past parliamentarian Sudeley Castle, not halting there, in part because 'there fell that night a great snow'.[40] Instead, he continued southwards, heading for Cirencester and its parliamentarian garrison, 'esteemed the very key of Gloucestershire on that quarter'.[41] Picking up reinforcements, Rupert led a two-pronged attack on the north and west sides of the town on 2 February. Despite the presence of plenty of stone garden walls and wall-lined lanes on the edge of town, behind which parliamentarian musketeers poured 'hot volleys' of shot upon the attackers, as well as a mixture of chains, harrows, waggons and turnpikes blocking the main streets, the royalists fought their way in, firing several houses and nearby haystacks on the outskirts of the town. They pushed into the marketplace, 'killing many and driving all before' them. At one point a Spanish soldier fighting for parliament rushed from The Nag's Head intending to fire at the attackers a cannon which stood ready-loaded with case shot, but he was dispatched by a royalist before he could reach the gun. After a stiff fight, Rupert took the town and well over 1,000 prisoners.[42] Parliament responded by abandoning several smaller garrisons in the area, including Malmesbury and Sudeley and Berkeley castles.

Waller entered Wiltshire in early March, progressed along the Dorset–Somerset border and then swung north to Bristol, recruiting en route. Marching east from Bristol overnight, as was his usual practice, he arrived outside Malmesbury on the morning of 22 March. Malmesbury was another Cotswolds town of walled gardens and narrow wall-lined lanes affording good cover to its royalist garrison and repeated assaults

by Waller's troops during the afternoon and evening failed to dislodge the king's men. At length, short of ammunition, Waller called a halt and began to pull back his guns in the early hours of 23 March, but to cover this he ordered his men to make a show and a noise, directing 'all the drums to beat and trumpets to sound […] as in preparation to an assault'. The tactic did more than cover his retreat, for it convinced the royalists that a powerful attack was imminent and they opened negotiations, surrendering the town later that morning.[43] Waller immediately moved on, leaving at Malmesbury a parliamentarian garrison, which rather pusillanimously surrendered to the king's men shortly afterwards.

Moving quickly overnight, Waller crossed the Severn on a bridge of boats at Framilode, south of Gloucester. He advanced up the west side of the Severn, intending to surprise around 1,600 Welsh royalists under Lord Herbert, who were holding the area around Highnam House and threatening Gloucester. A show of force by Waller, backed by artillery fire, was sufficient to persuade them to open negotiations and without much of a fight they surrendered on 25 March, with over 1,500 falling prisoner.[44] After resting in Gloucester, Waller toured Monmouthshire in early April, local royalists abandoning Monmouth, Usk and Chepstow. During the second week of April he returned to Gloucester; en route in the Forest of Dean he skirmished with but largely eluded Prince Maurice's royalists sent by the king to intercept him.[45] On 12 April he occupied Tewkesbury, but Maurice also moved quickly, crossing the Severn upstream at Upton and turning south to approach Tewkesbury along the eastern bank of the Severn. The two armies clashed the following day, 13 April, outside the village of Ripple, roughly midway between Upton and Tewkesbury. Waller's forces deployed across a slight east–west ridge just north of the village, while the royalists deployed by the river on the plain to the north. With around 2,000 horse and foot, the royalists slightly outnumbered Waller's men, who were predominantly mounted. Although they repulsed some parliamentarian cavalry, the royalists did not immediately counter-attack and Waller, who probably did not plan to force battle, began withdrawing. Perhaps detecting this, Maurice attacked, part of his army launching a frontal assault while others swung west to attack Waller's left flank. The twin attacks, catching an army which was on the move and so in some disorder, badly disrupted the rear of Waller's force, which turned and fled; some sought to escape across the Severn

and drowned. The royalists pursued Waller southwards, until held off by parliamentarian reinforcements dispatched from Tewkesbury.[46] The contest between the two commanders did not resume, for Maurice was recalled to Oxford and Waller, having rested and resupplied in Gloucester, moved north. He approached Hereford on 24 April and, in a show of force on the 25th, including the bombardment of several town gates, persuaded the lacklustre royalist governor to surrender. Waller briefly based himself in Hereford but, deep in royalist territory and with limited resources, did not attempt to garrison or to hold it and instead withdrew in May. But by then he and his army were urgently needed elsewhere, for the main campaigns of 1643 were at last under way.[47]

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE MAIN ARMIES, APRIL TO SEPTEMBER

On 15 April Essex's army resumed operations by laying siege to royalist-held Reading, in the Thames valley between London and Oxford and the nearest royalist garrison to London. He intended to starve it out and called upon both Waller and Lord Grey of Warke, commanding an army raised in eastern England, to assist. Alive to the danger, the king commanded princes Rupert and Maurice to return to Oxford to provide a potential relief force. The garrison was low on supplies and parliamentarian reports were soon noting gleefully that they were short of powder and ammunition, that 'the Welsh-men [amongst the garrison] have already feasted with a horse or two and those lean ones, in regard that horse meat hath much failed of late' and that the royalist governor, Sir Arthur Aston, had been seriously injured, 'some say shot in the neck, others bruised by the fall of a stone from a house'[48] – he had received a head injury when hit by a falling roof tile and had apparently been struck dumb. The king led a relieving force out of Oxford, along the north side of the Thames. But it needed to cross Caversham Bridge to approach the town and so to drive off Essex's army. However, by the time the royalists approached Caversham on 26 April, the acting governor of Reading had already put out a white flag and opened negotiations for surrender. Worse, Essex had anticipated the king's move and had a strong force in place around the bridge, behind hedges and earthworks and in a barn, ready to repulse the royalists. Contemporary accounts confirm that as

the king's forces approached Caversham, they quickly met such withering musket fire that they were forced back, losing 100 dead and many more wounded; one account claims that the parliamentarians were so elated by this action that even the wounded were happy and 'say their wounds have brought them more joy and comfort than ever they had in their lives'.[49] In an account written much later by Richard Atkyns, a royalist cavalry officer who took part, the author recalled seeing experienced royalists sent to attack the parliamentarians in the barn 'drop like ripe fruit in a strong wind and never see their enemies; for they had made loopholes through the walls that they had the full bodies of the assailants for their mark, as they came down a plain field, but the assailants saw nothing to shoot at but mud walls.' Even when the king drew off most of his relieving force, Atkyns and his men were left for a while, vulnerable and frighteningly close to the parliamentarian position, 'more like a flock of sheep than a party of horse'.[50] On the following day, the garrison surrendered on terms and Essex occupied Reading.

But then the parliamentarian campaign ground to a halt, as Essex made no attempt to follow up his victory and he and his army spent the next six weeks based in and around Reading. Essex was probably short of supplies and money, the army he possessed at Reading was suffering from disease and would be outnumbered by the men the king could draw upon in and around Oxford should he try to threaten it, he was certainly without any support from Waller, who had ignored orders to join the campaign, and it is also possible that, as a consequence of renewed though fruitless attempts by parliament to negotiate with the king via Henrietta Maria, Essex was being encouraged to inactivity by his political masters. He did order several East Midlands commanders to

33. *Enlarged from an engraving of the Earl of Essex on horseback, this map shows not only the actions in which parts of Essex's army were involved in and around Brentford during the second week of November 1642 but also, further west along the Thames valley, his siege operation around Reading in April 1643, leading to the surrender of the town on the 27th.*

block the queen's munitions convoy, most of which was no further south than Newark; they responded sluggishly and the first big consignment reached the king's army north of Oxford during the second week of May without incident. Even more disheartening for the parliamentarians, when in mid May Hertford led troops from Oxford to rendezvous with Hopton's Cornish royalists and Essex ordered Waller to take position in Somerset to stop this, Waller did no more than briefly visit the area on 20–2 May and soon headed north, hoping to capture Worcester. He did push as far as Worcester by late May, only to be firmly rebuffed on the 29th by the royalist garrison commander there, who informed him 'that he was not at Hereford now'. A brief and half-hearted attempt to capture the city was repulsed and Waller pulled away back to the south to meet the bigger royalist threat, but too late to prevent the rendezvous between Hopton's Cornish army and royalist forces under Hertford and Maurice at Chard in south Somerset on 4 June.

On 6 June Essex at length led much of his army from Reading northwards, to the area around Thame, close to the parliamentarian garrison of Aylesbury and the Chilterns. From there, he dispatched units to probe and to raid rather closer to Oxford, including attacks on Islip, Wheatley and Chalgrove during the third week of June, but royalists responded with counter-raids of their own, including one on High Wycombe, well within what parliament believed to be the safe Chiltern zone to the north-west of London. In early July Essex moved his main force a little further north, around Great Brickhill in Buckinghamshire. Around the same time, a second and larger royalist munitions convoy left Newark and, taking a more westerly route than the first, safely reached the king's main army around Banbury, no more than shadowed by parliamentarians. But by then, even more dramatic events were unfolding in the West.

The combined royalist army in the region overwhelmed much of Somerset in early June, including Dunster Castle, Bridgwater, Taunton and Wells. On 10 June a parliamentarian force, a mixture of local troops and some of Waller's men, clashed with royalist horse under Maurice around Chewton Mendip, on the Mendips, in a lengthy cavalry engagement which was inconclusive and also rather confused, not least because the area was for a time shrouded in a thick summer mist.[51] Waller's forces returned to his new base at Bath, where he attempted to build up his army in order to match the forces which the royalists now possessed.

Resupplied and reinforced though still short of infantry, he took to the field at the beginning of July, sparring with royalist forces around the Somerset–Wiltshire border. To meet an expected royalist advance, early on 5 July Waller led his army north-westwards out of Bath and occupied the northern edge of the broad and flat summit of Lansdown Hill, throwing up defensive works along the ridge. At the same time, the royalist army was approaching from Marshfield to the north and initially deployed on Tog Hill, a mile and a half from Waller's position. The armies which engaged at the ensuing battle of Lansdown were equally matched, with around 6,000 men apiece.

After lengthy but inconclusive skirmishing between advanced units of dragoons and with the royalist commander apparently thinking that Waller would not give battle and so beginning to move some of his forces back towards Marshfield, around 1,000 mounted parliamentarians advanced to challenge the main royalist line. Although initially successful in creating disorder, further royalist horse supported the foot in repulsing this attack; the parliamentarians fell back to their main line on the brow of Lansdown Hill. Encouraged by this and perhaps thinking that Waller's whole army was in retreat – 'the enemy to encourage us to persecute this success gave all the symptoms of a flying army, as blowing up of powder, horse and foot running distractedly upon the edge of the hill,'[52] reported Atkyns – the royalists advanced, taking position on Freezing Hill much closer to their enemies and pushing on, not only engaging parliamentarians in the valley between the two hills but also climbing the northern slopes of Lansdown Hill to launch central and flanking assaults on Waller's main line. Waller's men were in a very strong position and the royalists suffered heavy casualties and were several times forced back. At length, not least through the bravery of some Cornish infantry under Sir Bevil Grenville, the royalists took the crest of the hill. As Atkyns recalled, 'When I came to the top of the hill, I saw Sir Bevil Grenville's stand of pikes, which certainly preserved our army from a total rout, with the loss of his most precious life; they stood as upon the eaves of an house for steepness, but as unmovable as a rock.' Atkyns also recalled the uncertainty of that phase of the battle, 'for the air was so darkened by the smoke of the powder, that for a quarter of an hour […] there was no light seen but what the fire of the volleys of shot gave'.[53] Eventually forced back from the crest, Waller's men fell back several

hundred yards and took up a new position behind a stone wall which ran across the hill. From their new positions, at 'sunset […the armies were] still pelting at one another half musket shot off'.[54] Nightfall brought an end to fighting, the royalists holding their new position at the northern edge of Lansdown Hill. The parliamentarians left matches glowing on the stone wall behind which they were sheltering to make it seem that they too were holding position – 'they left all their light matches upon the wall and whole bodies of pikes standing upright in order within the wall as if men had held them'[55] – though in reality they withdrew to Bath under cover of darkness. The royalists pulled away north back to Marshfield the following morning.[56]

While neither side gained clear victory at Lansdown and the engagement was indecisive, the royalists lost several senior officers killed or wounded, their supply of gunpowder was greatly depleted and they suffered a serious setback the following morning. As the army gathered on Tog Hill, a number of officers were viewing parliamentarian prisoners, who had been mounted on an ammunition cart, when by accident or design one of them, possessing 'match to light their tobacco', caused the gunpowder to explode, resulting in 'a very great noise and darkened the air for a time and the hurt men made lamentable screeches'. Several royalist officers were killed or badly wounded, including Hopton, who was 'miserably burnt'.[57] He was carried off in a bed, 'his head being as big as three and both his eyes blinded'.[58] According to Walter Slingsby's account, 'this disaster encouraged the rebels and discouraged us; our horse were bad before but now worse, our foot drooped', and the whole army was very short of gunpowder.[59] Thus the royalist army was initially on the defensive and fell back ahead of Waller's men, their foot and the gravely wounded Hopton seeking refuge in Devizes, while much of their horse returned to Oxford in search of reinforcements.

Perhaps thinking that time was on his side, Waller besieged Devizes. But on 13 July a 1,800-strong cavalry relieving force dispatched from Oxford under Henry Wilmot approached the town. In response Waller drew his much larger 5,500-strong army out to face and to engage it on Roundway Down. There followed the decisive engagement of this brief campaign and also one of the most decisive of the entire war. The two armies faced each other on chalk downland north of Devizes, drawing up in parallel lines initially over a mile apart. The royalist army, comprising

entirely horse and with no infantry, deployed in three blocks, two at the front under Wilmot and Sir John Byron, and a third behind as a reserve under Lord Crawford. Waller deployed his much larger army in the conventional manner, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on both wings. After sparring between advanced units of horse, the royalists attacked the two wings of Waller's horse, Wilmot charging Waller's right and Byron his left. Wilmot seems to have broken and put to flight Waller's right wing quite quickly, though Byron had a stiffer fight before Waller's left broke. In his later account, Richard Atkyns claimed an important role in this royalist cavalry charge, identifying and attacking the parliamentarian cavalry commander and Waller's right-hand man, Sir Arthur Hesilrige. Atkyns alleged that he twice discharged his pistol at the heavily armoured Hesilrige at very close range, but that he was 'too well arm[our]ed all over for a pistol bullet to do him any hurt, having a coat of mail over his arms and a headpiece […] musket proof'; Hesilrige survived, though 'he staggered and presently wheeled off from his party and ran', pursued by Atkyns, who injured and brought down his opponent's horse and was about to take Hesilrige prisoner when he was spotted and rescued by 'a runaway troop of theirs'.[60] Watching from Devizes, the royalist infantry saw 'the enemy's whole body of horse face about and run with speed, and our horse in close body firing in their rear, until they had chased them down the hill in a steep place, where never horse went down nor up before'.[61] Waller had drawn up near the western edge of Roundway Down and his fleeing horse crashed down a steep escarpment.

Wisely, the royalist horse did not attempt to pursue the parliamentarian horse down this fatal slope – in his own account of the battle, Byron related how the parliamentarians' 'fear made them so valiant that they galloped down as if it had been plain ground, and many of them brake their own and their horses' neck'[62] – but remained on the field to attack Waller's infantry. However, the royalist horse could achieve little against well-equipped and well-ordered parliamentarian musketeers and pikemen, who held their ground. Only when the royalist infantry in Devizes marched out to attack did the parliamentarian infantry decide to fall back, initially in good order but then increasingly ragged as troops tried to descend the steep slope – 'they began to fall in pieces and melt into such disorder that they suffered miserably', as one royalist account put it[63] – and were now easily picked off by royalist horse. Although Waller

made it back to Bristol and gathered some surviving forces there, before moving off to Gloucester and into the Midlands, he retained probably little more than 1,000 fit troops. Of the 5,500-strong army which he had led at Roundway Down, the remainder had been killed, injured or captured or simply melted away in the wake of defeat. As a parliamentarian officer, Edward Harley, ruefully admitted, despite Waller's numerical advantage, 'this time nothing hath been gained by us with multitudes', noting that 'we must needs look upon this as the hand of our God mightily against us for it was He only that made us fly', for 'we had very much self-confidence and I trust the Lord has only brought this upon us to make us look more to Him'.[64] In very similar terms, much later Waller suggested that he had fallen victim to overconfidence, for 'my presumption upon mine own strength and former successes [was] justly humbled at the Devizes by an utter defeat'.[65]

Despite early success at Reading, thus far the main parliamentarian campaign of 1643 had been dismal. Essex had been inactive and unadventurous, while Waller had failed to combine with him in the Thames valley to bring their numerical advantage to bear against Oxford, had then failed to prevent the royalist armies in the West combining and had now heavily lost a battle against a much smaller royalist force; for this last disaster he unconvincingly tried to blame Essex for failing to prevent royalists sending a relieving cavalry force from Oxford. But thereafter, the main royalist campaign in the South and southern Midlands itself lost momentum.

Firstly, Rupert persuaded his uncle to sanction an attempt on Bristol, whose centre was strongly defended by the rivers Frome and Avon, stone walls and gates, and a medieval castle and whose suburbs were defended by a mixture of stone walls and gates, earthen ramparts and ditches, and a series of earthwork artillery forts. In mid July Rupert set out at the head of the main Oxford army, rendezvousing outside Bristol with Maurice and the king's western army, creating a combined force of around 15,000. Within Bristol the parliamentarian governor, Nathaniel Fiennes, had around 2,000 troops. Rupert arrived before the town on 23 July, formally summoned it the following day, and on the 25th, in a council of war, decided to storm rather than to besiege it. At or before dawn on 26 July the royalists attacked the outer line in several places. Although heavily outnumbered and hard pushed to defend a circuit

nearly five miles long, the parliamentarians initially repulsed royalist attacks on the northern and southern stretches of the outer line, inflicting heavy casualties; the royalists lost large numbers of men as they attacked intact walls and artillery forts, Atkyns recalling that 'as gallant men as ever drew sword […] lay upon the ground like rotten sheep'.[66] However, at length Henry Wentworth and his royalists broke through on the western side, crossing the ditch and wall at a point where they were immune from fire from the adjoining forts; they then breached the line to allow royalist cavalry to enter. After further heavy fighting but steadily reinforced by comrades, they attacked one of the gates on the inner line, the Frome Gate. Meanwhile, Fiennes ordered most of his men to fall back within the inner line to try to hold it, allowing the royalists to take further sections of the outer defences and one of the artillery forts. After house-to-house fighting around and outside the Frome Gate and elsewhere and an attempted parliamentarian counter-attack, early in the afternoon Fiennes opened negotiations and that evening Bristol was surrendered to the king's men.[67]

From the parliamentarian perspective, the fall of Bristol was a terrible blow and Fiennes was subsequently court-martialled, convicted and sentenced to death – though reprieved by Essex – for surrendering it so swiftly and, his accusers claimed, unnecessarily.[68] From the royalist perspective, the capture of Bristol gave the king England's second town, a west-coast port and a centre of trade and manufacture, as well as the military and other supplies and shipping found there. But all this had come at a high price. The operation, although in the end successful, had left many royalists killed or injured, with casualties particularly high amongst officers and the infantry. A royalist eyewitness stressed the dangers inherent in 'a general assault', the folly of launching a direct attack on an artillery fort 'which is not to be taken by a storm' and the high casualty rate which resulted, reporting that in some areas 'to my own knowledge a full third part [of the royalists were] killed and wounded' and that he viewed large numbers of royalist dead on the evening of 26 July and on touring the defences the following day.[69] Some historians are critical of the decision to attack Bristol and its consequences, pointing out that although possession of the town might boost royalist fortunes and resources in a lengthy struggle, it did not contribute to defeating parliamentarian field armies and thus to securing victory in 1643, and

moreover that the heavy casualties sustained at Bristol limited the king's options over the following weeks.[70] Some contemporaries, too, were critical, including the royalist Hopton, who noted pointedly that 'diverse extraordinary good men' in the king's army had been killed in the course of the 'unhappy assault' upon Bristol.[71]

Secondly, the king selected Gloucester as the next target. With the main northern royalist army under Newcastle bogged down elsewhere and with too few men available to contemplate a serious attack upon London or upon Essex's army, which had taken up a defensive position west and north-west of the capital, mopping up the West and South West was a useful if again somewhat limited alternative. Maurice was dispatched with the western army to capture remaining parliamentarian-held strongholds in Devon, while the king and most of his Oxford army focused on capturing Gloucester and thus potentially opening up the Severn valley as a royalist artery of trade and commerce. The king decided upon a lengthy formal siege operation, which would also serve as a breathing space for recruiting to restore regiments depleted at Bristol.

Although Gloucester possessed some surviving Roman and medieval stone walls and gates and a castle, the masonry defensive line was incomplete and had been supplemented by newly dug earthen banks and ditches. Its parliamentarian garrison of around 1,500 men was commanded by Edward Massey. The king's forces, numbering 12–13,000 men, massed around the town during the second week of August and operations began in earnest around the 10th. The royalists began digging ditches around the southern and eastern sides of the defences, while shortly afterwards further troops closed up the town on the western or Welsh side. The defenders, meanwhile, rapidly strengthened their own earthworks, blocking gateways and reinforcing stretches of stone walls with earth and turf; wool sacks were used to close up smaller breaches. Although there was minor skirmishing, with sallies and counter-attacks, no serious assault was attempted and instead both sides focused on building various offensive and defensive earthworks, with mining and counter-mining under way by the latter half of August. The royalists also maintained a steady bombardment using their plentiful artillery, including mortar pieces and incendiaries – a parliamentarian account reported that during the siege the royalists fired 'between three and four hundred great shot, and above 20 grenadoes and as many fiery bullets',

while claiming that only four people were killed by them and very few were injured; it went on to suggest that only around 40 people perished in Gloucester, most of them killed by royalist musketeers when 'looking over the wall […] to see their works'.[72] Another parliamentarian soldier, part of the relief army which eventually got into Gloucester, reported that the royalists had 'shot many grenadoes of great weight, which when they fell in the city were red as fire, yet blessed be God killed not one man therewith, only tore up the ground as if a bear had been rooting up the earth'.[73] The parliamentarians had to be sparing in using their own artillery, as their store of gunpowder was limited.

34. *Although originally from a minor Cheshire family, by autumn 1642 Edward Massey was commanding parliamentarian forces in Gloucester and he remained as governor of the town until spring 1645, displaying conspicuous determination and dynamic leadership during summer 1643, when the town was closely besieged by a massive royalist army. His successes at Gloucester led on to a field command, of parliament's western army, during the last year of the war, but thereafter he became increasingly disenchanted with the parliamentarian cause, was suspected of royalist sympathies and imprisoned from time to time, and he spent much of the 1650s on the Continent, actively supporting the royalist cause in exile.*

Despite royalist propaganda and repeated demands that Massey surrender, by late August the garrison had word that a large relief army had been assembled in London under Essex and was marching westwards to their aid and the garrison's resistance continued. Rather than risk being trapped between this army and the parliamentarian garrison and perhaps already with an eye on engaging Essex on ground of their choice, the royalists abandoned the siege and moved away, allowing Essex to enter and to resupply Gloucester unhindered. On 4 September the defenders spotted the royalists carrying off some wounded by boat and noticed that cavalry were also being withdrawn, which raised hopes, while on the 5th the rest of the royalist force departed: 'we discovered their carriages making [away…] perceived their foot and horse marching after […and] perceived their rearguard to fire their huts and their men to be drawn out of their trenches.'[74] The king's army had sustained no significant losses and moved off in good order, but the month-long operation in poor weather had achieved nothing and Gloucester remained parliamentarian.

Thirdly, the king then failed to achieve the consolation prize of destroying or seriously damaging the army under Essex dispatched from London to relieve Gloucester. This 14,000-strong force, a mixture of regular and experienced troops, newly raised men and some units of the London trained bands, departed from Gloucester on 10 September, initially marching north, occupying Tewkesbury and building a bridge of boats across the Severn, as if intending to move on Worcester. The king responded by moving his army north and occupying Evesham. But instead Essex, whose real intention was to return to London, swung southwards on 15 September, pushing that night as far as Cirencester, which surrendered to parliament. The king was initially caught unawares – according to an imaginative parliamentarian report, when he and his entourage heard the news 'they did stamp and swear and curse their scouts exceedingly, that they gave them no better intelligence of our departure'[75] – and was left far behind. By the 17th Essex reached Swindon, while the pursuing royalists retook Cirencester, killing or capturing negligent parliamentarians who had stayed behind there 'drinking and neglecting to march with their colours, who are not much to be pitied'.[76] Aiming for the Kennet valley, Essex reached the downland of Aldbourne Chase on 18 September, only to hear that advanced royalist cavalry units were nearby. The royalist horse sparred with and harassed

Essex's army throughout the day, causing few casualties but achieving their aim of slowing the parliamentarian advance and so allowing the king's army time to close. Increasing fatigue and the bad weather – 'it was a night of much rain [and] we were wet to the skin'[77] – had the same effect, though the king's army suffered in the same way, a royalist account relating how 'the unceasing winds next morning soon dried up our wet-through clothes we lay pickled in all night (as a convenient washing of us at our coming from the trenches)'.[78] Fearing further attacks, Essex crossed the Kennet at Hungerford, which he reached on the evening of the 18th, protected by putting the river between his army and the royalists but in the process abandoning the main road, which then as now ran north of the river, and instead marching eastwards on the south side of the valley along smaller and slower roads and through more enclosed ground, which again afforded protection but at the cost of losing speed. He approached Newbury on 19 September only to find that the king's army had got there before him and had occupied both the town and the area to its south. Essex halted around Enborne, a couple of miles west-south-west of Newbury. The king had successfully overtaken Essex's army, blocked its path to the safety of Reading and was determined to force battle. The royalist debacle of Gloucester might yet be retrieved by glorious victory.

The battle of Newbury of 20 September was large and complex. It is likely that the two sides were quite evenly matched, with around 14,000 men apiece, and probably with broadly similar proportions of horse and foot. Thus it was numerically by far the biggest battle of the year and one of the biggest of the entire war. It was also one of the longest, for it began around 7 a.m. and continued for 12 hours or so, until around 7 p.m., from dawn until dusk, making full use of the daylight available on that late-September day. Fighting occurred across a very mixed area of land to the west and south-west of Newbury, comprising open commons, especially the raised plateau of Wash Common south-south-west of the town, hedged enclosures to the west and north of it and a strip of meadow running along the south side of the river Kennet. The area was crossed by two main roads, running south-south-east from Newbury to Basingstoke and south-south-west to Andover, as well as by a complex network of smaller lanes. There was also a distinct 'S'-shaped escarpment, running east–west to the south of Newbury, then turning north–south a mile to

the west and finally swinging back east–west near its southern end, where the ground rose to the elevated plateau of Wash Common and its environs. The battlefield was bounded by the river Kennet to the north and, running roughly parallel to it, the smaller river Enborne to the south.[79]

Most formal battles of this size began with the two armies deployed in parallel lines and in similar formations, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on both wings. That did not happen so clearly or neatly at Newbury. Although the two armies deployed at the start of the day facing each other in broadly north–south arrangements, the royalists to the east of the parliamentarians and thus blocking their route to Reading and London, the topography meant that neither side deployed in neat lines. Although both had horse at the southern end of their lines, their centres and northern wings comprised a mixture of horse and foot. Moreover, most engagements of this size were fought because both sides saw advantage in giving battle and wished it to happen. At Newbury, the parliamentarians had no desire to fight and merely wanted to get through the area and to continue eastwards; Essex's principal objective was not to defeat the royalists but simply, as a parliamentarian account put it, to 'force our passage'.[80] He had no choice but to try to push ahead, even though that meant a fight on and around Wash Common. He lacked the numerical advantage to attempt with any hope of success to attack Newbury and so to cross the bridge over the Kennet there. Equally, he could not merely halt and try to hold his current position, as his army was running short of food and there was a risk that further royalist forces would advance from the west and so trap him in a pincer movement.

Sources for the battle are plentiful and there are several strictly contemporary accounts, including what might be called the official parliamentarian account, which was anonymous but probably written on behalf of Essex, and the official royalist account by Lord Digby,[81] as well as narratives by a more junior parliamentarian officer who was in one of the London trained bands regiments[82] and a clutch of reports which appeared in the newspapers of the day. Somewhat later versions of events were written by the royalists John Gwyn and the secretary of Lord Belasyse,[83] who were present at the battle, as well as by Lord Clarendon, who was not. However, contemporary accounts often give incomplete or confusing versions of events and it is not always easy to reconstruct from them a clear, coherent narrative.



35. *Another enlargement from the engraving of the Earl of Essex on horseback, this section of the map shows in stylised form the first battle of Newbury. While it can provide no information about the nature and course of the battle, other than that it involved action between blocks of pikemen and units of cavalry, it does accurately place the battle to the south-west of the town.*

Essex's army moved at dawn on the 20th, 'advancing towards the enemy with most cheerful and courageous spirits', as one parliamentarian account put it.[84] While troops at the left – that is, the north – end of his line moved towards the meadows by the Kennet and in the direction of Newbury, perhaps hoping to trick the royalists into believing that Essex's intention was to attack the town, much of his army moved eastwards, mounting the escarpment and taking up positions on the western side of Wash Common. Some parliamentarian cavalry took the lead, probably hoping to flank and to protect the infantry as it made its way across the common. But in a series of sporadic encounters, the royalists reinforced the common and began gaining the upper hand, not only halting the parliamentarian advance but also pushing the forward units westwards, either onto the edge of the common or back down to the enclosed ground below it; they also disrupted parliamentarian attempts to establish forward artillery positions. Both armies seem to have maintained reasonable order in these manoeuvres, casualties had not been unusually heavy and the engagement had been something of a stalemate. The intermittent artillery exchange had gory results – a parliamentarian officer saw one of his own gunners 'shot in the head with a cannon bullet from the enemy' and commented how it was 'somewhat dreadful when men's bowels and brains flew in our faces', while a royalist claimed after the battle to have seen lying dead on the heath 'a whole file of men, six deep, with the heads all struck off with one cannon shot of ours'[85] – but artillery alone did not determine a battle.

It was during the latter half of the day that casualties rapidly mounted, as the royalists took the offensive and repeatedly attacked parliamentarian musketeers and cannon lining hedges and within enclosures. The parliamentarians remained in good order and these attacks were fought off with heavy losses. Some royalist infantry apparently refused to attack such strong parliamentarian positions, while some royalist cavalry did launch assaults but suffered very severely as a consequence; amongst those killed or fatally wounded on the royalist side were Lords Caernarvon, Falkland and Sunderland. When fighting ended at dusk, the parliamentarians had made only very modest territorial advances and the royalists still held much of Wash Common and the land south of Newbury which Essex needed to cross; nothing seemed to have been resolved. However, battle did not resume on the morrow, for by dawn the royalists had fallen back into Newbury. Essex did not at first advance, perhaps fearing a trick and an ambush, but in fact the royalist army took little further action and Essex was able to march away eastwards during the afternoon of 21 September. It is not entirely clear why the king's army effectively abandoned the fight after its first day, but the explanation may lie more in the very heavy casualties sustained in attacking well-positioned, well-disciplined and well-armed parliamentarian infantry than in shortage of powder or ammunition, though the latter may have played a part.

On the following day some of Rupert's cavalry attacked the rearguard of Essex's army in and around a lane near Aldermaston. According to a parliamentarian officer, it caused some initial disruption, for the rearguard of horse 'fled [and] routed our own foot, trampling many of them under their horses' feet, crying out to them "away, away, every man shift for his life, you are all dead men"'; both the royalist cavalry attack and the flight of their own horse created panic amongst part of the waggon train. However, parliamentarian infantry units steadied the position, repulsed the royalists, captured some cavalrymen and 'knocked out their brains with the butt end of their muskets'.[86] No great damage was done and without further significant fighting Essex's army safely returned to the London area via Reading. Perhaps overcautiously, the parliamentarian garrison at Reading was withdrawn and royalists quickly reoccupied and regarrisoned the town, thus reversing the event which had opened the main campaign; in the wake of the battle of Newbury,

royalists also garrisoned Donnington Castle, just north of the town, and reinforced Basing House.

Thereafter, the principal armies of king and parliament effectively went into winter quarters. Thus, the 1643 campaigning season for the armies of the king and parliament's lord general lasted less than five and a half months, from mid April to late September, and had done little to alter the balance of power. Instead, for the remainder of 1643 the focus returned to a decentralised or provincial style of campaigning in which the king and Essex played only indirect parts. This was the type of civil war which dominated the early and closing months of 1643 and which had a far greater and more direct impact upon the changing fortunes and territorial possessions of the two sides in the course of the year.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE AUTUMN AND WINTER

In Gloucestershire, local royalists under Sir William Vavasour and Sir John Winter maintained some pressure on parliamentarian Gloucester, though they lacked the resources tightly to besiege the town or seriously to attack it.[87] Further west, in Devon, Maurice and much of the king's western army reinforced local royalists in a determined effort to mop up remaining parliamentarian garrisons. Barnstaple and Bideford fell quickly at the beginning of September and Exeter, too, despite its stone walls and larger garrison, surrendered quite promptly. On 3 September Maurice unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment against the town and although the parliamentarians sought to negotiate, the royalists were determined to end things quickly. Before dawn on the 4th they attacked parliamentarian positions to the south of the walled town: 'with firelocks and pikemen with pistols by their sides, that lighted matches should not discover our design […they] march[ed] silently an hour before break of day, to assault the line jointly, by way of surprise.' According to this later royalist account, the operation was successful, all parliamentarians there were killed or captured, parliamentarian artillery pieces were taken and turned upon the town, and the royalists advanced to the wall.[88] Exeter surrendered to the king's men on terms on the 7th. Dartmouth was the next target, but the pace slackened as the royalist siege operation was disrupted by sallies from the parliamentarian garrison, deteriorating

weather and sickness amongst the royalists, and not until 5 October did it surrender.

During the rest of the autumn Maurice besieged Plymouth, the last surviving parliamentarian garrison in Devon, reinforcing local forces which had blockaded the town since summer, deploying around the eastern and northern sides and bringing up heavy guns both there and at Saltash on the other side of the Tamar; the royalists also mounted guns at Mount Edgecumbe, on the Cornish side of the estuary. However, the garrison and its determined governor were well protected by a newly built circuit of earthen and stone ramparts, complete with bastions or integral forts, around the town, by a string of earthwork forts to the

36. *Published early in 1644 to accompany a printed account of the unsuccessful royalist operation against Plymouth of the closing months of 1643, this map shows the town completely enclosed by a defensive circuit which comprised remaining sections of the medieval stone walls greatly enhanced and extended by earthwork ramparts, a stone wall and projecting bastions constructed in 1642–3. The area around Plymouth and especially the northern approaches to it were further protected by additional earthwork artillery forts, most of them depicted here in triangular form, and several of those to the north of the town were linked by an earthwork bank and ditch, beyond which the besieging royalists – the 'enemy' according to this plan, confirming that it was drawn up by the parliamentarians – had their main strongpoints.*

north and by a further free-standing earthwork artillery fort, Mount Stamford, on the promontory across the Plym estuary, south of Plymouth. Repeated sallies disrupted royalist operations and even though, 'hoping […] to perform what the hellish plot of the gunpowder treason should have done',[89] the royalists took Mount Stamford after a hard fight on 5–6 November and launched several raids on the northern defences in early December, the town was not seriously threatened. A particularly destructive parliamentarian counter-attack in late December, combined with increasing royalist exhaustion, persuaded Maurice to abandon the operation and he marched away on Christmas Day.[90]

There was no great change in the East Midlands, largely because the potential push south in force by Newcastle's northern army never materialised. Secure in Kingston upon Hull, the Fairfaxes rebuilt their army and, with 3,000 or more troops, they began raids deep into Yorkshire. Pro-royalist Yorkshire landowners demanded protection, urging Newcastle to keep most of his troops within or close to the county. Equally, as the year progressed and as the English parliamentarians moved towards a military alliance with the Scots, Newcastle became uneasy about his northern frontier, vulnerable to Scottish attack, and wary about committing too many men too far south. Instead, at the beginning of September he deployed the bulk of his army of around 15,000 to besiege Kingston upon Hull, though the operation proved a repeat of the earlier desultory royalist siege. The defenders again opened earth banks to flood low ground around the town, while parliamentarian naval supremacy ensured both that troops and supplies could be moved freely into and out of the town and that royalist attempts to construct artillery forts on the north side of the river and on its south bank, opposite the town, were thwarted. During the second week of October Newcastle abandoned the futile operation and moved away.[91] Thus while some of his troops, bolstered by men from Newark garrison, secured much of Lincolnshire during latter half of 1643, both because Newcastle was reluctant to commit too many men far from Yorkshire and the North and because most of his army was tied up for six weeks besieging Kingston upon Hull, there was no major drive south in force.

Newcastle had sent parts of his army, often mounted units, to fight in Lincolnshire, though with mixed fortunes. In cavalry engagements fought outside Gainsborough on 28 July and Winceby on 11 October,

37. *While Sir John Hotham, shown here in his pomp on horseback before the town of Kingston upon Hull, was a parliamentarian hero for his resolute defence of the town during 1642, by winter 1642–3 his enthusiasm for war and for fighting the king was waning, as he increasingly urged a negotiated settlement, and by the time of the renewed and again unsuccessful royalist siege of autumn 1643 he was gone, deprived of his governorship by parliament at the end of June and quickly captured and imprisoned on suspicion of plotting to betray the town to the king. While Kingston upon Hull survived the war, a parliamentarian stronghold throughout, Hotham did not, as he was tried and convicted by court martial during the closing weeks of 1644 and beheaded on Tower Hill on the second day of 1645.*

royalists under Charles Cavendish and jointly Sir William Widdrington and Sir John Henderson respectively were defeated by parliamentarian horse. Both engagements were brief, involved small numbers of mounted troops – around 3–4,000 at Gainsborough, around 5,000 at Winceby – and had little impact on the wider course of the war. At Gainsborough, a parliamentarian relieving force engaged and defeated royalist troops which were besieging the town and which had drawn up on a hilltop to its east; the main parliamentarian horse and then a cavalry reserve attacked uphill, putting the king's men to flight and killing their commander. However, the victory was immediately undone, for a much larger royalist force approached the following day, the now heavily outnumbered parliamentarians retreated and town and garrison swiftly fell to the king, surrendering on 30 July. Lincoln fell a few days later without a fight. At Winceby, parliamentarian cavalry protecting colleagues besieging nearby Bolingbroke Castle clashed with and defeated royalist horse on rolling ground near the edge of the Wolds, the two armies at first deploying on roughly parallel ridges and then engaging in a series of charges and counter-charges in the depression between them. But while the royalist defeat at Winceby underlined that the king's men were losing momentum and perhaps contributed to their surrender of or withdrawal from Lincoln and Gainsborough soon after, the royalists were not in any case advancing through the region at that stage. Winceby was probably not crucial to the fate of East Anglia, as parliament's victory there did not stop the king's northern army from breaking into the parliamentarian heartlands, for there was no sign that that was imminent or likely; whatever the outcome of Winceby, Newcastle was bogged down in Yorkshire and distracted by Kingston upon Hull and there was little prospect of him committing most or all of his troops to the road south. These engagements are, however, important because they were two of the earliest examples of parliamentarian cavalry outperforming the hitherto superior royalist horse, they were won by what became parliament's most important regional army of the first half of the war, the Eastern Association army, and they were battles in which a rising star of parliament's war effort, Oliver Cromwell, at this stage colonel of a cavalry regiment, played a substantial role.[92]

In the shorter term, Winceby confirmed that something approaching stalemate had been reached in the East Midlands. In early October the

parliamentarians easily snuffed out a royalist rising in King's Lynn, on the borders of Norfolk and Lincolnshire, but despite recapturing several towns and strongholds in Lincolnshire, they were unable to threaten the royalist garrison at Newark. Further south, during October the royalists raided Bedford and occupied Newport Pagnell, but they soon had to evacuate the latter and parliament garrisoned and fortified Newport. Similarly, during the autumn the royalists garrisoned Towcester and nearby Grafton Regis in Northamptonshire, but the parliamentarian hold on the area was too strong and Grafton fell at Christmas, while the royalists abandoned Towcester in January 1644.[93]

Something similar became apparent with the failure of royalists and parliamentarians to alter significantly the balance of power and control in two other regions where campaigning continued. In the North West, Lancashire was fairly quiet under parliamentarian control and most of Shropshire and Staffordshire remained in the king's hands, though parliament had established a fairly secure hold over the northern parts of both; an attempt by royalists in mid October to recapture Wem in north Shropshire was fiercely beaten off. However, it was in the divided county of Cheshire, with the centre and east controlled by Brereton's parliamentarians and the western parts and Chester by royalists, that most action occurred. Unable seriously to threaten Chester, instead in early November Brereton and some of his troops crossed the Dee at the next bridging point upstream, brushing aside a royalist guard at this key Holt–Farndon crossing. They swept on into Wrexham and turned northwards, overrunning most of the western side of the Dee estuary and towns and castles there and encountering little resistance in this apparently solidly royalist area. Brereton lacked the men and resources to push on westwards with any reasonable expectation of conquering and holding the heartlands of royalist North Wales, but he may have hoped to retain this north-eastern Welsh buffer zone, isolating Chester from Wales and so enabling him to step up action against the garrison. In reality, his force was in full flight by late November and Brereton quickly evacuated almost all the newly won territory and pulled back into Cheshire. He did so because during the fourth week of November royalists landed in the Mostyn area on the Welsh side of the Dee estuary around 4,000 foot shipped over from Ireland to reinforce the king's forces in England and Wales. Having refreshed and re-equipped in Chester,

they combined with other troops, including 1,000 horse from Rupert's army, which the city's new governor and regional commander, Sir John Byron, raised to the peerage as Baron Byron [Plate 19], had with him and together they formed a new and much larger Cheshire royalist army.

During a rapid midwinter campaign and displaying brutality not hitherto seen in the county's civil war, this royalist force briefly overran much of central Cheshire, including Beeston Castle and Middlewich. Despite deteriorating weather, in January they besieged Nantwich, Brereton's parliamentarian headquarters – as Byron put it, it was 'of that importance that unless we were masters of that town we could not assure ourselves of anything in the country'.[94] Protected by a circuit of earthwork bank and ditch and by free-standing earthwork strongholds guarding entrances to the town, the garrison beat off a royalist assault at dawn on 18 January. The royalists continued the siege, but help was soon at hand, for Sir Thomas Fairfax marched from Lincolnshire, across the Midlands to Manchester, picking up reinforcements both en route and in that strongly parliamentarian area. On 24 January, his relieving army approached Nantwich from the north through thick snow. Contemporary accounts of the battle which occurred outside Nantwich late on the 25th suggest that a rapid thaw during the night of 24–5 January had caused the river Weaver, which ran north–south through the Nantwich area, to rise significantly, temporarily isolating the royalists besieging the town on the eastern side from their colleagues based at Acton on the western side. However, by the time Fairfax's force of up to 3,000 foot and 1,800 horse arrived outside Nantwich in the afternoon and was ready to give battle, the eastern royalists had got round to join their colleagues deployed at Acton. Fairfax was therefore facing Byron's full force, which was probably around the same size as his own army. At that point, Fairfax may have attempted to carry on into Nantwich, in order to link up with the garrison, but as he did so the royalists moved forward and attacked, forcing Fairfax's troops to turn and face them. Although troops on the royalist wings caught the front and rear of Fairfax's moving army in some disorder and had an initial advantage, the royalist centre did not perform well and began to lose ground, especially when it found itself caught in the rear by up to 1,000 parliamentarian foot from the Nantwich garrison, which sallied out. Byron later claimed that his centre had fallen back 'almost without fighting a stroke', while his brother, Robert Byron,

38. *The dramatic hilltop castle at Beeston, overlooking the Cheshire plain, fell to Byron's new royalist army surprisingly easily during December 1643, as a band of royalists first broke into the lower or outer ward and then, crossing the dry, rock-cut inner ditch, took control of the upper ward, part of the walls of which are shown here. While the lacklustre parliamentarian commander was soon executed for his cowardice and suspected treachery in giving up the castle so easily, the royalists garrisoned Beeston as a forward outpost of Chester and only relinquished it in late 1645, having been starved out by a lengthy parliamentarian siege.*

39. *As part of their sometimes brutal midwinter campaign in Cheshire, on 23 December a group of royalist troops, commanded by a Major Connaught, attacked Barthomley, smoked out a group of twenty villagers who had sought refuge in the imposing late-medieval church tower by burning benches and pews at its base and then killed twelve of them on the spot, leaving the remaining eight badly wounded. Lord Byron, who was not actually present, supported the action, crowing in a letter a few days later that 'we presently beat them forth of it [the church] and put them all to the sword, which I find to be the best way to proceed with these kind of people, for mercy to them is cruelty'.*

hinted at 'foul play' and suggested that some of these troops defected to parliament and turned and fired on former colleagues. All this allowed the parliamentarians to isolate the two wings of Byron's army, where the royalist horse, which could play little part in the engagement because of the enclosed nature of the ground, 'were struck with a panic fear [and] so disordered the rest, that though they did not run away, yet it was impossible to make them charge'.[95]

The battle had not begun until after 3 p.m. and the fading light of the short winter's day saved the royalists from utter destruction. Some made it back to the safety of Chester – much of the cavalry probably survived and shortly afterwards Byron claimed that he retained 1,200 foot[96] – though others who sought refuge in Acton Church overnight surrendered and fell prisoner the following morning. The royalists lost no more than 300 dead and around 1,500 captured, and much of the newly formed royalist army escaped and survived. However, the reports which Byron and his brother wrote at the end of the month had a defeatist air about them – 'It hath pleased God of late to turn the tide of our good fortune here' and 'our whole actions have been nothing but disasters' – and show how events had turned in a single battle, with the Chester royalists defensive and calling for reinforcements.[97] Although Fairfax soon moved on, Brereton again controlled most of Cheshire and was soon applying pressure on Byron and the royalist garrison in Chester.[98]

Much further south, Waller's parliamentarians and Hopton's royalists fought a brief autumn and early-winter campaign in central southern England and the fringes of the South East. Having rebuilt his army in London, by the beginning of November Waller had 5–6,000 men, which he based in and around Farnham Castle. Having recovered from the serious injury sustained after Lansdown, Hopton – also now created a peer as Baron Hopton – commanded around 3–4,000 men in Hampshire and had orders to take the fight to Waller, not only clearing Dorset, Wiltshire and Hampshire of parliamentarians but also 'point[ing] forward as far as he could go towards London'.[99] There followed several weeks of indecisive sparring between the two. When royalists secured and fortified Winchester in early November, Waller did not challenge them and instead fell back and half-heartedly besieged the royalist garrison in Basing House. When Hopton approached Basing, he withdrew and returned to Farnham. Hopton moved on Farnham at the end of

November but, unable to tempt Waller out to give battle and unwilling to launch an attack on the strongly fortified parliamentarian position, with his enemies deployed under and protected by the guns of Farnham Castle and despite Waller attempting to lure him on, Hopton fell back on Winchester. With winter approaching, he divided his army amongst a string of urban bases spread east–west across the centre of Hampshire, including Winchester, Alresford, Petersfield and Alton; slightly later, Hopton established a unit at Romsey to threaten Southampton, but raids by the Southampton parliamentarians forced it out. More successfully, at the beginning of December, the Petersfield unit, reinforced by some horse from Oxford, pushed eastwards into weakly held parliamentarian territory in western Sussex, their advance being covered by 'a great mist', so that they surprised and swiftly captured Arundel; following a brief siege, the small parliamentarian force in Arundel Castle also surrendered.[100] Although attempts to move further east petered out, the royalists had gained a strong base in hitherto parliamentarian Sussex.

But the fortunes of war swung back towards parliament. Hopton's unit stationed rather vulnerably at Alton was overwhelmed less than a fortnight later, when Waller marched overnight and 'soldier-like' taking 'advantage of the woodiness of that country', as Hopton admitted,[101] swooped on his target at dawn. The attack on 13 December was not the complete surprise that Waller hoped, for the royalists had been alerted by a sentry. Parliamentarian horse attacked a body of royalist cavalry, which galloped off towards Winchester to seek help, while the foot focused their attack on the main royalist position – the area of high ground around the parish church, churchyard and adjoining brick and stone buildings, which the royalists had strengthened with several earthworks. The parliamentarians bombarded the position and covered their movements by deliberately firing a thatched house to create clouds of smoke. Outflanked and outnumbered, the defenders were steadily pushed back towards and into the churchyard. Eventually, royalists there were overwhelmed and fell back, some of them deliberately leaving their muskets visible over the top of the churchyard wall to confuse the attackers, though the parliamentarians soon entered and began 'laying about them stoutly with halberds, swords and musket stocks', while others 'threw hand-grenadoes in at the church windows [and] others attempting to enter the church'.[102] Royalist resistance continued within

the church, the defenders firing from platforms constructed inside the windows and also from behind horses 'slain in the aisles, of which the enemy had made breastworks'.[103] Only when their commanding officer, who had threatened to kill any who sought to surrender and cried for quarter, was himself killed did the defenders in the church surrender, Waller taking almost 1,000 prisoners back to Farnham.

By 19 December Waller was outside Arundel and on the following day a determined parliamentarian assault overwhelmed the outer defences of town and castle and forced the royalists back into the medieval castle itself, despite withering musket fire from the defenders. The parliamentarian officer John Birch had just spoken to a fellow officer when the latter was shot dead, and a few paces further Birch himself was 'shot in

40. *The royalist colonel Richard Bolle and – so his late-seventeenth-century engraved brass epitaph which survives in Winchester Cathedral claims – around eighty of his men withdrew into Alton Church and continued desperately to withstand Waller's assault. Resistance collapsed only when Bolle was killed, reputedly dispatched by several blows from the butt ends of parliamentarian muskets while standing in this fine late-Jacobean pulpit, from which he was attempting to encourage his men to maintain the fight.*

[…his] belly', though allegedly through God's help he managed for a time to fight on, keeping 'in […his] guts [and] stopping the hole with […his] finger', before handing command to a captain and collapsing.[104] Having taken the town, with assistance from reinforcements Waller closely besieged the castle for three weeks, frightening off a royalist relieving force. A parliamentarian account admitted that the siege was 'long and tedious', the besiegers enduring 'high winds and extraordinary showers of rain',[105] but the sufferings within the castle were worse. Although over the Christmas period the garrison tried to make light of their position and to make it appear that they had plenty of supplies, writing to request 'sack, tobacco, cards and dice to be sent unto them to make merry [at] this idle time, promising to return us for them beef and mutton', an attempt by some to get away by river 'in a boat made of raw ox hide' indicated that in reality things were not so rosy.[106] At length, shortage of food and drinkable water – Hopton reported that an ox fell into the castle's 'best well' and was left there, so that it became unusable[107] – and other supplies, compounded by 'the bloody flux and spotted fever' amongst the defenders, compelled the garrison to negotiate and the castle was surrendered on terms, Waller's men taking control on 6 January 1644.[108] Royalist attempts to break into Sussex had failed and were, at least for the moment, at an end.[109] While further north the combatants in Cheshire fought on through the winter weather of January 1644, during the third week of that month heavy snowfall in southern England effectively brought an end to campaigning there for several weeks and ended the 1643 campaign.

CONCLUSIONS

One theme to emerge from the war during 1643 is that of mistakes, missed opportunities and distractions on both sides. For the parliamentarians, these include the slow start to Essex's main campaign and his general lack of dynamism during spring and summer, the failure during spring of Essex and Waller effectively to cooperate or to pool resources in order to bring to bear their potential numerical advantage in the Thames-valley region against the king's headquarters and his main army in and around Oxfordshire, and the failure of Waller both to prevent royalist armies in the South from combining and then to halt their

ROBERT DEVEREUX EARLE OF ESSEX &EWE VISCOUNT HERREFORD LORD FERRYES
of Charttley Bouchey
ment for the defence of the Protestant Religion King
Kingdome

41. *The map which appears in the background of this image of the parliamentarian commander-in-chief, the Earl of Essex, on horseback of October 1643 reveals that, despite the active and martial figure he cuts here – his horse rearing, his scarf or sash billowing behind him, fully armoured and equipped ready for action – in reality his achievements during the first year of the war had been rather limited and military victories few and far between. The map highlights the defence of Brentford and battle of Edgehill of autumn 1642, and the siege and capture of Reading, relief of Gloucester after minor skirmishing nearby, capture of Cirencester and first battle of Newbury of late summer 1643, but has little to show beyond that and much of the map is rather empty.*

advance through south-western and southern England. For the royalists, these would include the attack upon Bristol and the expensive victory gained there, probably the long and fruitless sieges of Gloucester and Kingston upon Hull, even though there was some justification for both, and the effective abandonment of the fight against Essex's army after the first day at Newbury. Another overall feature of the war is that by late 1643 there were signs that, employing the resources then available to both sides, something approaching a balance or stalemate had been reached in several regions, a new equilibrium which might be changed only if the resources available to either side were to alter significantly in the New Year. But it was a balance which earlier in the year had tipped very much in the king's favour. Thus the third broad theme of the war during 1643 is that it was for the king a year of useful, significant or very substantial territorial advances in almost all English regions outside the North West. The royalists had gained territory in northern England east of the Pennines, in parts of the northern, eastern and western Midlands and, most dramatically, across large swathes of south-western and central southern England. In spring 1643, as just about all England and Wales were secured for king or parliament, the land mass was divided fairly evenly between them. In the wake of royalist military successes, by late 1643 the king's men controlled certainly more than two-thirds, perhaps nearer three-quarters, of England and Wales [Map 4]. Despite some signs of the royalist effort stalling towards end of year and of parliamentarians, forced back into their heartlands and with shortened supply lines, mounting a firmer defence and beginning to win key engagements, in many ways the royalists appeared to be winning the civil war during 1643 and might look to the New Year with optimism.

5

'Pluck[ing] a victory out of the enemies' hands': The Fighting and Campaigns of 1644

> Having before our eyes the glory of God […] the honour and happiness of the king's Majesty and his posterity and the true public liberty, safety and peace of the kingdoms, wherein every one's private condition is included; and calling to mind the treacherous and bloody plots, conspiracies, attempts and practices of the enemies of God against the true religion and professors thereof in all places, especially in these three kingdoms […] and how much their rage, power and presumption are of late and at this time increased and exercised […] we have […] resolved and determined to enter into a mutual and solemn league and covenant.[1]

Although expressed in religious language and presented as a pledge to defend the true faith, the more immediate and pressing aim of this agreement between parliament and the Covenanter government of Scotland in September 1643 was to pave the way for the entry into England of a substantial Scottish army in support of the English parliament and its war effort. Indeed, as a result of negotiations undertaken by king and parliament during 1643 and successfully concluded before the year's end, from the start of 1644 troops from the other British kingdoms entered mainland England and Wales and contributed to the continuing war there. Accordingly, 1644 – the various regional and national campaigns of which are explored in this chapter – was the year in which the English Civil War more directly gained a British element.

The king had looked west, to Ireland, and during 1643 concluded a truce or cessation with the Irish Catholics, who had quickly gained control of most of Ireland after their Rebellion of autumn 1641 and

who, via an Irish Confederacy government, administration and army, were now confirmed in quiet possession of much of the island.[2] This would enable the king to bring back to fight for him on the mainland many English and Welsh troops who had been dispatched to Ireland in the months between the outbreaks of the Irish Rebellion and of the English Civil War – up to 10,000 of them – together with further troops which might be raised amongst the surviving Protestant population in Ireland, most of fairly recent English or Welsh descent, who, thanks to the cessation, were now secure.

As we have already seen, the king's deal bore fruit during winter 1643–4, with the landing on the Dee estuary in late 1643 of several thousand foot who had crossed from Leinster and formed part of Byron's new royalist army which campaigned across Cheshire until heavily defeated by Fairfax in late January 1644. A few more landed around the Dee estuary and the North Wales coast early in 1644, while during winter 1643–4 several thousand, mainly from Munster, landed in western England and joined Hopton's army and existing royalist forces around Gloucester and in Dorset. In total, around 8,000 troops from Ireland, mainly infantry and with just a few hundred cavalry, landed in England and Wales between October 1643 and March 1644. Most were English and Welsh troops sent over in 1641–2 and probably no more than 1,000 might be deemed 'Irish' in the sense that they had property or family roots in Ireland and had lived there for a time. They were overwhelmingly Protestants, with very few if any Catholics coming over to fight for the king on the mainland before spring 1644 and after.[3]

In practical terms, the number of troops which the king gained from Ireland during winter 1643–4 did little to boost his war effort, especially as many who landed in the North West formed the core of the army so badly mauled at Nantwich within weeks of arrival; others, both there and in western England, soon deserted or defected to parliament. More generally, the king's deal with Irish Catholics, who had recently risen up in rebellion against English and Protestant rule and had killed many Protestants of English and Welsh descent, caused misgivings, even amongst his supporters. It handed the parliamentarians an easy propaganda victory, which they certainly took by portraying all royalists coming from Ireland as 'Irish' and implicitly or explicitly tarring them with the brush of being brutal Irish Catholic murderers of English and

Welsh Protestants, even though in reality their only links with the Irish Rebellion had been to oppose it. Parliament's propaganda machine was active by the time of the first engagement involving significant numbers of these men, the battle of Nantwich, with one parliamentarian pamphlet, entitled *The King's Letter Intercepted Coming from Oxford, with a Joyful and True Relation of the Great Victory Obtained by Sir Thomas Fairfax, Sir William Brereton and Sir William Fairfax against the Irish at the Raising of the Siege at Nantwich* – a great victory against 'the Irish' – stressing that these were 'Irish forces' who had perpetrated great 'cruelty' and were nothing but 'traitorous Irish rebels'; it went on to claim that, after the battle, the parliamentarians discovered 'a sort of Irish women, that were in the enemies' camp, whose office was to rob and plunder our men that fell and with long knives which they had hanging by their sides to cut the throats of those that they found not quite dead'.[4] In practice, because the parliamentarians controlled the navy and had supremacy at sea, it was easy to initiate naval patrols in the Irish Sea to intercept and to search boats found crossing from Ireland and to prevent potential royalists from reaching their destination. Accordingly, from March 1644 the flow of troops successfully crossing from Ireland to fight for the king in England and Wales reduced to a mere trickle, with probably no more than 1,000 men in total reaching the mainland during the remainder of the year.[5] The king's deal did very little to enhance his war effort and its impact on the unfolding campaigns of, and the balance of power during, 1644 was slight.

Conversely, parliament gained huge military advantage from the deal it had struck with the Scots. During the opening weeks of 1644 a large and well-equipped Scottish army, comprising well over 20,000 men, many of them experienced troops, crossed the Tweed and began pushing southwards into royalist northern England, threatening the king's control of the North. They changed the balance of power in that region and played a major role in overturning territorial control there before the end of the year. Their military impact during 1644 was almost wholly beneficial to the parliamentarian cause and initially involved none of the complications, disappointments and disadvantages which from the outset beset the king's Irish deal.[6]

As for the course of the war in England and Wales during 1644, some traits already noted during 1643 were repeated. Thus the campaigning

season of the armies of the king and Essex were quite short, beginning in the second week of May and effectively ending soon after the second battle of Newbury of late October, thus lasting less than half the year. Instead, as in 1643, fighting began in late winter and continued through the spring as a series of regional or provincial contests. However, while the regional contests of the opening months of 1643 were vital in establishing the initial balance of power between, and competing territorial possessions of, king and parliament in many areas, and so shaped the ensuing national conflict, effectively providing the starting point for the war, those of the opening months of 1644 were far more limited and less important in the overall course of the conflict. Indeed, although both sides enjoyed clear successes and suffered setbacks in these clashes of early 1644, they were not followed up and did not lead to major changes in the course or fortunes of war; with hindsight, they may be viewed as missed opportunities. Instead, most significant territorial changes of 1644 came about because of a few large engagements fought by the main armies, including the Scots. Another trait of 1644 was the way in which increasingly stark differences opened in the fortunes of war in different areas. While the parliamentarians and their allies overwhelmed the North, in the Midlands and the South they made little progress and the royalists generally retained not only most of their territory but also to some extent the upper hand there.[7]

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES DURING THE SPRING

The Scottish army crossed the Tweed in January but made slow progress south during February and March. The caution of the Scottish commander, his decision to blockade Newcastle upon Tyne for a time, harassment by the Earl of Newcastle's royalist army and bad weather all contributed. But the Fairfaxes, too, were slow in either coming to their aid or launching diversionary attacks to the south with their force of around 7,000. Not until early April did they challenge royalist control of Yorkshire, engaging several thousand royalists under Lord Belasyse whom Newcastle had left in the York area. On the afternoon of 10 April Lord Fairfax approached Belasyse's troops, based at Selby, and beat in the guards. After spending the night outside the town, he attacked early on the 11th. The parliamentarians assaulted the town

in three places, but the royalists put up stiff resistance and held them at bay for two hours, though the account written for Belasyse claimed more dramatically that it was 'eight or ten hours'. At length and perhaps through treachery, some parliamentarian foot entered the town close to the river Ouse, 'betwixt the houses and the river', whereupon Sir Thomas Fairfax's cavalry 'rushed into the town', wounding and capturing Belasyse. Royalist resistance collapsed, 'the enemy was wholly routed and, as many as could, saved themselves by flight', while around 2,200 fell prisoner.[8] With his southern flank in disarray, Newcastle hurried back, entering York a week or so later and making preparations to hold the city with his infantry, sending his cavalry away to Newark. But the Scots, who Sir Thomas Fairfax thought were 'with cold and often alarms […] reduced to great extremity',[9] pursued Newcastle only very slowly, while the Fairfaxes were slow to follow up their success at Selby. Had they been more enterprising, Newcastle's heavily outnumbered force might have been caught between them north of York and the long and difficult siege of the strongly fortified city which followed from late April onwards might have been avoided.[10]

A second missed opportunity fell to the royalists in the Midlands. Early in the year Rupert was given overall command of Wales and the Marches, but not until the latter half of February did he establish his headquarters in Shrewsbury. Within weeks he was called away to the East Midlands, where, after the royalist defeat at Winceby and the loss of many royalist garrisons in Lincolnshire, Newark was isolated and under pressure. Although the royalist governor, Sir Richard Byron, had nearly 2,500 men, by early March a regional parliamentarian army of 7,000 men, led by Sir John Meldrum, was menacing Newark, holding bases around the town and investing it more tightly. Ordered to aid Newark, during mid March Rupert crossed the Midlands from Shrewsbury, on his way picking up reinforcements from royalist garrisons, so that when he approached Newark from the south on 20 March he had around 6,500 men. Displaying his customary energy and drive and determined to attack before the besiegers had an opportunity to withdraw or to summon reinforcements, Rupert went on the offensive immediately.

In the early hours of the 21st advanced units of Rupert's army occupied Beacon Hill, a mile east of Newark, overlooking most of Meldrum's army, drawn up on low ground north-east of the town,

though with some horse in a more advanced position on the lower slopes of Beacon Hill. At around 9 a.m. Rupert charged down and attacked these horse and a fierce exchange ensued, in the course of which the royalist right faltered for a time, while at one point Rupert himself became isolated; he was 'assaulted by three sturdy rebels, whereof one fell by His Highness's own sword, a second being pistolled […and] the third now ready to lay hand on the prince's collar had it almost chopped off' by another royalist. However, the parliamentarian right performed poorly and, a parliamentarian account claimed, simply 'ran away'. Much of Meldrum's army then retreated onto part of 'the island', a large area of flat land west and north-west of the town, formed by the division and reunion of the Trent. There was also a pause in the fighting as the rest of Rupert's horse and his foot arrived, while troops from the royalist garrison also came to assist. Dispatching men to the far side of the island, Rupert surrounded the parliamentarians, who were 'cooped up in a very narrow room', as the royalist account put it; the prince had decided it would be 'cheaper to block up their trenches than to storm them'. Outnumbered, surrounded, short of supplies and with some of his troops mutinying or deserting, Meldrum too decided not to fight and instead sought terms. His troops were allowed to march away but had to leave behind their arms and ammunition; although Meldrum lost around 200 dead in the initial engagement, most of his men survived.[11] It was an impressive victory, often viewed as Rupert's most complete and inexpensive triumph, and it ensured the survival of the Newark garrison, but otherwise had few lasting effects. Rupert hurried away, back to Shrewsbury and then off to join the king's main war effort further south, while within weeks parliamentarian forces recovered bases in central and northern Lincolnshire, including Lincoln and Gainsborough, which had been abandoned upon Rupert's arrival and Meldrum's defeat.

There were missed opportunities on both sides in the South. The contest between Hopton and Waller resumed in late February and early March. Both commanders were reinforced, Waller with men from Essex's main army under Sir William Balfour, Hopton with men from the king's Oxford army under Lord Forth. With an enhanced force of 8,500 men, Waller was ordered to push west, perhaps attacking Winchester, perhaps bypassing it and moving on royalist bases in Dorset. The royalist army

of up to 7,000 men was technically commanded by Forth as the senior officer, though he was old and gouty and in practice worked closely with Hopton. Together, they were to block Waller's advance. However, both commanders were also ordered to give battle only if they had a clear advantage and victory was likely and these orders encouraged caution on both sides. During the last week of March the two armies manoeuvred and sparred in the area east of Winchester, but neither seemed set on battle, even when on 27 March both deployed little more than a mile apart around and east of the village of Corhampton and then raced to occupy Alresford, and when on the 28th they deployed south of Alresford, on rolling land east of the village of Cheriton – the settlement which in modern histories routinely gives its name to the battle

42. *An experienced and hardened Scottish mercenary with long experience of fighting in Ireland and on the Continent, despite the failure of his operation against Newark in spring 1644 and the surrender of most of his army to Rupert's relieving force, Sir John Meldrum's mainly Midland-based campaigns for parliament were generally successful, including the defence of Kingston upon Hull, the capture of Liverpool, holding steadfast in battle at Edgehill and gaining a clear victory at Montgomery later in 1644. However, he suffered repeated setbacks while besieging Scarborough in spring 1645, falling from the cliff top, though he survived because his cloak acted as a form of parachute, then painfully 'shot through the cods [testicles]' and finally dying slowly after being shot in the stomach during a failed assault upon the castle and its royalist garrison.*

fought on the following day, though contemporaries more often named it after nearby Alresford.

The battle of Cheriton of 29 March is well documented, with half a dozen accounts by or about parliamentarian officers who fought there – Robert Harley, Sir Arthur Hesilrige, John Birch, Balfour, John Jones and an officer with the initials E.A.[12] From the royalist perspective, we possess quite detailed accounts by Hopton and by Walter Slingsby.[13] While between them they give a fair account of what became a rather disorganised battle, 'the worst prosecuted of any I ever saw', one thought,[14] they are at times confused or unclear. Cheriton was a long battle, lasting from mid morning to late afternoon, it was intermittent or episodic and some phases, such as the cavalry engagements which probably ran through the afternoon, are covered briefly in surviving accounts. Even the precise location of the battle is not entirely clear. It was fought on land east of Cheriton and the Itchen valley, which was crossed by a series of chalk ridges or spurs aligned east–west and separated by valleys, as well as by a number of small hedge-lined lanes; there was some open land or heath in the area, though much had been enclosed, and there were some woods, especially Cheriton wood on the eastern side of the battlefield. Contemporary accounts reveal that Cheriton wood featured at the start of the battle and that the armies were drawn up on two parallel ridges, the northern occupied by the royalists and the southern by the parliamentarians, who then clashed in the valley between them. However, which two ridges and valley they were, of the several sets available in the area east of Cheriton, is not entirely clear in the contemporary accounts and remains a matter of debate. Not all historians agree, but John Adair and Malcolm Wanklyn make a good case for the two armies having by nightfall on 28 March secured the southern two ridges, with Waller's army on the northern edge of the ridge to the north of Hinton Ampner village, below which ran the Winchester-to-Petersfield road, and an advanced royalist brigade under George Lisle occupying the next ridge to the north, directly east of Cheriton village and with Cheriton wood to their east.[15]

Although parts of the armies were in position overnight, battle did not start at dawn. Instead, overnight and under cover of early morning mist, Waller sent forward some horse and foot to occupy Cheriton wood, thereby threatening the royalist left and an outflanking manoeuvre.

Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., as the mist burned off under strong spring sunshine, Hopton and Forth realised what had happened – 'the morning was very misty, so as he [Hopton] could not make a clear discovery till the sun was near his two hours up', wrote Hopton[16] – and they responded in two ways. Firstly, they reinforced their front line by bringing up much of the army to support Lisle. Secondly, they attacked Cheriton wood, initially with 1,000 musketeers, but when they encountered 'very thick and sharp' fire,[17] further royalist infantry attacked the north side of the wood. The parliamentarians in the wood were expelled and fell back to rejoin their main line. At that point, Hopton contemplated attacking Waller's line, but Forth was cautious, directing that the royalists 'should not hazard any farther attempt' and should leave it to Waller either to advance or to retire; Hopton claimed that he was 'extremely well satisfied with that solid advice'.[18] Waller, too, was largely holding his position and showed no enthusiasm for battle.

Fighting resumed when some royalist foot under Henry Bard, apparently acting without orders, moved forward and 'hotly engaged with the enemy' – perhaps Waller's horse, much of which he had moved forward ahead of his main line 'into a heath, which stood betwixt the two hills where they did fight', as Harley noted[19] – in the shallow valley below. Thus 'the forwardness of some particular officers, without order'[20] caused some royalist troops to attack the parliamentarians, who overwhelmed them; Slingsby condemned Bard's foolishness in 'leading on his regiment further than he had orders for, and indeed with more youthful courage than soldier-like discretion', causing the regiment's destruction.[21] Around the same time and probably in a separate development, a larger body of royalist foot attacked the western end of Waller's line, where his men were stationed in what accounts referred to as a 'little village', initially making good progress, but then pushed back when Waller sent in reinforcements. Forth did then authorise at least one royalist cavalry attack, ordering forward 1,000 horse under Sir Edward Stowell, with some infantry support, but after half an hour this force was 'broken and routed'.[22] There may have been further royalist cavalry attacks during the afternoon and some historians suggest that for a time a more general cavalry engagement developed in the valley, though sources for this are thin. In the course of the afternoon, some parliamentarian infantry and dragoons began pushing forward on both wings, threatening to outflank

the royalists and to cut their line of retreat. This, together with the losses they were sustaining in the cavalry engagements, probably prompted Hopton and Forth firstly to pull back to the ridge upon which they had started the day and then to conduct a reasonably orderly retreat as darkness fell, initially back towards Alresford and then away.

The royalists lost several cavalry officers at Cheriton and, as a result of his failures there and earlier in the campaign at Alton and Arundel, Hopton also lost his army, which the king decided to absorb into his Oxford army. However, the parliamentarians made few tangible gains. Waller raided Winchester, but made no attempt to hold or to garrison it and instead the royalists, who temporarily fell back into the castle, soon regained control. The parliamentarians did capture and hold Christchurch, on the east Dorset coast. But Waller did not use his victory to launch a wider campaign in southern England and instead, rather unenterprisingly, by mid April he had fallen back to Farnham. Like the clear victories obtained at Selby and Newark, Cheriton did little to alter the course of the war.

Further west, Prince Maurice and his 6,000-strong army resumed campaigning in spring 1644 and, leaving Plymouth blockaded, made Lyme Regis their principal target. A small town, hemmed in by hills and with hastily constructed earthwork banks and ditches and artillery forts to defend it, Lyme was nonetheless an important parliamentarian naval base, from which seaborne raids were being launched. Moreover, the royalists had intelligence of parliamentarian plans to expand operations in the area, using Lyme. Maurice approached and surrounded the town on its landward side in mid April, overwhelming minor parliamentarian outposts in the area. But thereafter, as the very detailed parliamentarian accounts of the siege made clear, the operation became bogged down, not least because parliament was able to keep Lyme well manned and supplied by sea, while the garrison also mounted destructive raids and sallies, capturing or spiking royalist guns which were bombarding the town and repulsing Maurice's occasional attacks upon the defences.[23] Although the besiegers got closer to the defensive lines, they paid a high price in dead and injured – parliamentarian claims that Maurice lost up to 2,000 men are implausible, but all accounts suggest that he suffered significant losses. Parliament authorised a relieving army to march to Lyme's aid and by the second week of June this was approaching through

Dorset. Maurice decided to abandon the siege and move away. On 14 June his men were seen taking down tents, drawing off heavy guns and loading carts. In the early hours of the 15th it was noticed that they were no longer returning fire and parliamentarians who cautiously investigated found the royalist trenches and strongholds deserted.[24] Although the royalists were later to gain a huge and unexpected advantage from the incaution of the relieving army sent into the West, in terms of Maurice's original objectives his eight-week siege had failed.

MIXED FORTUNES IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH DURING THE SUMMER

The principal armies of the king and Essex did not begin campaigning until late spring, after a false start. During April parliament directed the Earl of Manchester to bring part of his Eastern Association army into Buckinghamshire to reinforce Essex, before moving against the king in the Thames valley, but Manchester stayed put, arguing that in the wake of Newark his priority should be restoring parliament's position in Lincolnshire. Essex's army therefore remained in winter quarters around London. Equally, although the king rallied his Oxford army in April, reviewing over 10,000 men, no action followed. Not until the latter half of May did Essex, supported by Waller, who had been ordered to assist, begin operations against Oxford and the king's army. So long as Essex and Waller could work together, their forces would significantly outnumber the troops which the king had at Oxford and so seriously threaten both the king and his capital; should the king quit Oxford, they would then be faced with a choice of whether to pursue him or to attempt to capture the city. In the face of this, on 18 May the king abandoned Reading, now very exposed, and used its garrison troops to reinforce his Oxford army; parliament quickly occupied it. Working in tandem, Waller and Essex moved west along the south bank of the Thames, prompting the king to abandon Abingdon, too, also occupied by the parliamentarians, on 26 May. Essex and Waller then tried to encircle Oxford. Essex crossed the Thames and moved around the east and north of the city, for a time held up at the bridge over the Cherwell near Islip – where, according to a royalist report, 'our soldiers hung lighted matches at the mill and bridge […] to cheat Essex, and so fairly

left the place, the enemy shooting many times that night at the matches in vain'[25] – but eventually crossed and pushed on to Woodstock. Meanwhile, Waller moved around the south of Oxford. Their aim was to reunite around Witney, thus completing the encirclement. Alive to the danger, the king left Oxford with such troops as he could usefully take with him before the trap was complete. On 3 June he led around 7,500 horse and musketeers, who probably rode behind the troopers, out of the still open west side of Oxford, away across the Cotswolds to Evesham and on to Worcester, putting the Severn between him and his opponents. Essex and Waller followed behind, though hardly in hot pursuit. On 6 June, with the king approaching Worcester, the two parliamentarian generals were in Chipping Norton. There, they reached a major decision, which had huge consequences for the southern campaign and the war in 1644.

Essex and Waller decided that their priorities would be pursuing and defeating the king and relieving hard-pressed Lyme Regis. For the moment, Oxford and the troops, mainly infantry, left there by the king, could wait. Waller would pursue the king, ideally reinforced by parliamentarian troops in the West Midlands and the North West, while Essex would turn south-westwards and go to Lyme's aid. Parliament and its main executive committee seemed content with this in principle, while preferring the forces to be employed the other way around, with Waller returning to the West and Essex focusing on the king, but by the time it intervened, the two armies were too far advanced to change the original plan.

Waller moved west through the Cotswolds, capturing Sudeley Castle, and then swung north to Evesham. The king moved north from Worcester as far as Bewdley, as if heading for Shrewsbury, shadowed by Waller, whose army, reinforced at Stourbridge on 14 June, substantially outnumbered his opponents. The king either abandoned a genuine plan to move north or decided that his feint had worked and doubled back through Worcester and across the Cotswolds towards Oxford, breaking down bridges behind him to hinder Waller, though this went wrong at Pershore, where the bridge collapsed prematurely – 'forty of our men lost […when] the bridge fell from under them into the river'.[26] At Witney on 20 June the king rendezvoused with much of the foot left behind at Oxford and pressed on into Buckinghamshire, picking up further troops en route. Waller was left far behind and either because he assumed that the king

would head towards Bristol or because he contemplated abandoning his pursuit and instead heading into the South West himself, he took a southerly route and was in Gloucester by 20 June. When parliament reiterated that he was to move against the king, Waller set off eastwards and advanced towards Banbury in north Oxfordshire. The king, too, returned to north Oxfordshire to shadow Waller's army and to ensure that his lines of communication with Oxford remained open, able to do so with more confidence as the two armies were now roughly equal, with around 9,500 men apiece. By 28 June the two were very close to each other around Banbury and the upper Cherwell valley, north of the town, the parliamentarians west and the royalists east of the river.

The battle of Cropredy or Cropredy Bridge fought on 29 June was a disorganised and fragmented encounter, initiated by opportunistic parliamentarian strikes across the Cherwell as the two armies were moving northwards, but in which the parliamentarians came off worst. At no point did the entire armies engage each other, the battle instead comprising fierce clashes between different units, fought at different points along the Cherwell valley during a hot summer's day. Contemporary parliamentarian accounts by Waller and two officers serving under him, Thomas Ellis and Richard Coe, as well as the later account written for John Birch,[27] and on the royalist side accounts by Sir Edward Walker, Richard Symonds and Lord Digby, all of whom were present, plus a detailed report which appeared in a royalist newspaper very soon afterwards,[28] together allow us to reconstruct events.

The main action began shortly before noon, when Waller, noticing that the king's army had become temptingly strung-out as it marched north, launched cavalry attacks upon the royalist rear, 'to bite the heel according to his custom', as a royalist account put it.[29] Crossing the river by the bridge at Cropredy and at a ford nearly a mile further south, the parliamentarian horse moved forward, hitting the flank and rear of the king's army. The unit which crossed Cropredy Bridge was initially very successful, carrying all before it and pushing the royalists back over a mile to the next bridge upstream, where the road taken by the king crossed the Cherwell as it turned north-eastwards; this opened up a good bridgehead for the parliamentarians, who moved some infantry and much of their artillery across Cropredy Bridge onto the east bank. However, the parliamentarians who had crossed further south were far less successful

and were quickly repulsed. This freed royalist troops to counter-attack and both the parliamentarian horse, which had reached the northern bridge but were halted and repulsed there, and the infantry and artillery, which had followed them over Cropredy Bridge, were now fiercely counter-attacked in the area east of the bridge and between the villages of Cropredy, Williamscot and Wardington. Only with great difficulty and significant losses, including much of the artillery, did the parliamentarians get back over the bridge to rejoin the main parliamentarian army west of the river, around Great Bourton and on Bourton Hill. The royalists did not attempt to cross the river or to attack Waller's shaken army. After a late-afternoon artillery exchange, the two armies stayed in the field overnight, before marching off in different directions the following day. Waller had lost around 700 dead or captured, but much worse was to follow, for after his mauling at Cropredy and with morale low, his army disintegrated. Reinforcements set to join him in Buckinghamshire mutinied and many of his own troops, particularly those from the London militia, deserted. Waller attempted but then abandoned a half-hearted pursuit of the king in mid July and instead, leaving those troops he still possessed at Abingdon, he returned to London in late July.[30] The king and his main army were now largely unchecked and at liberty to take the initiative. However, good news was balanced by bad, for it was at this point, as the army opposing him in the South was falling apart, that the king heard first rumours and then firm reports that the royalist army which he had sent northwards under his nephew Prince Rupert had suffered a stinging defeat.

That a major royalist army should be dispatched to assist Newcastle's northern royalists against the Scots had been considered intermittently during the late winter and spring. The royalist defeat at Selby and the increasing pressure on Newcastle's 4,500 men besieged within York gave added urgency and during the latter half of April Rupert urged his uncle to approve a 'northern design'. The king had reservations, arguing that the priority was the position in the South and that his southern army should have first call upon resources. Although approval was given in principle in early May, not until mid May did Rupert set out from Shrewsbury with the mixed goals of rebuilding the royalist position in southern Lancashire and relieving York. Gathering together an army of around 8,000 men, Rupert headed north into Lancashire, on 25 May

throwing back parliamentarian forces at Stockport, capturing the town and crossing the Mersey. Bypassing Manchester, Rupert then launched a whirlwind campaign in southern Lancashire.

His first target, approached during the afternoon of 28 May, was parliamentarian Bolton, defended by earthwork banks and around 2,500 armed men, a mixture of parliamentarian troops and townsmen. However, Rupert now had up to 12,000 troops, and was joined by the Earl of Derby, back from the Isle of Man and keen to settle old scores. Royalist attempts to storm the town were initially thwarted by heavy rain and determined resistance, but a second assault by horse and foot, with Derby to the fore, overwhelmed the defenders. The royalists burst into the town and unleashed death and violence, a parliamentarian account claiming that

> nothing heard but kill dead, kill dead was the word in the town, killing all before them without any respect […] their horsemen pursuing the poor amazed people, killing, stripping and spoiling all they could meet with, nothing regarding the doleful cries of women and children, but some they slashed as they were calling for quarter, others when they had given quarter, many hailed out of their houses to have their brains dashed out in the streets […] But I forbear many sad things that might be inserted, the usage of children crying for their fathers, of women crying for their husbands, some of them brought on purpose to be slain before their wives' faces; the rending, tearing and turning of the people naked, the robbing and spoiling of all the people of all things that they could carry.[31]

Even allowing for exaggeration, other accounts confirm that the scale and nature of the killing at Bolton went well beyond what was usual when a town fell and included not only members of the garrison and other troops but also civilian townspeople, women as well as men. Many hundreds perished – the total death toll may have been over 1,000 and possibly closer to 2,000 – and more than 600 were carried away as prisoners. Thereafter, parliament consistently viewed the event as a massacre.

Turning south-west and gaining further recruits en route, on 7 June Rupert deployed on high ground overlooking Liverpool, its parliamentarian garrison defended on the landward side by an earthwork bank and

43. *Although not specifically linked to the events at Bolton or to Rupert's campaign in southern Lancashire, this image of atrocities being committed by royalists, including the killing of women and children and (top left) the burning of towns, was published later in 1644, adorning the title page of a pamphlet printed in London by order of parliament. Clearly an example of parliamentarian propaganda, the accompanying text ranges over several issues, including reproducing* A Copy of the King's Message Sent by the Duke of Lenox *(which serves as the overall title of the pamphlet), though much of the text focuses upon recent atrocities perpetrated in several parts of England by royalist troops and their adherents, 'barbarous blood-suckers and inhumane beasts' as they are referred to at one point.*

ditch and with further earthworks surrounding the castle. Liverpool was too strong to be immediately stormed in the manner of Bolton, so Rupert instead bombarded the defences. Although initial attempts to break into the town were repulsed and the garrison received reinforcements and supplies from parliamentarian warships, by 12 June the defences were crumbling and some senior parliamentarians began getting away by sea. In the early hours of 13 June the royalists successfully stormed the town, resulting in further killing and plundering, though not on the scale of Bolton.[32] Spurred on by a further letter from the king urging the relief of York, on 19 June Rupert left Liverpool at the head of a 13,000-strong army, travelling via the Derby mansion of Lathom House, which had been besieged by parliamentarians during the spring, though they melted away long before the prince arrived. Moving up the Ribble valley

from Preston to Clitheroe and crossing into Yorkshire, Rupert picked up further reinforcements at Skipton on 26 June.

Awaiting Rupert outside York was a huge parliamentarian besieging force of up to 30,000 men and comprising the bulk of the Scottish army, the Fairfaxes' Yorkshire army and also a large part of the Eastern Association army under Manchester which joined the operation in early May. With such numbers at their disposal, the parliamentarians initially contemplated maintaining the siege while using the bulk of the troops to intercept and to engage Rupert's army as it approached York. However, they thought better of this and, instead, on 30 June – the same day that Rupert arrived at Knaresborough, a day's march from York – the siege was lifted and almost the entire parliamentarian army redeployed onto moorland a few miles west of the city in anticipation of Rupert's approach. But the prince took a more circuitous northerly route, entering York unopposed late on 1 July. Even though he had relieved York, his army was tired and he was significantly outnumbered, Rupert insisted on engaging the huge parliamentarian army without any delay.

The battle of Marston Moor was fought on fairly flat moorland to the west of York on the evening of 2 July. The parliamentarian army deployed roughly east–west between the villages of Tockwith and Long Marston on the northern slope of a slight hill or ridge, the royalists in a parallel line well under a mile to the north – too close to the enemy, one of Newcastle's officers thought, bluntly telling Rupert that 'he did not approve of it [the army] being drawn too near the enemy and in a place of disadvantage' and then brushing aside the prince's suggestion that the army could be moved back with the blunt comment 'it is too late'.[33] Both armies deployed in the conventional manner, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on both wings, arranged in two or more often three lines, the rear line generally acting as a reserve; for extra protection, the royalists put some musketeers amidst and adjoining their cavalry and also placed a small reserve of cavalry behind their foot in the centre. The area was crossed by a number of ditches, particularly one hedge-lined ditch – perhaps continuous, perhaps discontinuous – also running roughly east–west across the battlefield between the two armies. In the light of vague or inconsistent comments about this in contemporary accounts, modern historians differ about exactly where it ran – not far in front of the parliamentarian front line, roughly midway between

the two armies, or perhaps closer to the royalist front line – as well as about how deep and difficult it was to cross at this time and thus the role it played in the ensuing battle. There was also at least one ditched enclosure somewhere on the north – that is, the royalist – side of the battlefield, but no hedged enclosures. However, a number of linear hedges ran along the lower hillside where the parliamentarians initially drew up, some of which were cut down to enable the army fully to deploy. Cereal was growing in the area where the parliamentarians deployed, contemporary accounts noting that they were in a 'great cornfield' and that the army drew up 'in a large field full of rye, where the height of the corn […] proved no small inconvenience unto our soldiers'.[34] There was a wood on the north side of the battlefield, behind the royalist line, and a small stand of trees behind the parliamentarian line. As well as the Tockwith-to-Long Marston lane, two rough tracks ran northwards from it, the western one close to Tockwith, roughly opposite where the parliamentarian left wing of cavalry deployed and across which the royalist horse of Rupert's right wing deployed, the eastern one around a mile from Long Marston.

The engagement was by far the largest of the English Civil War, involving around 46,000 men, 28,000 parliamentarians and 18,000 royalists. It also had a clear outcome and it was quickly apparent that it formed a major turning point in the war, at least in the North. Perhaps in consequence, there is an abundance of contemporary and near-contemporary source material relating to it, but it is variable in detail and quality and sometimes problematic. The most valuable royalist sources include accounts by the soldiers Sir Hugh Cholmley, though he did not fight at Marston Moor, Arthur Trevor, who was also in the area but not present throughout, Sir Henry Slingsby, who apparently was an eyewitness, and the later biography of Newcastle by his wife.[35] Although accounts which were printed soon after in the royalist newspaper *Mercurius Aulicus* may draw on Rupert's report or reports of the battle which he must have written to the king,[36] no detailed account by the prince appears to be extant. On the parliamentarian side, there survive a handful of accounts written by or in the name of Scottish officers, including John Lumsden, John Somerville and a Captain Stewart,[37] and another clutch by English parliamentarian officers and other apparent eyewitnesses which were printed in pamphlets over the summer, including those by

or in the name of Simeon Ashe, Lionel Watson and W.H.,[38] while the official report which the senior parliamentarian generals submitted to parliament's executive committee after the battle was also soon printed.[39] Cromwell's main surviving account of the battle was his letter focusing upon the death in battle of the recipient's son, while Sir Thomas Fairfax's main account was written well after the battle as part of his 'Short memorial of the northern actions'.[40]

The armies deployed slowly during 2 July, both because the parliamentarians had not expected Rupert to offer battle so soon or in that area and had already began moving off towards Tadcaster, which meant that troops had to be brought back, and also because parts of Rupert's army, especially some of Newcastle's troops, were slow to arrive. Accordingly, any chance that Rupert had to launch a sudden attack upon the rear of a marching army, catching the parliamentarians off guard, was lost. Although not explicitly confirming this, the royalist report in *Mercurius Aulicus* stresses that Rupert's plan was to launch an attack before noon.[41] There was exchange of artillery fire in the late afternoon but little further action. As the day wore on, Rupert concluded that nothing would happen that day and that the armies would stay in the field overnight and give battle on the morrow. However, confident in their greatly superior numbers but also perhaps worried that their supplies of food and drink were running short – one account reports that the parliamentarians had already drunk dry the wells around Long Marston and were 'necessitated to make use of puddle water'[42] – and that sitting tight would not be in their interests, the parliamentarian generals decided to attack. Thus the battle of Marston Moor took place late on a summer's day, shortly after a heavy, thundery shower, beginning a little after 7 p.m. and concluding around or a little after 9 p.m., as it had to do given the failing light.[43] Marston Moor was, therefore, a fairly swift battle and, despite the huge numbers involved and vagaries or inconsistencies found in the plethora of contemporary accounts, it was also a straightforward engagement.[44]

The parliamentarian advance met mixed fortunes. On the left, Cromwell's horse mauled and, after a sharp fight, broke and routed the opposing royalist horse – 'they stood at the swords' point a pretty while, hacking one another, but at last he [Cromwell] brake through them, scattering them before him like a little dust,' wrote Watson.[45] Cholmley, too, noted how dramatically the royalist cavalry crumpled, 'for these troopers

which formerly had been thought unconquerable now upon a panic fear […] took scare and fled, most of them without striking a stroke or having the enemy come near them.'[46] It may be that Cromwell's triumph was made easier because his royalist opposite number, Lord Byron, led forward some of his horse to meet the charge but, outnumbered and isolated, they were soon cut to pieces, and Cromwell then proceeded to rout the surviving royalist horse behind them. However, by no means all contemporary accounts of the battle refer to this manoeuvre and it may be a somewhat later embellishment or exaggeration by those keen to throw blame onto Byron, who died in the early 1650s and was thus not able to defend himself thereafter. At around the same time, the left-hand side of the parliamentarian infantry, with its front line Eastern Association foot under Lawrence Crawford, also engaged, mauled and pushed back the opposing infantry units on the western side of the royalist centre. In short, the left or western half of the parliamentarian army gained the upper hand.

However, almost exactly the opposite was occurring to the east: 'as the prince's right wing went to wrack, so his left was very prosperous,' commented Cholmley,[47] while Watson recalled how the troops on the parliamentarian left, thinking the battle won and that nothing more remained to be done than mopping up, were shocked to find that on the other side of the battlefield the royalists were 'wholly carrying the field before them, utterly routing all our horse and foot, so that there was not a man left standing before them'.[48] Sir Thomas Fairfax had led forward the parliamentarian right cavalry wing, but it quickly became bogged down, perhaps because it had to cross difficult ground which disrupted the horse, made it hard for them to retain tight order and also prevented them gaining momentum – certainly, in his later account Fairfax blamed 'the furzes and ditches we were to pass over before we could get to the enemy, which put us into great disorder'[49] – but also perhaps because Lord Goring's cavalry opposing them were in better order, better led and made of sterner stuff than Lord Byron's. Accordingly, the parliamentarian right was rebuffed and thrown into considerable disorder. Moreover, the central and eastern parts of the parliamentarian infantry, comprising in the main Scottish troops but also with some Yorkshire foot and Eastern Association infantry in the rear, were repulsed by the opposing units of royalist foot. Some broke and fled – 'it was a sad sight to see so many

posting away, being amazed with panic fear', wrote Ashe[50] – though other regiments fell back in reasonable order. But overall, parts of the centre and most of the right of the parliamentarian army were soon in disorder or worse, with many men and officers fleeing the battlefield carrying news of a terrible defeat on their lips.

Thus far the battle had been a tale of two halves, with the parliamentarians triumphant on the western part of the battlefield but the royalists dominant on the eastern. However, the battle then turned decisively in parliament's favour, probably for a number of reasons. Even if the royalists had pushed back, broken or routed half the parliamentarian troops, while the parliamentarians had routed barely half the royalist line, such was the huge numerical advantage of the parliamentarian army at the outset that it would still substantially outnumber its opponents in terms of units and regiments left largely complete, in order and in position. Secondly, in reality not all the units on the parliamentarian right wing and centre right were completely disordered or broken and a few, including some infantry units and Fairfax and some of his horse, were able to maintain the fight, either in their original position or, in Fairfax's case, by crossing the battlefield to support colleagues on the left. Thirdly, while many of Goring's successful royalist cavalry and some of the royalist infantry on the eastern side of the battle had left the battlefield or fallen into disorder in pursuit of broken or fleeing opponents, on the western side Cromwell and Crawford held their men back from pursuing their defeated enemies. As Cholmley ruefully noted, 'if his [Goring's] men had but kept close together as did Cromwell's and not dispersed themselves in pursuit, in all probability it had come to a drawn battle at worse.'[51] The victorious parliamentarians on the western side of the battlefield were in good order and turned to tear into the flank and rear of the remaining parts of the royalist army, Watson commenting that in this 'second charge […] our horse and foot seconding them with such valour, made them [the royalists] fly before us […] pluck[ing] a victory out of the enemies' hands'.[52]

By nightfall the parliamentarians had won an overwhelming victory and the royalists had suffered a major defeat. As usual as battle swung decisively in favour of one side, many defeated cavalry were able to spur their horses and get away, in due course rejoining Rupert who also escaped, allegedly because for some time he 'hid himself in bean land

[a bean field]',[53] but much of the defeated infantry became sitting ducks, either cut down at will – including a body of Newcastle's foot who made a final stand in a ditched enclosure somewhere to the rear of the royalist line – or falling prisoner. Cromwell described defeated royalist infantry as 'stubble to our swords', while Watson noted that they were pursued all the way to York, the parliamentarians 'cutting them down so that their dead bodies lay three miles in length'.[54]

The defeat at Marston Moor marked the beginning of the end of royalism as an effective military force in northern England. Rupert got away with around 6,000 cavalry and moved back southwards, largely retracing his steps through Lancashire and, via Chester, which he reached on 25 July, into the Welsh Marches, but this time avoiding significant fighting en route. He never again campaigned in northern England. Newcastle went into self-imposed exile on the Continent shortly afterwards and

44. *In another example of parliamentarian propaganda, the title page of* Rupert's Sumpter and Private Cabinet Rifled, *which appeared in late June 1644, carries an image of Rupert hiding from parliamentarian troops in a bean field somewhere outside York after his defeat at Marston Moor. To the right, victorious parliamentarians are shown going through the prince's captured chests and other personal possessions carried on his packhorses, revealing a selection of crucifixes and papal bulls – parliament several times suggested that Rupert was suspiciously sympathetic to Catholics and Catholicism – while nearby Rupert's dog is show lying dead.*

45. *A similar propaganda image, this time on the title page of* A Dog's Elegy or Rupert's Tears, *also of late July 1644, develops the theme of the killing of Rupert's dog, called 'Boy', by a parliamentarian musketeer in the field outside York, to the dismay of a grotesque woman, almost certainly intended to represent a witch, who is throwing up her hands in horror. Parliamentarian propagandists had long claimed that there was something suspicious about Rupert and his military successes, that he was in league with the devil and practising witchcraft and that his dog was his familiar, that is, a supernatural and demonic entity often taking the form of an animal who served witches and assisted their practice of magic.*

Derby scuttled back to the Isle of Man. The siege of York was swiftly resumed and although a depleted garrison hung on for a couple more weeks, it surrendered in mid July.[55] Most remaining royalist bases in Yorkshire fell over the following weeks and months, many taken by the Fairfaxes, while much of the Scottish army trundled north to blockade and to besiege Newcastle upon Tyne, which fell in October. In Lancashire, Preston and Liverpool were recovered in the latter half of the year. A few royalist outposts were still holding out at the end of 1644, including Carlisle and castles or fortified houses at Lathom, Pontefract, Sandal, Scarborough and elsewhere, but they were isolated and quite impotent and, barring a major change of fortune further south, doomed. The collapse of royalism in the North also weakened the royalist position in the northern Midlands and the latter half of 1644 saw the parliamentarians consolidating or extending their control over Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, most of Cheshire and significant parts of

northern Shropshire and Staffordshire, though substantial penetration of still solidly royalist North Wales eluded them.

In far happier circumstances much further south, the king heard firm news of the outcome of Marston Moor around 12 July, while he and his army were based around Cheltenham. In the wake of Rupert's report, the king knew that there was nothing to be gained by heading northwards himself. Bolstered by news that Waller's army was deserting and crumbling and confident that Oxford would not be threatened in the foreseeable future, the king resolved to lead his Oxford army into the West in pursuit of Essex's parliamentarians.

With 9,000 men, Essex had headed into Dorset during the second week of June to relieve Lyme Regis, but having achieved that quickly and without a fight he showed no inclination to halt or to turn around. Instead, he continued westwards, slowly and with substantial rests, halting his army around Chard and again around Tiverton, which he did not leave until 19 July. He may have hoped to bolster parliament's position in the region, in which case he had some success, for Weymouth, Taunton and Barnstaple were taken or secured for parliament. He may have hoped to catch the queen, who had been in Exeter unwell before and after the birth of another child, but if so he was out of luck, for she was escorted into Cornwall by Maurice. He may have hoped to engage Maurice's outnumbered army somewhere in Devon and to score a glorious victory, but if so he was again frustrated, for Maurice sidestepped him on 20 July as Essex was marching west from Tiverton and instead awaited the king around the royalist garrison of Exeter. Essex certainly justified his advance on the grounds of raising the morale of the Plymouth garrison, still blockaded by royalist forces on the landward or northern side of the town, which probably explains why he made for and halted at Tavistock, north of Plymouth and overlooking the Tamar valley. After further discussion, Essex decided to continue west into Cornwall, perhaps expecting significant support for the parliamentarian cause there, though in that he was again disappointed. He entered Cornwall on 26 July and reached Bodmin on the 28th. Essex knew that the king had moved into the South West behind him, but for a long time he clung to the belief that Waller would take military action somewhere in the South to cause the king to turn back. But by late July Waller was in London and in no position to do anything of the kind.

Rendezvousing with Maurice, the king left Exeter on 27 July, crossed into Cornwall, entered Launceston on 1 August and reached Liskeard by the 3rd. With the king so close, Essex turned south, seeking a defensive position which would also allow him to keep in contact with parliamentarian naval vessels based at Plymouth. Accordingly, he based himself in and around Lostwithiel, set amidst steep valleys and enclosed land which might afford protection from a numerically superior army – the king now had over 16,000 troops with him – as well as access to the sea, for Essex's men also occupied the area south of Lostwithiel and to the west of the Fowey estuary, with ports at Fowey and Par, though they did not hold the east bank of the estuary, quickly occupied by royalists. There was then a lull in operations, perhaps because the king hoped to wean Essex away from the parliamentarian cause. Only slowly did the royalists move closer to Lostwithiel, in mid August expelling cavalry which Essex had left in Bodmin and on 21 August, in a concerted push sometimes referred to as a battle but really just a series of aggressive manoeuvres, driving down the Fowey valley north of Lostwithiel as far as the area around Restormel Castle and pushing westwards to occupy Beacon Hill, overlooking the town. During the last week of August royalists occupied the area west and south-west of Lostwithiel, thus surrounding parliamentarians on all landward sides. Although during the night of 30–1 August most of the parliamentarian cavalry managed to break out and in due course reached Plymouth with little loss, Essex's infantry had little hope of escape.

On 31 August Essex's foot left Lostwithiel and moved south, making a stand on high ground on and around the road to Fowey, where a prolonged fight followed through the rest of the day and into the night.[56] Recognising that defeat was inevitable, on 1 September Essex and a few senior officers got away by fishing boat, though the bad weather – 'it being very windy […] and rained much and great storms', Symonds noted of the night of 31 August–1 September[57] – prevented parliamentarian vessels from evacuating more men. Philip Skippon, left to command the infantry, opened negotiations, leading to a mass surrender on 2 September. The terms were lenient, for although arms, ammunition and artillery had to be left behind, the 6,000 parliamentarian foot were allowed to depart for bases on the Hampshire coast. Symonds gleefully noted that 'it rained extremely as the varlets marched away' and that as

they passed through Lostwithiel they were 'strucken with such a dismal fear' of the hostile townspeople and royalist soldiers who assaulted them as they went; they were 'so dirty and so dejected as was rare to see […] none of them, except some few of their officers, that did look any of us in the face'.[58] Further sufferings and desertions followed as they marched through enemy territory, though eventually 3–4,000 reached southern Hampshire, where they re-equipped and returned to parliament's service. But that was little comfort. Even as the parliamentarians were winning and securing the North, the performance of their two principal commanders – Waller and Essex – in the South had been dismal.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES DURING THE AUTUMN

For the remainder of 1644 the trends evident by late summer continued, with parliament mopping up the North but unable to make much headway and missing opportunities further south. In the West, parliament retained most of the bases bolstered – though at a very high cost – by Essex's expedition, including Plymouth, Lyme Regis and Taunton, marooned amidst royalist territory. In the Midlands, local parliamentarians continued slowly to eat into royalist territory in some counties, including Staffordshire and Shropshire, but there was no great change in the balance of power, despite parliamentarian success in field engagements. For example, in late summer parliamentarians in northern Shropshire raided though made no attempt to hold Newtown and Welshpool, and in early September they seized first Montgomery and then the hilltop castle overlooking the town, removing a rather half-hearted royalist garrison. Determined to expel the newcomers, local royalists gathered 5,000 troops, drawn from garrisons in the region, and laid siege to Montgomery, while the parliamentarians enhanced their forces in the area to defend their new acquisition. The result was the battle of Montgomery, fought on flat land north-north-east of the town and castle on 18 September, by some way the biggest field engagement to take place within Wales during the war of 1642–6. The outcome was a decisive victory for parliament, which retained its toehold on the borders of Wales, as both Montgomery and also the nearby border castle of Powis outside Welshpool were secured. But for the moment, local parliamentarians could go no further, as they lacked resources to

make many inroads into the solidly royalist heartlands of Mid and North Wales. The losses suffered at Montgomery substantially depleted royalist garrisons in the region, as far away as Chester and Liverpool – the latter's recapture by parliament a few weeks later may owe something to this – and also meant that Rupert had fewer troops to lead south to support his uncle in his southern campaigns of the later autumn. But it made little tangible difference to the overall balance of power in the region during the remainder of 1644.[59]

Worse, during autumn the parliamentarian war effort in the South stalled, with evidence of lethargy. Fearing that, having crushed Essex's army in Cornwall, the king might attack the capital, parliament ordered Manchester to bring most of his Eastern Association army southwards to protect the western approaches to the capital and gave Waller command of a largely new force raised in the London area. However, it soon became apparent that an attack upon London was not on the king's mind. He and his army moved only slowly back from Cornwall, halting in the Plymouth area and again around Exeter, before meeting and conferring with Rupert at Sherborne in early October. The king's priority during the autumn seemed to be linking up with other forces available in the South, relieving the pressure on a handful of royalist bases in the region, including Banbury Castle, Donnington Castle and Basing House, so ensuring that they had plenty of men and supplies to see them through to 1645, and then going into winter quarters. But with parliament gathering and concentrating several of its existing and new armies in the South, including surviving and re-equipped elements of Essex's army, it also became clear that achieving this limited objective might involve fighting another battle before the year was out.

During the third week of October the king moved eastwards through Wiltshire and Hampshire. Waller fell back before him. With news that a parliamentarian force besieging Donnington Castle had abandoned its operation and moved away, the king focused on Basing House and he pushed on, perhaps hoping to make it to Basing before any parliamentarian armies could intercept him or, failing that, seeking to pick off Waller's or Manchester's army singly before the two could combine. But around 21–2 October he learned that he was too late, as Manchester and Waller had rendezvoused and their combined force was now between his army

and Basing. The king swung away northwards and entered Newbury unopposed. He dispatched a small force to reinforce Banbury Castle, but most of his army, around 9–10,000 men, took up a strong position to the north of Newbury. His army deployed in a very well-defended area east-north-east, north and north-west of Newbury, on a tongue of land in the shape of a narrow arrowhead or a letter 'V' lying on its side and pointing eastwards, formed by the converging rivers Kennet to the south and Lambourn to the north. The two met around a mile east-north-east of Newbury and this formed the eastern end of the royalist position. Both rivers were running quite high and fast, so they and adjoining waterlogged ground provided a significant obstacle for any enemy, particularly as the royalists either demolished bridges over them – especially the bridge carrying the London-to-Bath road over the Lambourn just above its confluence with the Kennet – or strongly defended them – especially the two bridges on the road northwards out of Newbury, crossing first the Kennet on the northern edge of the town and then the Lambourn at Donnington around a mile further on, with the northern side of the crossing further protected by Donnington Castle. The king's army occupied a steadily widening and also rising triangle of land extending three miles west of the confluence of the two rivers, comprising a mixture of open land and open fields in the area known as Speenhamland, roughly between Newbury and Donnington, the village of Speen and its small enclosures a little further west and further enclosures and woodland on the western side. However, there was no natural feature to the west, such as a river or steep valley, which was easily defensible and the royalist position was most vulnerable from that direction.

The parliamentarian army which approached from the east on 26 October greatly outnumbered the king's forces and its commanders were therefore intent on forcing battle. It numbered well over 15,000 and probably nearer 18,000 men, but it was also a strange amalgam, comprising much of the Eastern Association army under Manchester and with Cromwell as his second in command, the cavalry and dragoons of Waller's army, the cavalry of Essex's old army under Sir William Balfour and its surviving infantry under Skippon. The senior parliamentarian commanders had also been joined by representatives of parliament's main executive committee and it seems that the campaign was directed

by committee rather than by a single commander. Essex might have provided such leadership, but he was ill in Reading. Thus it was probably a collective decision, taken on the morning of 26 October after surveying the royalist position around Newbury, that the main attack should be from the west. This made sense, as that was the only direction from which the royalist position could be assaulted without having to fight across a river, but it entailed further manoeuvring. Accordingly, during the afternoon of 26 October, a clutch of senior officers, with Waller to the fore, and the bulk of the army – probably over 11,000 men – set off on a circuitous route around the north side of Newbury, stopping overnight, crossing the Lambourn at a ford four miles upstream of Donnington and approaching the western side of the royalist position via Wickham Heath sometime on the 27th. Meanwhile, Manchester remained in position north-east of Newbury with a little under 5,000 men. He was to distract the royalists and to keep many of them occupied around the eastern end of the area they held, both by attacking the main royalist stronghold there, Shaw House and its grounds, and perhaps by crossing the Lambourn, for which purpose Manchester was equipped with at least one mobile wooden bridge. He could distract the royalists by sparring throughout the 27th, but for maximum effect his main attack was to coincide with the principal parliamentarian assault to the west. Waller would fire a gun to alert Manchester when he was in position and about to attack, though in any case he could probably hear the guns and muskets of both sides as they clashed and might well be able to see something of the action there.[60]

The second battle of Newbury is well documented, though there are problems with the parliamentarian sources. Although some brief eyewitness accounts were written almost straightaway, including those of Skippon, of Richard Norton, another officer, and of the members of parliament's executive committee,[61] slightly later accounts, even those dating from well before the end of the year, are problematic. The performance of parliament's army at the battle and during the autumn campaign as a whole quickly became matters of dispute between senior parliamentarian officers – especially between Manchester and Cromwell – and much of the evidence generated later in the year, including pamphlets and detailed accusations and testimony presented to parliament and before a parliamentary committee of inquiry, was strongly coloured

by this dispute and highly partisan.[62] It needs to be used with extreme caution, if at all, in reconstructing what happened at Newbury on 27–8 October. On the royalist side, we possess accounts of the battle by the officer Richard Symonds and the politician and administrator Sir Edward Walker, a report in the royalist newspaper *Mercurius Aulicus* and a somewhat jumbled and confused account written by or in the name of the officer John Gwyn.[63]

During 27 October Manchester repeatedly skirmished with royalists at the eastern end of the area they were holding, especially in and around Shaw House, including actions more or less coinciding with the parliamentarian assault to the west in the late afternoon. His men did not advance very far or achieve much and were repeatedly driven back by heavy royalist musket fire – an attempt to cross the Lambourn early in the day was driven back particularly fiercely – but it may be that Manchester's assault was never intended as much more than a diversionary tactic. To the west, the main parliamentarian force was in position by early or mid afternoon and deployed with foot in the centre and horse on both wings. The first assault, probably launched after 3 p.m., was led by the infantry against a defensive work which the royalists had constructed west of the village of Speen in order to block the road. It is referred to in several accounts, Norton claiming that it was 'as good breast works as they [the royalists] could desire', while the report by the members of parliament's executive committee spoke of it as works and fortifications thrown up by the royalists the previous night.[64] There was a stiff fight here, but after an hour the royalists were forced back into and through Speen village and the advancing parliamentarians captured several guns. As one parliamentarian account put it, 'after a long and hot dispute, we beat them first from their work, and then from their ordnance, nine in number'.[65] The royalists fell back to a long hedge which marked the western edge of the larger, open fields of the Speenhamland area and separated them from the smaller enclosures immediately around Speen. It was now late afternoon and Waller, who had overall command of the western force, decided not to seek to advance further before looming nightfall but to halt there overnight. His decision probably also rested in part upon the limited achievements of his cavalry wings during the afternoon. The horse on the right or southern side, under Balfour, had for a time pushed ahead

along the northern side of the Kennet valley and seemed to be shaping up to threaten Newbury and the bridge over the Kennet, but a royalist counter-attack forced them back. There is little evidence in surviving accounts of what the left or northern wing of horse, led by Waller and Cromwell, had been doing during the afternoon, but their silence suggests that they had achieved little.

As dusk fell, the parliamentarians had made reasonable progress, especially on the western side, where the main attack had expelled the royalists from their defended starting position. The king's men were being pushed into a narrowing triangle and the parliamentarian generals probably anticipated renewing battle there the following morning with a good chance of victory. But during the evening the king abandoned the triangle of land bounded by the two rivers and his army trooped northwards over the Lambourn river via Donnington Bridge. Although the parliamentarians knew that their opponents were on the move, they did not intervene and did nothing overnight to prevent the king from moving his troops. The inactivity of parliamentarians probably reflected their confidence that, rather than fight a messy engagement in the dark, they could resume the attack and finish off their enemies properly by daylight the following morning, either in battle somewhere around or a little north of Donnington, if that was where the royalists were redeploying, or by swooping on them and cutting them to pieces on the rolling downland north of Newbury, if instead they were trying to make for the Thames valley and the Oxford area. But the parliamentarian generals apparently miscalculated. The king, his son and around 500 horse galloped away and by the following afternoon were with Rupert in the safety of Bath, while even more remarkably Maurice managed to lead the bulk of the army away northwards in a speedy overnight march, aided by moonlight, and reached the safety of the town and garrison of Wallingford before parliamentarian cavalry, dispatched in pursuit on the morning of 28 October, could catch them. The king had faced an army which outnumbered his own by well over three to two and had escaped almost unscathed. Whatever the causes and whoever was to blame – in the aftermath Manchester and Cromwell strongly blamed each other – it was a great royalist achievement and, alongside his role in the Cornish campaign against Essex during the summer, perhaps the high point of the king's own military performance.

46. *This martial image of Charles I on horseback, dressed in full armour and carrying his commander's baton, and with an army marching or deploying in the background, was one of several very similar representations produced by the Bohemian artist Wenceslaus Hollar in 1643–4, before he returned to the Continent. This version is dated 1644 and therefore shows the king around the time that his fortunes in war were either at their height or had begun to turn with his nephew's defeat at Marston Moor and the loss of the North.*

The aftermath was equally bad for parliament. An initial assault on the royalists in Donnington Castle, where the king had left his wounded and heavy guns, was rebuffed and the parliamentarians began moving northwards, generally in the direction of Oxford, before turning around and trundling back to Newbury, to renew the operation against Donnington. Meanwhile, the king's army was enhanced by reinforcements from Rupert in Bath, from South Wales and from Oxford, so that when the king again marched to Newbury, in support of Donnington, during the second week of November, he brought with him over 15,000 men, probably outnumbering parliamentarian troops still around the town. The king's army again drew up in the Speenhamland area and offered battle on 9 November, but the parliamentarians, deployed around and beyond the south bank of the Kennet, decided not to risk an engagement and there was no more than minor skirmishing. Having

resupplied and reinforced the royalist garrison within the castle, the king moved away at a steady pace, taking his artillery with him. On the following day, his army halted and drew up around the village of Winterborne, less than three miles north of Donnington, and offered battle, but the parliamentarian generals again thought better of it. The king resumed his march with nothing more than minor parliamentarian cavalry harassment. Before sending his army into winter quarters at the end of the month, he also dispatched a force to Basing House which brought plentiful supplies to its royalist garrison. The operation was unopposed, as parliament had already withdrawn troops which had been blockading or weakly besieging the base. It was a desultory end to parliament's main campaign in the South.

CONCLUSIONS

For the royalists, 1644 had been a difficult year. The king's truce with the Irish Catholics had not given much boost to his war effort and in most regions he struggled to match the numbers which parliament could put into the field. His troops were heavily outnumbered in the North and, despite containing the enemy for a while, huge defeat in battle opened the floodgates for the collapse of royalism as an effective and active military force in most of northern England by the end of the year. In the Midlands and the South the royalists had held their own and retained most territory held at the start of the year. However, in the main they had been able to do so only because of mistakes or poor performances by parliamentarian armies and generals and because their opponents had failed effectively to bring to bear against them a numerical superiority which they potentially possessed there. Yet the royalists had mounted a skilful defence and had scored some useful victories in the field, feeding off the blunders of their opponents.

Despite parliamentarian disappointments and setbacks, from their perspective they could look back on many solid achievements as the year ended. The slide in parliament's military and territorial position during 1643 had been halted and reversed, the North was now almost entirely parliamentarian territory and active, militarised royalism had been broken in that region [Map 5]. There had been limited territorial advances in some areas of the Midlands and the South, including much

of Lincolnshire and parts of Staffordshire, Shropshire and neighbouring fringes of Montgomeryshire and of south and east Dorset, and several parliamentarian outposts still largely surrounded by royalist territory, including Gloucester, Plymouth and Lyme Regis, were no longer under such a strong royalist threat. That things were changing, even in the South, was also indicated by the decision of parliament during December to put its southern armies into winter quarters along an advanced or forward line, including Portsmouth, Petersfield, Farnham, Reading, Aylesbury and Newport Pagnell, as well as strengthening its garrisons closest to Oxford, including Abingdon and Henley. At the end of the year, parliament had reasonably firm control over two-thirds of the land mass of England and Wales.

On the other hand, the year had ended on a low note for parliament and with a sense of disappointment felt by officers and politicians. The boost which the campaign had been given by the entrance of the Scottish army was already rapidly dissipating, as it became clear that the Scots wanted to keep reasonably close to their homeland – not least because of significant royalist activity under the Marquess of Montrose in the Scottish Highlands – and were not willing to campaign further south in large numbers. Worse, several times during 1644 the potential or real numerical advantage which parliamentarian armies possessed had been squandered through the failure of their leaders – Waller and Essex during the spring and summer, the various generals of the second Newbury campaign during the autumn – fully and effectively to combine, to coordinate and to focus their forces on defeating the king. This had been compounded by the limited or poor military performance of several senior officers in particular operations and the general lack of enterprise and real achievement evident in much of the Midlands and the South. In the light of all this, several senior parliamentarians came to conclude that major changes needed to be effected before the opening of the 1645 campaign.

6

'Bestrewed with carcases of horse and men': The Fighting and Campaigns of 1645–6 and the Outcome of the War

> Grant that we have an army of gallant and able men […] yet have we infinite disadvantages on our side, the parliament having double our number and surely […] persons of as much bravery, nay, and sure to be daily supplied when any of their number fails, a benefit which we cannot boast, they having the most popular [populous] part of the kingdom at their devotion, all or most of the cities, considerable towns and ports, together with the mainest pillar of the kingdom's safety, the sea, at their command, and the navy; and which is most material of all, an unexhausted Indies of money to pay their soldiers, out of the liberal contributions of coin and plate sent by people of all conditions who account the parliament's cause their cause.

This speech, by the Earl of Dorset in the king's council at Oxford, argued that the royalists should seek a negotiated settlement, largely because they were at such a huge military disadvantage. He suggested that because parliament controlled the more populous parts of the country, its army greatly outnumbered the king's forces and could replenish losses in a way the king could not; that parliament also held most of the largest towns and ports, the navy and the seas; and that its access to almost inexhaustible financial resources ensured military dominance. Although Dorset made this speech very early in the war, in February 1643, and at that time received limited support, many historians suggest that the factors which he adumbrated were accurate and that the disparity in resources he perceived shaped especially the last 18 months of the war and lay behind parliament's

military successes and the king's failures during 1645–6; most – though not all – also believe that Dorset correctly identified key factors which explain parliament's complete military victory secured in summer 1646.[1]

This chapter explores the course of the war during its last 18 months, a period which can be treated as a single campaign and phase, both because operations continued without much of a break – there was no planned halt to the main parliamentarian campaign during winter 1645–6 – and because just about all the substantial fighting related to or was shaped by the major battle of mid 1645 and its consequences. The emphatic parliamentarian victory at Naseby was decisive and coloured the remainder of the war and its outcome. Although further, smaller field engagements followed during the ensuing nine months and some royalist garrisons hung on in besieged towns and castles during the closing stages of the war, after Naseby the outcome of the war was not in doubt, most historians argue. The chapter concludes by examining historians' assessments of the reasons for parliament's victory and the king's defeat.

THE OPENING MONTHS OF 1645

Parliament overhauled its army before the 1645 campaign. Under the Self-denying Ordinance,[2] almost all officers who were members of either House of Parliament had to resign their military commands by spring 1645, at a stroke removing most senior officers of 1643–4; they were replaced by a cadre of newly promoted men, who had shown their mettle earlier in the war. At the same time, parliament combined several existing armies and recruited further troops to create a fresh army, well over 20,000 strong, commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax.[3] Soon dubbed the New Model Army, it was charged with winning the war as quickly as possible. It did not replace all parliament's existing regional armies – there remained northern and western armies, the separate Scottish army and local forces – and it took some time to set up and to get into action, which is why the fighting of 1645 again began rather slowly and in a limited and disjointed manner. Around the same time, the king made modest changes to his remaining armies and war machine, with Rupert promoted to royalist lord general, Maurice replacing him in Wales and the Marches and Goring given a larger role in the South. Although the New Model was not ready to campaign until the end of April, the king

and his southern forces showed no inclination to take the field before it. One reason for this was another round of peace negotiations, under way at Uxbridge during the opening weeks of 1645, and although the two sides remained far apart and the talks collapsed, they may have deterred campaigning by the principal armies while they lasted.[4]

Limited action did resume in several regions early in 1645. In January Goring led a cavalry force into Hampshire, hoping to take Portsmouth and Christchurch, though he failed in both, but he did raid parliamentarian positions in eastern Hampshire. In February he tried to help local royalists who had captured Weymouth in Dorset only to be expelled by a counter-attack from neighbouring Melcombe, but Goring's night attack was repulsed. The parliamentarians reported that the midnight assault

47. *The new parliamentarian lord general and commander of the New Model Army, Sir Thomas Fairfax, was soon portrayed in the conventional manner of the time, shown on horseback, with his horse rearing up on his hind legs, dressed in full or almost full body armour and carrying a commander's baton. As was also often the case, in the background, below the horse, part of an army is depicted on the move.*

was fiercely beaten off, with 60 royalists killed, 'of whom diverse were well apparelled, with buff coats and velvet jackets', while survivors were cowering around Dorchester in 'a trembling posture'.[5] Goring resumed operations later in March, sparring with Waller who, ahead of his imminent retirement from command, launched a final campaign with 6,000 men to counter Goring and to relieve pressure on parliamentarian Taunton. There was no major engagement and Waller failed to do much in Somerset, but he did bolster parliament's position in Wiltshire and parts of Dorset.

Elsewhere, Rupert failed to dislodge the parliamentarian garrison at Abingdon, worryingly close to Oxford, while parliament's operation against one of the few remaining royalist bases in Yorkshire, Pontefract Castle, also failed when some surviving royalist Yorkshire horse, now based further south, made a brief return home to aid their colleagues and repulsed the besiegers. In the Welsh Marches, Brereton and his Cheshire parliamentarians increased pressure on Chester and during early 1645 outside royalist forces twice marched there to assist the garrison. At the other end of the Marches, in late April some parliamentarians from Gloucester were caught and mauled by Rupert in and around Ledbury. A royalist newspaper reported that the parliamentarians barricaded the streets on news of Rupert's approach, but that after a stiff fight royalist horse and foot poured into the town, compelling their opponents to flee, with 120 parliamentarians killed and many more 'hiding their wounds in the woods'.[6] However, the most significant change in the Marches at this time occurred at Shrewsbury where, during the night of 22–3 February, local parliamentarians, by now controlling most of northern Shropshire, launched a surprise attack, overwhelming the garrison and killing the governor. According to parliamentarian accounts, some infantry got through or over the defensive line near the castle and then opened one of the main gates into the town, whereupon the waiting cavalry charged in and secured the town, the foot meanwhile taking the surrender of the castle.[7]

THE NASEBY CAMPAIGN, SUMMER 1645

Even after Fairfax led much of the New Model out of Windsor into the field at the end of April, it did not immediately launch a major

campaign, as military necessity and parliament's orders caused parts of the army to focus on different tasks. Thus although the New Model initially set off westwards, probably in support of colleagues in Taunton, the bulk of the army was halted and recalled by parliament and instead Fairfax dispatched a New Model brigade under Colonel Ralph Weldon to relieve the Taunton garrison; it did so without a fight on 12 May, but the royalists quickly returned and this New Model unit found itself stuck in Somerset. While parliament directed that Waller's old western army, now led by the governor of Gloucester, should aid colleagues marooned in Taunton, it envisaged that the New Model should be on hand to counter any moves by the king and his Oxford army, which by the second week of May were in the Stow area. There the royalists decided that Goring should focus on the South West and maintain operations against Taunton, while most of the king's forces would head north. The king's intention was not clear, though the relief of Chester, once more under pressure, was a key objective. The king's army moved slowly towards Cheshire, shadowed by another New Model unit, its approach causing Brereton to abandon his operation on 21 May.

During May parliament directed Fairfax to besiege Oxford. Although at this point the New Model probably lacked the numbers and heavy artillery needed to take the king's capital, Fairfax obeyed. The siege of Oxford, which lasted from 22 May to 2 June, allowed most New Model

48. *Enlarged from the engraving of Fairfax on horseback, this image probably shows part of the New Model Army, with at least eight blocks of pikemen, three troops or units of horse and other mounted soldiers, perhaps individual officers. To the right several carts or waggons appear, together with a large pot or cauldron being heated on an open fire, with figures standing close by either managing or watching the process.*

troops to come together and, by threatening the king's capital, might serve to distract the king and to lure him south. Whether as a response to this or simply because he no longer needed to push north – if there had ever been a plan to campaign more extensively in the North West or to attempt to link up with royalist forces operating in Scotland, it came to nothing – the king swung south-eastwards, crossing the Midlands to Leicestershire. If the siege of Oxford had been designed, in part, to lure the king south, his response was certainly intended to relieve the pressure on Oxford and to lure away the New Model. On the night of 30–1 May he stormed and sacked the parliamentarian town and garrison of Leicester.

The bombardment of Leicester and its storming and sacking produced a strong reaction in London, where reports circulated of indiscriminate killing and massacre.[8] Parliament ordered Fairfax to abandon the siege of Oxford and to move against the king, who marched on to Daventry and remained there until 11 June, resting and resupplying. Fairfax and the bulk of the New Model marched north-eastwards during the second week of June, picking up reinforcements around Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire, including cavalry under Oliver Cromwell, who, although an MP, was temporarily exempted from the Self-denying Ordinance and who became Fairfax's second in command and commander of the New Model horse. Several days were spent jockeying for position in Northamptonshire, each army apparently not always certain of the position and intentions of its opponents. On 12 and 13 June scouts and advanced units of the two spotted each other or clashed in the Northampton area. The royalist army began moving northwards to Market Harborough, but when it became clear that Fairfax was less than ten miles behind, the king, rejecting advice to hurry northwards, decided to turn and to offer battle in the Northamptonshire countryside.

Although the battle of Naseby of 14 June was quickly seen as a decisive turning point in the war, strictly contemporary accounts by participants or eyewitnesses are not as plentiful as might be expected, particularly on the royalist side. Given the outcome, it is understandable that the royalist newspaper, *Mercurius Aulicus*, said little about the battle and that Richard Symonds passed over it briefly in his diary, focusing instead on the preliminaries and sad consequences of that 'dismal Saturday'.[9] Other royalist accounts by Sir Henry Slingsby, Sir Edward

Walker, Lord Clarendon and the secretary of Lord Belasyse were written or published long after the event. Contemporary parliamentarian accounts, most appearing as pamphlets over the summer, are more plentiful, including letters or reports by Fairfax and Cromwell, by a couple of civilian commissioners accompanying the New Model,[10] by a trio of apparent eyewitnesses,[11] by the dragoon commander John Okey and probably by the military clerk John Rushworth,[12] as well as a peppering of reports in the London newspapers. They can be supplemented by a handful of slightly later parliamentarian accounts.[13] There is also some illustrative material, with another rather later watercolour by Bernard de Gomme, purporting to show in stylised form the deployment of the armies at the start of the battle, and an engraving by Robert Streeter, giving a bird's-eye view of the two armies deployed and set within the



49. *Several versions of this plan or bird's-eye view of the army deployed at the start of the battle of Naseby exist, by or after Robert Streeter and first published in 1647. It certainly cannot be taken as an accurate representation, not least because the perspective is strange and much foreshortened and because it disguises the significant numerical advantage which the parliamentarians possessed, but it is splendid in showing points of detail, particularly how units or elements of an army deployed, and it is full of fascinating vignettes, such as civilians gathered on a hill close to the windmill (bottom right) presumably in order to watch the spectacle, the parliamentarian baggage train and its guards (bottom left) and some of Okey's dragoons just discernible lurking in and around Sulby Hedges (middle left).*

built and natural landscape, certainly executed by 1647 when it was published. While attractive and interesting, there are problems with Streeter's illustration as a source, for it significantly exaggerates the strength of the royalists in order erroneously to make it appear that Fairfax was facing an army at least equal to and probably bigger than his own and the overall perspective is strange and foreshortened.[14] In recent years the battlefield has also been physically examined, using elements of field and landscape archaeology and metal-detector surveying. The latter has revealed concentrations of musket balls and other metallic artefacts of the civil-war era, though exactly how these relate to the course of the battle derived from the written sources is sometimes problematic or gives rise to different interpretations.[15]

The armies deployed during the early morning of 14 June. There was some movement at first, as scoutmasters struggled to locate their opponents in the morning mist and as the armies shuffled into position, seeking advantageous ground. The area settled upon was part of an elevated plateau crossed by small hills and intervening valleys, 'a place of little hills and vales', as one contemporary put it,[16] most running roughly east–west. Some of these shallow valleys were dry, though others were boggy or contained small streams. Much of the area was open and unenclosed ground, part of the open field country of this part of Northamptonshire. As the morning progressed, parliamentarians deployed around the top and on the northern slope of the hill north of Naseby village, generally known as Mill Hill, though its various modest summits and rises went under several names; part of the parliamentarian infantry may have drawn up just behind the summit, not initially visible to their opponents. The royalists deployed a mile or more to the north, along the southern slopes of a hill often known as Dust Hill, though several other names were attached to the area; the village of Sibbertoft lay some way behind, that is north of, their line. A shallow flat-bottomed valley, generally called Broad Moor, lay between the two. A hedge, often known as Sulby Hedge (or Hedges), ran roughly north–south across the western side of the battlefield, marking the eastern edge of an area of enclosures; there may have been another hedge line running somewhere past and behind the eastern end of the royalist line and further east the ground fell away down an escarpment in some places. However, most contemporary accounts suggest that the battlefield itself, Broad Moor

and the lower slopes flanking it, were open and fairly featureless, perhaps with odd patches of rough or broken ground and possibly with a small stream running through part of the valley, but contemporaries made few references to hedges, walls, ditches or buildings playing any part. The Naseby to Sibbertoft lane ran north–south through the battlefield, a little east of the centre of the armies.

The deployment was conventional for a major battle, with foot in the centre and horse on both wings. Philip Skippon commanded the parliamentarian foot, arranged in eight units and two lines, five in the front, three in the rear. Henry Ireton commanded the horse on the parliamentarian left, in two main lines, Cromwell the horse on the right, in three lines. The details of the initial royalist deployment are not so clear, but they certainly had foot in the centre under Lord Astley, horse on the right (that is, the western side of their line) under Maurice, though Rupert played a role on that wing, and horse on the left (the eastern end of their line) under Sir Marmaduke Langdale; as he had done at Marston Moor, Rupert deployed pockets of musketeers amongst and between his horse. In the main, the royalists seem to have drawn up in two principal lines, though there was a significant reserve of lifeguards and other horse and foot units at the rear, stationed behind the royalist infantry and around the king. The extent to which the royalists had third, reserve lines of horse on the wings depends upon credence given to, and interpretation of, de Gomme's later plan. Despite the impression created by Streeter's illustration, the parliamentarians significantly outnumbered the royalists, by around 14,000 to 10,000.

The opening move occurred at the left or west end of the parliamentarian line, where Okey led forward his dragoons to an advanced position lining Sulby Hedge, so they could fire into the flank of the royalist right cavalry wing should it advance. Around or a little after 10 a.m. the whole royalist army advanced and engaged the parliamentarians. In the centre, the king's infantry initially had the better of things, breaking part of the front line of parliamentarian foot and forcing much of it back, some units and regiments in flight, others in more orderly retreat. However, the second line seems to have stabilised the position in the centre and began to force back part of the royalist foot. At some point quite early on, Skippon received a serious wound from a musket ball, but he managed to remain on the battlefield – one account noted

that he received his wound 'in the first charge […] shot through the right side under the ribs, through armour and coat, but not mortal, yet notwithstanding he kept his horse and discharged his place and would by no means be drawn off until the field was won'.[17]

On the royalist right, on the western side of the battlefield, Maurice and Rupert jointly led forward their horse which, despite probably being hit in the flank by Okey's dragoons, pushed on and engaged Ireton's left wing of parliamentarian horse. Although details of what occurred are not entirely clear, as sources are vague or tell different stories, it is apparent that after a stiff fight the royalist horse gained the upper hand,

50. *Philip Skippon was another hardened and experienced veteran of fighting on the Continent during the first half of the seventeenth century who was committed to the parliamentarian cause from the outbreak of war, campaigning extensively in the Midlands and southern England with the Earl of Essex and his army during 1642–4, before being appointed sergeant major general of the New Model infantry. Despite his bravery and resolve in fighting on at Naseby regardless of his injury, the wound was serious and led to months of convalescence, such that he did not see action again during the main civil war and took little further role in the field, instead focusing on supporting parliament's cause by overseeing the defence and security of London and through parliamentary and political activities.*

mauling or breaking at least some of Ireton's cavalry. One parliamentarian account talked of 'a most terrible dispute' on this wing, resulting in Ireton himself being 'wounded in four place[s]', another referred to the parliamentarian left being driven 'off their ground in some disorder' and a third claimed that the left wing 'were immediately routed [and] above a thousand ran along with them'.[18] Much of the royalist horse, under either Maurice or Rupert, then carried on towards Naseby village and attacked the parliamentarian baggage train, stationed with a guard south of the battlefield. This looks like another instance of royalist horse breaking their opposing cavalry wing and then charging off the battlefield in pursuit of fleeing opponents and plunder, squandering a possible wider advantage.

On the royalist left, on the eastern side of the battlefield, Langdale's horse also attacked, the charge met by the front line of Cromwell's horse, which moved forward to engage them. After a fight, about which strictly contemporary accounts reveal few details, Cromwell's front line gained the upper hand – 'like a torrent driving all before them', as one parliamentarian account put it, while a later royalist account claimed that Langdale's horse had been 'routed without any handsome dispute'[19] – and much of the royalist horse, including its second line, were pushed back beyond their starting position. They were not pursued further or chased off the battlefield by Cromwell. Most or all of his second and third lines probably did not take part in this clash and so remained complete and in good order. It was these which turned and began attacking the royalist infantry; somewhere on the battlefield, a distinct unit of blue-coated royalist foot were mauled around this stage. The royalist reserve seems to have been unable to stop the rot, either because it had been committed earlier on, because the king was dissuaded from personally leading a risky attack with his lifeguards or because such reserves as remained were overwhelmed. As surviving royalist infantry began surrendering in large numbers, Fairfax regrouped much of his force, with foot in the centre and cavalry on both wings, and prepared to engage surviving royalist cavalry which had gathered somewhere on the northern side of the battlefield, but they turned and fled. It was only at this stage, with victory assured, that Fairfax unleashed some of his cavalry to pursue fleeing royalist horse northwards for several miles, well into Leicestershire. At this stage, too, parliamentarian forces captured

the royalist baggage train, killing or mutilating many women, probably the wives and girlfriends of royalist soldiers, found there.

Some historians, notably Glenn Foard, have suggested that the battle also ended with a further bloody encounter, claiming that large parts of the king's infantry escaped the main field and made a final stand two miles north, on and around Wadborough Hill, where they were destroyed by parliamentarian troops. But contemporary accounts make clear that the royalist infantry were defeated and killed or surrendered on the main battlefield and make no reference to a significant royalist infantry retreat or subsequent fighting. On the other hand, the metal-detector evidence is clear and the concentration of musket balls leaves no doubt that a significant firefight occurred here. Malcolm Wanklyn has speculated that royalist infantry posted to guard the baggage train, guns and ammunition to the rear of the royalist line may have fallen back here in the closing stages of the battle, though the number and concentration of metallic finds seem to suggest something bigger than merely finishing off the baggage guards.[20] Exactly what happened around Wadborough Hill remains unclear [Plate 20].

The battle was over soon after noon – as one account noted, 'by one of the clock in the afternoon there was not a horse or man of the king's army to be seen in Northamptonshire, but the prisoners.'[21] While the king, Rupert, Maurice and most senior officers escaped unscathed and much of the royalist horse got away – 'the horse knew well how to save themselves, though not their honours, by a hasty and shameful flight to Leicester,' as a later royalist account put it[22] – the demoralising defeat and the loss of much of the infantry were shattering blows. Around 1,000 royalists perished – one eyewitness recalled seeing 'the field so bestrewed with carcases of horse and men as was most sad to behold'[23] – but 4–6,000, predominantly infantry, were captured [Plate 21]. The king retained some troops, including cavalry which survived the battle, Goring's army in the South West and a force under Sir Charles Gerrard in South Wales, as well as some minor county-based forces and scores of royalist garrisons; for the moment, a pro-royalist army in Scotland under Montrose was triumphant in the Highlands. The king could try to raise fresh troops in areas he retained and he spent the weeks after Naseby in South Wales trying to do just that. He continued to look to Ireland for further reinforcements, and although the flow of soldiers

crossing the Irish Sea in the wake of the cessation had ended by this stage, during 1645 the king probably explored a further deal with the Irish Catholic Confederate government to bring Irish Catholic troops over to fight for him, so snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. But the Irish negotiations dragged on and nothing came of them, just as a catastrophic defeat suffered by Montrose in September put paid to the king's hopes in Scotland. Even in England and Wales few recruits could be raised after Naseby. The king's options and territory steadily diminished, parliamentarian dominance and assurance of victory were increasingly clear and the closing months of the war became a large mopping-up operation.

MOPPING UP, 1645–6

After Naseby, the king travelled west across the Midlands to Hereford and then over the border to Raglan Castle. He based himself there for some time, looking for support from Gerrard's troops and fresh recruits. Fairfax and the New Model Army did not pursue him, instead focusing on recapturing Leicester, which they did on 18 June. With parliament's support, Fairfax decided that his priority should be breaking Goring's royalist army and taking royalist bases in south-western England, in the process preventing the king from linking up with them. The king and royalist bases in the southern Marches and South Wales would for the moment be contained by other parliamentarian forces, both local troops and part of the Scottish army, persuaded to support the parliamentarian campaign along the Welsh border during the latter half of 1645.

In late June and early July Fairfax and the New Model swung through Wiltshire and into Dorset, avoiding royalist garrisons at Bath and Bristol, and pushed on to relieve pressure on Taunton. Goring abandoned the siege without a fight and pulled back northwards. By the second week of July he was seeking to hold north central Somerset, keeping open communications westwards to Devon and Cornwall and eastwards to Rupert at Bristol, while holding the town and port of Bridgwater, a possible landing place for reinforcements from South Wales. Goring tried to hold the line of the Yeo from the Yeovil or Ilchester area down to its confluence with the Parrett and then on to Bridgwater and Bridgwater Bay. But with the approach of both Fairfax's army and parliament's

51. *The magnificent castle at Raglan, by the time of the civil war the seat of the hugely rich Somerset family, headed by the Marquess of Worcester, was the king's secure base in the weeks after Naseby and held out in the royalist cause until late summer 1646. The garrison eventually surrendered to the besieging New Model Army and the castle was slighted after the war, with parts of it, including one side of the keep or great tower shown in the foreground, demolished to ensure that it could not be refortified and held against parliament.*

western army, under Edward Massey, he was heavily outnumbered. Although for a time he held his enemies at bay in the Somerset fens and by defending crossing points of the Yeo, he was outflanked and forced back. With much of the parliamentarian army crossing the Yeo around Yeovil, Goring's men abandoned Ilchester and instead massed around Langport, hoping to make a stand and to delay the parliamentarian advance. With Massey's men dominant to the south, in the Isle Moor on the other side of the Yeo, and with Fairfax rapidly approaching from the south-east, on the northern side of the Yeo, Goring probably hoped merely to hold off the New Model long enough for much of his army to fall back to Burrow, the next strongpoint downstream, or to Bridgwater. For his part, Fairfax, who ordered Massey to join him, wanted to prevent this and to catch around Langport as much of Goring's army as possible.

With Fairfax two or three miles south-east of Langport by the evening of 9 July, Goring deployed part of his army of around 7–8,000 men on the morning of the 10th somewhere outside the town. Exactly where he did so and where the resulting battle was fought is not clearly revealed

in contemporary accounts and remains disputed. The engagement focused on a pass where a lane or enclosed track crossed the valley of the Wagg Rhyne, a stream rising in the hills three or four miles north of Langport and flowing south to join the Yeo just east of the town. Accounts of the battle described this lane descending a hillside, fording the stream and then, as it continued, climbing through a narrow area enclosed by hedges onto more open ground.[24] Although championing slightly different sites, historians agree that this 'pass' or 'passage' crossed the Wagg Rhyne east of Langport, somewhere close to the village of Huish Episcopi. Goring tried to hold the pass with infantry and artillery, supported by a large cavalry unit behind them, but what was essentially the rearguard of his retreating army proved too weak to hold off Fairfax for long. Beginning in the late morning, Fairfax used his artillery first to soften up royalist foot and guns holding the pass and then to disrupt royalist horse stationed beyond them, while a body of parliamentarian musketeers and horse swept aside remaining resistance around the pass, carried the ford – 'through water which was deep and dirty and very narrow'[25] – and attacked the royalist cavalry. Goring rallied his horse and counter-attacked, but parliamentarian reinforcements soon broke his men and put them to flight. The royalist stand created time for parts of Goring's army, including some infantry and artillery, to get away across the Yeo and to demolish the bridge behind them, but this came at a high price. Goring lost around 2,000 men killed or captured, mostly cavalry. He withdrew into Devon but was largely inactive over the following weeks and went into exile on the Continent in the autumn.

Having broken the last significant army in the South West, Fairfax took his time. He sealed off Devon and Cornwall and for the moment left remaining royalist troops – including up to 5,000 men from Goring's army which got away from Langport – and various garrisons there to stew, while he shifted his attention eastwards to capture remaining royalist bases and forces. In the wake of Naseby and Langport, parliamentarian campaigns not only in the South and South West but also in other regions focused upon capturing remaining royalist garrisons, over 80 of which fell during the final year or so of the war. In methodical fashion, Fairfax cleared the rest of Somerset and Dorset. Bridgwater was stormed on 23 July and surrendered, though only after the royalists had fired large parts of the town,[26] Bath and Sherborne fell in late

July and early August and, the biggest prize, Bristol was surrendered by Rupert on 11 September, much to the king's shock and displeasure. Possessing a garrison of just 1,500 men and with plague in the town, the prince felt unable to continue resistance once the outer line of defences had fallen to Fairfax by storm on the 10th. With Somerset and Dorset cleared, Fairfax authorised Cromwell to lead part of the New Model across central southern England to capture three substantial bases which the king retained there. Devizes Castle and the town and castle of Winchester submitted swiftly in late September and early October, but the third base, Basing House, proved more obdurate. After an intense barrage, the stronghold was stormed by Cromwell on 14 October, much of the garrison was put to the sword and the buildings, already badly damaged by the bombardment, were plundered and then by accident or design gutted by fire. In a separate and much longer operation, not part of Cromwell's expedition, Donnington Castle was tightly besieged by October, though the garrison held out until the following March.

By the time Cromwell and his force rejoined Fairfax and the bulk of the New Model, royalist garrisons, strongholds and outposts elsewhere were falling. During August 1645 parliament began making inroads into hitherto fairly solidly royalist South Wales. Pembrokeshire parliamentarians defeated local royalist forces on 1 August on Colby Moor and then pushed eastwards into and through Carmarthenshire, Glamorganshire, Breconshire and Radnorshire, which fell without much of a fight. The last remaining royalist bases in Yorkshire also fell during the latter half of the year, including Pontefract Castle in July and Skipton Castle in December. In the North West, Carlisle surrendered in October and Lathom House in December, while from late summer the royalists in Chester were confined within the circuit of stone walls and tightly besieged. During the fourth week of September the king briefly visited the beleaguered city, but a small relieving force he ordered to its aid never arrived, cut to pieces in a running fight on Rowton Heath or Moor, south-east of the city, on 24 September; the king and his host, Sir Francis Gamul [Plate 22], probably watched the debacle from one of the towers on Chester's walls. With nothing more he could do, the king slipped away the following day, giving the royalist governor permission to surrender. In fact, Lord Byron held out until early February 1646 and surrendered only after an intense parliamentarian artillery and mortar bombardment [Plate 23].

52. *The aesthetically pleasing late-fourteenth-century castle at Nunney, with its lofty corner towers and wet moat, housed a royalist garrison for much of the war, but the king's men found themselves besieged and bombarded by a New Model Army unit in September 1645, part of Fairfax's campaign to clear Somerset of enemy bases. Although they resisted for a time, reputedly carrying their one remaining live pig around the castle and repeatedly pinching or poking the animal so that its loud squealing would deceive the besiegers into thinking that the garrison still had plenty of food available, in fact dwindling supplies and the hopelessness of their position compelled the king's men to surrender within a week.*

The king's brief visit to Chester followed an earlier royal peregrination, for during August he circled the Midlands, gathering some garrison troops en route, moving as far north as Doncaster, swinging south and briefly threatening Huntingdonshire, before passing through Oxford and Worcester and returning to the Welsh border. He was not seriously attacked en route, but the jaunt achieved little and did not prevent the continuing collapse of his military position. The king's visit to Chester in late September was part of a second trip northwards, before swinging east to Newark and returning south to his still reasonably secure Oxford capital for the winter.

During the autumn, Fairfax, Cromwell and the New Model resumed operations in the South West, launching a fairly steady invasion of Devon, which proceeded through the winter without much of a break, though it was for a time hampered by bad weather. By the beginning of 1646 Tiverton and Dartmouth had been captured and Exeter was closely besieged. Hopton, reappointed in place of Goring, scraped together a royalist army of up to 5,000 men from Cornwall and the Tamar valley and led them into north Devon in February 1646. They were caught, engaged and routed by Fairfax in a disorganised night-time battle in and around Torrington on 16–17 February. Fairfax's men expelled the royalists from hedges and enclosures around the town, assaulted and overthrew barricades erected across the entrances and then engaged them in a hard-fought contest in the main streets. A huge and deadly explosion of the royalist ammunition store in Torrington Church brought the engagement to a premature end:

> it proved a terrible blow, not only blowing up the church with all the wood and lead that was upon it, deforming many houses in the town, but killed some of the prisoners in the church and some of our men that were in the churchyard; […many] being burnt, both with the timber, stones and lead, [and] most of the town was shaken by this blow, being the terriblest that hath been seen in the memory of man.[27]

Although Hopton and some of his troops got away under cover of darkness back into Cornwall, many royalists simply deserted over the following fortnight and Hopton had with him only a small force when he surrendered to Fairfax outside Truro in mid March. Exeter and

Barnstaple surrendered soon after, though the royalists in Pendennis Castle in south Cornwall clung on into and through the summer.

On 21 March the last royalist field army of any size, a West Midlands force of up to 3,000 men under Lord Astley, which was crossing the Cotswolds in hope of joining the king at Oxford, was caught and routed outside Stow, Astley and others falling back into the market square and surrendering there.[28] By that time, even North Wales, the last significant region to remain solidly royalist, was wavering and parliamentarian troops were moving in, generally without a fight. The final stage of the war in the royalist heartlands of Wales and parts of the central Marches was marked, not by field engagements, but by sieges, as royalist diehards and

53. *The parish church at Torrington was extensively damaged by the gunpowder explosion which effectively ended the street fight of mid February 1646 and it was subsequently repaired and partly rebuilt. The nearby low mound, now cobbled and out of which trees grow, is supposedly the site of a mass grave of those who perished in the explosion and in the battle.*

garrisons tried to hold out in a few defended towns – such as Hereford, captured at the end of 1645, and Worcester, which held out until summer 1646 – and in a string of medieval castles, especially Edward I's mighty fortresses in Mid and North Wales, where resistance often continued well into 1646. At last recognising that defeat was imminent and fearing that his capital would shortly be closely besieged, in late April the king slipped away to the Scottish army at Southwell in Nottinghamshire, its base for the nearby siege of royalist Newark. Surrendering to the Scots in early May, the king ordered both Newark and Oxford to surrender, which they did, Newark almost immediately on 8 May, Oxford after lengthy negotiations on 24 June. A few isolated bases held out a while longer, including the castles of Pendennis and Raglan until August, the little border castle at Holt until January 1647 and the isolated Edwardian castle at Harlech in the far north-west of Wales until March 1647. But the main war ended between early May and late June 1646 with the surrender of the king, his last major regional base and his capital. Parliament had won the war.

CONCLUSIONS: WHY DID PARLIAMENT WIN THE CIVIL WAR AND WHY DID THE KING LOSE?

The question of why parliament won the war and the king lost it has not in recent years generated much major new work or many dynamic reinterpretations. Most historians have long favoured a multi-causal explanation, citing a number of factors, many but not all of them relating to resources available to the two sides and the ability of parliament to supply and maintain a lengthy war better and for longer than the king – the very argument Dorset had made in 1643. The importance attached to and the weight placed on particular issues may vary, but most historians address this question by going through a list of factors. Conversely, a small number of historians have disputed this interpretation, arguing that the outcome of the war was not decided by resourcing and other broad issues, as there is little sign that major royalist reversals were the result of a lack of resources, while other factors are intangible and cannot be firmly proved. Instead, these historians suggest that, although parliament may well have had some significant advantages from the outset, they may better explain why it did not lose the war in 1643 and early 1644, when

54. *Together with the adjoining town defences, Conwy Castle was built by Edward I in the late thirteenth century as part of his second campaign against the Welsh and it remained intermittently in royal hands thereafter, though it was the Archbishop of York who oversaw its repair and garrisoning for the king at the outbreak of the civil war. Like many Edwardian castles in Wales, it held out far longer than the countryside and although the walled town fell to parliament in August 1646, not until November and only after a lengthy and substantial siege did the royalist garrison surrender the fortress, which was garrisoned by parliament for a time and then slighted.*

55. *Although an even mightier castle of Edward I's second Welsh campaign than Conwy, Caernarfon's resistance at the end of the civil war was not so prolonged. The walled town fell in May 1646 and the royalist garrison under Lord Byron surrendered the castle in early June on terms, which guaranteed quarter and safe passage for all inside the castle, including a bear and his keeper who had kept the garrison entertained.*

the king appeared to have the upper hand, than why it went on to win it two years later, as they did not clearly contribute much to the military failings of the king's side and the defeat of his armies during the last two years of the war. Instead, a minority of historians argue that the direct and active causes of the royalist defeat and the parliamentarian victory are found in particular military developments and in narrower and specific military factors which determined the outcomes of key battles, operations and campaigns, chiefly those of 1644–6. The two groups remain far apart. Recently, two historians from the latter camp, writing together, have commented that, on this matter, 'Clio's chariot has ground to a halt with one wheel stuck firmly in the rut of a determinist explanation formulated in the distant past, namely that parliament's victory was inevitable because of its overwhelming superiority in resources', and that while recent work has 'revealed flaws in some facets of the determinist model […] they fight shy of discussing why the war ended when it did in a royalist defeat.' In response, a historian from the first, multi-causal camp, has dismissed this contribution, with its 'dark denunciations of hindsight and determinism' and its insistence 'on parity of resources and thus on "operational factors" as key to parliament's victory', as 'the most recent example of the kind of discussion I find so unconvincing'.[29]

Turning first to the multi-causal, often resource-linked interpretation, most of the strands it presents have already been discussed here and need not be rehearsed at length. Throughout the war, parliament controlled the navy and dominated the seas, allowing it to retain hard-pressed ports such as Kingston upon Hull, Lyme Regis and Plymouth and to make it difficult for the king to get supplies from the Continent and reinforcements from Ireland, effectively closing off that route so that from spring 1644 onwards the king received a mere trickle of troops crossing the Irish Sea to fight for him – though it should also be noted that, after the initial crossing of nearly 10,000 troops from Ireland in late 1643 and early 1644, the number of Protestant troops remaining in Ireland who might be spared for the conflict in England and Wales was in any case quite modest. Throughout the war, parliament controlled London and its hinterland, the national centre of government and administration, the country's largest town, port and manufacturing base for war-related items, a huge reservoir able to supply the parliamentarian war effort with well-trained militiamen, fresh volunteers, conscripts, tax revenue, loans

and other income streams, and altogether far and away bigger, more productive and more lucrative than any towns in the king's hands at any stage of the war. Similarly, even when forced back into its heartlands in late 1643, parliament always retained, controlled and could draw upon the most populous, most productive and richest parts of England. Parliament's 1643 alliance with the Scots led to the entry into England of a well-trained, experienced Scottish army of over 20,000 men, which tipped the balance decisively in parliament's favour in northern England during 1644, even if thereafter their direct contribution to the campaigns further south proved limited. In contrast, the king's 1643 deal with the Irish Catholics brought him little military benefit, short, medium or long term, as few reinforcements crossed from Ireland to fight for him in England and Wales, it dismayed many in his own camp and it gave parliament an obvious and easy propaganda victory.

Historians favouring this approach also look to the administrative system which parliament established at regional and county level, arguing that it had decisive statutory authority from the centre and was crisp, efficient and effective, often good at winning over and mobilising local opinion, generally excellent throughout the war at tapping and steadily drawing off resources in order to supply the war effort. Conversely, the king's local administrative system is often portrayed as rather hesitant and uncertain, lagging behind and perhaps never as effective as the parliamentarian system, so that as the war progressed increasingly short-supplied and desperate royalist military commanders were almost forced to take the law into their own hands and to resort to heavy-handed and sometimes brutal tactics in order to resource their war effort. This, together with the broader unpopularity of some royalist commanders and the belief that some were Catholics or led armies containing Catholics, aroused strong opposition to the royalist cause, seen for example early in the war in the spontaneous and active support for parliament evident in parts of the West Riding of Yorkshire and northern Staffordshire.

Although far less tangible and hard to prove, some historians also believe that parliamentarian commanders, troops and supporters in general were more strongly motivated than their royalist opponents, fired up by the sort of fervent religious radicalism and sometimes, too, a desire for secular reforms rarely evident on the royalist side. Moreover, with the military reforms of winter and spring 1644–5, parliament promoted

and appointed more dedicated, energetic and skilful senior officers who were committed to winning the war, and in the New Model established a large, well-equipped and focused national army which proceeded to do just this. From the outset the king's war effort was impaired by a lower level of commitment, perhaps seen in the way Derby, Newcastle and others abandoned the fight in adversity, and by fragmentation inherent in a system of great, semi-independent regional military commands, while his military reforms were always more piecemeal and nothing like so effective as parliament's, so that by the closing stages of the war he could match neither the standard of generalship seen on parliament's side nor its New Model Army.

The counter-attack on this argument takes different approaches to its different strands, some more convincing than others. Some elements, such as the assertion that parliamentarians were more strongly motivated, not least through their godliness, can be queried as resting more on the overall impressions of the historian than on tangible evidence and an overwhelming case constructed from contemporary sources. Others, such as the assertion that parliamentarian county committees were better at tapping local resources, are again largely unprovable, as the financial and related records surviving on the royalist side are so thin; merely citing a multitude of financial accounts from parliamentarian counties, demonstrating that large sums of money and other supplies were efficiently raised there throughout the war, does nothing to prove the key point, as we know so little about royalist finances. While parliamentarian naval supremacy undoubtedly played a key part not only in retaining important parliamentarian ports during the first half of the war but also in closing off the Irish Sea route to potential royalist reinforcements, it actually did little to contribute directly to parliamentarian victories in the second half of the war, playing little discernible role in the Marston Moor and Naseby campaigns. The potential resource advantage to parliament of London and the parliamentarian heartlands, the fact that the king's territory comprised less populous and less wealthy parts and that the royalists were increasingly squeezed into the western peripheries, with limited resources, cannot be disputed. However, here the key argument of the sceptics is that almost to the end, and certainly during the Marston Moor and Naseby campaigns, there is little sign that the king's armies were underequipped, that they were being hampered by

insufficient, old or faulty muskets and pikes, for example, or were struggling because of a shortage of food or horses, or that they lacked the money and resources to campaign properly and to fight at more or less the same level as their opponents. By this stage, the potential resources available to parliament were certainly much greater than those available to the king, but in terms of the quantity and quality of resources actually collected, made available to and employed by the two armies which met at Naseby, it is not at all clear that there was much of a disparity and there is little evidence that the king's troops lost there because they ran short of bullets or gunpowder, had inferior arms and armour and so on.

The royalists did have fewer men on the field at Naseby and many fewer at Marston Moor, a numerical disparity which probably was crucial to the outcome of both, especially as for a time both engagements appeared close and in the balance. Focusing on this factor as central in deciding the outcome of particular battles, which in turn led to the overall royalist defeat and parliamentarian victory, moves the argument onto ground favoured by the other camp. Here particular operational decisions become important or crucial in the outcome of the war. If there is a case that the king might have won the war during 1643, then things like the decisions to storm Bristol and to besiege Gloucester and Kingston upon Hull might become crucial. If down to 1644 and on to the early stages of the 1645 campaign a case can be made that militarily things were still in the balance and that the military resources actually being deployed by the two armies were also broadly similar, then crucial operational decisions would include things such as Rupert's decision to engage the English parliamentarian and Scottish army immediately after relieving York, even though his own army was tired and would be significantly outnumbered, rather than refreshing and awaiting reinforcements, perhaps from the Newark garrison; the king's decision to leave some of his best and most experienced cavalry in the South West when he marched northwards in spring 1645, whereas if he had had them with him his army would have been numerically much closer to the army he engaged at Naseby and the cavalry much more evenly balanced; and the king's decision to turn and fight at Naseby, rather than continuing northwards, perhaps offering battle later and on more favourable terms, having sought reinforcements from the still well-manned Newark garrison.

It is unlikely that this historical debate will be resolved, as there are too many intangible factors and issues, especially regarding finance and resources, where the contemporary evidence is too thin and skewed for conclusions to be drawn safely. We are almost forced to contemplate the counter-factual route, never a particularly healthy path for a historian, and to consider what might have happened had, say, the king won at Naseby rather than, after what for a time appeared a close-fought engagement, suffering a heavy defeat. Would a royalist victory have been possible in those circumstances, or a compromise peace deal on terms quite favourable to the king, or would it merely have delayed a parliamentarian victory inevitable because of the superior resources potentially available to it? We can never be certain. For all the sniping about 'determinism' and the use of 'hindsight' from its critics, the multi-causal interpretation, the factors which it adduces and particularly the clear disparity in the resources potentially available to king and parliament which it highlights, together constitute a very strong case and it is understandable that some contemporaries, such as Dorset, and the majority of modern historians hold to this plausible and in many aspects convincing line. Yet its critics undoubtedly score telling hits in pointing to the thin, unbalanced, unquantifiable or intangible contemporary evidence upon which significant strands of this interpretation rest. The fact that parliament won the war because it won a small number of key battles should not be dismissed quite so quickly as merely 'unexceptional if unhelpful',[30] and instead merits further analysis, and with it fuller investigation of campaigns, military operations and operational factors, to sit alongside but not to replace other broader, often resource-linked factors.

CONCLUSION

The Impact, Consequences and Legacy of the Civil War

> My dear Doll, I know it is to no purpose to advise you not to grieve […] for such a loss as yours cannot be received indifferently, by a nature so tender and so sensible as yours; but though your affection to him whom you loved so dearly and your reason in valuing his merit […] did expose you to the danger of that sorrow which now oppresseth you, yet […] I am persuaded you will see cause to moderate that sorrow; for that affection to that worthy person may tell you that, even to it, you cannot justify yourself if you lament his being raised to a degree of happiness far beyond any that he did or could enjoy upon earth, such as depends upon no uncertainties nor can suffer any diminution.

In similar vein, the writer urged the recipient to moderate her grief, not only as it was 'vanity' to bemoan 'that which hath no remedy', but also because 'you offend him whom you loved if you hurt that person whom he loved'. Reminding her how 'apprehensive he was of your dangers and how sorry for anything that troubled you', the writer went on to ask her to 'imagine that he sees how you afflict and hurt yourself […] though he look upon it without any perturbation, for that cannot be admitted by that blessed condition wherein he is, yet he may censure you and think you forgetful of the friendship that was between you if you pursue not his desires in being careful of yourself who was so dear to him.' The writer noted that, while 'I doubt not but your eyes are full of tears and not the emptier for those they shed', yet God would 'comfort you and let us join in prayer to Him that He will be pleased to give His grace to you'. He closed by imploring that, with God's support, 'nothing shall be able to make us unhappy in this life nor hinder us from being happy in that which is eternal', a happiness which, 'that

you may enjoy at the end of your days, whose number I wish as great as of any mortal creature and that through them all you may find such comforts as are best and most necessary for you […] is and shall ever be the constant prayer of your father who loves you dearly'.[1] Although less famous than Cromwell's letter offering condolence to his brother-in-law whose son perished at Marston Moor, this letter is in many ways its royalist counterpart. It was written by the Earl of Leicester to his daughter Dorothy or 'Doll', wife of the Earl of Sunderland, who had just died fighting for the king at the battle of Newbury in autumn 1643. She was left a 26-year-old widow, pregnant and with two now fatherless children aged two and three. Facing an uncertain future, she was also unable to mourn her husband properly, as his corpse was hurriedly buried in an unmarked grave somewhere on the battlefield.

For the grieving widow, life continued and before the end of the year she gave birth to a third child, Sunderland's second and posthumous son, though he died before the decade was out. Sunderland's family, the Spencers, were very wealthy and Dorothy's widowhood was cushioned by the property she held during her lifetime and the financial bequests which her husband left to their children. However, as the widow of a prominent royalist and the daughter of a peer who supported the king during the war, albeit in a lukewarm and agonised manner, her position was not entirely secure, though the active parliamentarianism of two of her brothers may have helped shelter her in the years that followed. After 1646, Dorothy and her children lived in somewhat reduced circumstances at the principal Leicester seat of Penshurst in western and Wealden Kent, close to but apparently unaffected by the Kentish rebellion and one of the major centres of renewed fighting in 1648 nearby, and where during 1649–50 they almost certainly came into contact with two of the late king's children, placed in the Leicesters' care after his execution. During the 1650s, the years of republic or interregnum, Dorothy resided at her late husband's seat of Althorp in Northamptonshire, reportedly sheltering and supporting ejected clergymen and remarrying. During the 1650s one of her parliamentarian brothers, Philip Sidney, styled Lord Lisle, became a prominent politician, under the Rump, as a member of the non-elected parliament or Nominated Assembly which replaced it during the latter half of 1653 and especially during the Protectorate of 1653–9. As a friend of Cromwell, when he became head of state as

Lord Protector at the end of 1653, Lisle became a member of the small, permanent, semi-independent and very powerful executive council which worked with the Protector, a position he retained until the Protectoral regime collapsed in spring 1659.

After the Restoration of monarchy in the person of Charles II in 1660, Dorothy, who was widowed a second time during the 1660s, divided her time between Northamptonshire and Kent, living a private life but retaining close connections to and corresponding with family members who became key figures and politicians of the post-Restoration era, including her more radical brother Algernon Sidney, who was executed for treason towards the end of the reign of Charles II (1660–85); another brother, Henry Sidney, later Earl of Romney, a politician who was out of office and out of favour during the reign of Charles's younger brother James II (1685–8), but who was a trusted supporter of William of Orange and became a key player in William's seizure of power in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and an influential courtier and royal official during William's subsequent reign as William III (1689–1702); her son, the new Earl of Sunderland, who in a long and varied political career during the closing decades of the seventeenth century managed to avoid permanent disgrace or exclusion from power, despite all the twists and turns of events, and who outlived both the Glorious Revolution and William III, like his uncle Romney seeing the last Stuart, Queen Anne (1702–14), take the throne; and her son-in-law the Marquess of Halifax, who eclipsed even his brother-in-law Sunderland in the wheeler-dealer political world of the 1670s, 1680s and early 1690s.[2]

Dorothy herself had died in the mid 1680s, but both in her own life and experiences and via her close family connections, in many ways she encapsulates the areas explored in this concluding chapter. It opens by looking at the direct impact of the war, exploring issues such as death – something of which Dorothy had terrible experience – as well as injury and maiming, the financial impact and costs of the conflict and the physical damage and destruction which it wrought. The consequences of the war are then assessed, in the short term – focusing on the later 1640s – and in the medium term – focusing on the republic or interregnum of 1649–60. Lastly, turning to the Restoration and post-Restoration era which Dorothy lived to see and during which several of her immediate family played key roles, the chapter closes by

assessing some of the possible longer-term consequences of the war and by examining its legacy during the closing decades of the seventeenth century and beyond.

THE DIRECT IMPACT OF WAR: INJURY AND DEATH, FINANCIAL COSTS AND WAR DAMAGE

Soldiers could be killed or mortally wounded in action in many ways, including fractures sustained in strikes and falls; burns from explosions of gunpowder, from handling hot or burning equipment or from being caught in fires; flesh wounds from sword blades or pike tips; and being shot, hit by cannonballs and mortar shells or by musket, carbine and pistol balls. From accounts of surgeons and of combatants who were injured but survived or who saw comrades perish, we know quite a lot about the nature of civil-war wounds and their outcomes, fatal or otherwise. Neat and clean fractures could usually be set and would heal, but if any principal limb bones were shattered it was more likely that amputation would be attempted, carrying a real risk of death, and little could be done to treat serious damage to the pelvis, spine or skull, which often proved fatal. Contemporaries were aware that burns might be alleviated by salves or ointments, but in practice medical treatment was limited and either the burn caused death or the victim slowly but naturally recovered. Cuts, slashes and other flesh wounds from swords and pikes could be treated by pressure, so stemming the loss of blood, and by bandaging and the victims saved, but if they were deep, had severed a main blood vessel or became infected a quick or slow death was likely. Hits from and wounds inflicted by round shot were more often fatal, especially if the lead balls had penetrated deeply into the head or torso and inflicted extensive damage to tissue and organs; if the ball remained in the body and could not be removed, infection generally set in. In cases of major infection and sepsis, there was little surgeons could do to aid the body's natural defences, though in cases of serious infection or gangrene in a limb amputation might be attempted.

Soldiers could meet violent or unnatural deaths while on active service in many ways and not only directly from enemy action and war wounds. They might perish from falls from horses or from the walls of garrisoned strongholds, from accidents during training or before and after

operations, especially the unintentional discharge of loaded firearms and the mishandling and explosion of gunpowder, from the premature collapse of bridges and other structures being demolished or from military executions, as well as, less violent but just as deadly, from exposure and hypothermia while serving in bad weather. The range of deaths which might await them is revealed by Richard Gough's account of how 13 men from his home parish in northern Shropshire, who volunteered to march off and to fight for the king, were presumed or known to have died. A handful had simply been 'heard of no more', so it was assumed 'that they all died in the wars', another was presumed killed at Edgehill, more locally two brothers died defending the royalist garrison at High Ercall in Shropshire while a third was 'hanged for stealing horses', another man died in a skirmish at Oswestry, two were killed at Hopton Castle and a further local man earned himself a very bad reputation during the war for repeatedly raiding and plundering in Shropshire, but he eventually perished, badly injured by fellow royalists in 'an alehouse quarrel near Bridgnorth', such that he was bedridden and 'unable to help himself' when parliamentarians attacked the town and fired part of it, so that he was 'burnt to death' there.[3]

Given the nature of extant source material and the likelihood that some war deaths passed entirely unrecorded, we cannot now know exactly how many died as a direct result of military operations. Nonetheless, the fullest work in this area suggests that around 62,000 people died in action in England and Wales between 1642 and 1646, perhaps 28,000 on the parliamentarian side and around 34,000 on the royalist. The majority of these deaths, around 45,000 of them, occurred in 1643 and 1644, with a further 9,000 or so killed during 1645.[4] However, to gain a true total for the number who died as a result of the war, this figure needs to be more than doubled. Almost certainly a larger number of people, not only soldiers but also civilians with whom they came into contact, perished during 1642–6 not directly in combat but as a result of the diseases spread through and by civil-war armies and garrisons. Of course, even during years of peace and plenty, there were many contagious and deadly diseases in seventeenth-century England and Wales, from which people died in large numbers every year. But wherever sources, particularly records of burials in parish registers, survive, not just for the war years but also for comparison for adjoining periods, and they

have been studied by demographic historians, they reveal significantly heightened numbers of deaths and death rates during the war years. In some areas, including Berkshire and Oxford, burials of non-combatant dead more than doubled during the war as a whole, while in other towns, such as Plymouth, the rate doubled during periods of blockade and siege.[5] In Devon between 1643 and 1645 roughly two and a half times as many people – soldiers and civilians – may have died through the indirect, disease-related consequences of the war than those who perished in combat.[6] Recent studies of national trends in English mortality not only confirm that the war years, particularly 1643 and 1644, saw a significantly higher number of deaths compared with preceding and following years but also conclude that the civil war caused a sharp mortality crisis amongst the whole population, albeit one much less severe than other late-medieval and early-modern demographic crises caused by major plague epidemics or by agrarian and socio-economic crises.[7]

Numerous accounts confirm that disease was rife in armies and garrisons and that it caused many deaths. Military operations involved large numbers of men living close together in rough and insanitary conditions, sometimes with little shelter from the elements, often with poor diets and low levels of hygiene and cleanliness, and sometimes seriously undernourished, particularly if the army was moving through a hostile area or if the garrison was under close siege and running short of supplies. So there is no mystery about how and why disease might have been present and prevalent, spreading quickly through the troops and, where soldiers were garrisoning towns or were billeted with civilian householders, into and through the civilian population as well. Contemporaries tended to refer to these diseases as 'the bloody flux', 'camp fever', 'the spotted fever' or simply 'the new fever', and they probably encompassed a number of diseases, including dysentery, some cases of plague, smallpox and measles, plus malarial-type fevers picked up in wet and marshy regions. But the biggest killers, carrying off soldiers and civilians in large numbers, were almost certainly the similarly named but quite different diseases of typhus-fever and typhoid in their various forms.

Overall, and adding on the 6,000 or so killed in action during the risings and rebellions of 1648, the 4,000 or so who perished during the renewed military action of 1651 and other wartime dead whose deaths cannot with assurance be ascribed to a single year, it has been estimated

that from the outbreak of the civil war in 1642 down to the return of peace in the 1650s at least 85,000 people, soldiers and civilians, were killed in England and Wales as a direct consequence of military action. However, over the same period there were perhaps around 100,000 extra deaths, over and above the number of deaths which demographic historians would expect to find, a consequence of the various diseases prevalent within and spread by civil-war soldiers, armies and garrisons and which can therefore be attributed to the war. Accordingly, it has been estimated that the civil war of the mid seventeenth century directly and indirectly killed somewhere around 180–90,000 people – perhaps up to 200,000 – in England and Wales.[8] An awful lot of people died in the civil war and an awful lot of wives were left widows, children fatherless, parents, siblings and friends bereaved, shocked and in mourning.

Other combatants survived but were left maimed and damaged. In many counties, quarter-session records of the post-war period are littered with petitions from maimed soldiers, claiming that they could not work or support themselves and their families and were left destitute; they therefore sought charity and financial help. Down to 1660, while parliamentarian officials controlled county government, they were from those claiming to have fought for and suffered in the parliamentarian cause; appeals from royalists would receive short shrift. The reverse was true of petitions received after the Restoration. The survival of such petitions, together with other scattered first-person records and contemporary accounts making passing reference to the wounded, is patchy and can provide no more than a fragmentary and incomplete picture of the numbers and state of the injured and maimed. But they do give an insight into some of the wounds received and the consequences for subsequent lives. For example, surviving post-war Cheshire petitions include that of Thomas Oulton, who claimed that in 1643 he had been shot through his left leg while fighting against Chester royalists, 'by which shot he is maimed and be lamed while he liveth', though he had returned to military service by the closing stages of the war, only to be wounded in a further attack on Chester, where he 'lost very much of his blood' and had thus been rendered 'disenabled in his body to work for his living'; of William Kerrison, who stressed his long service to parliament, in Cheshire and elsewhere, including his role in an advanced party of parliamentarians trying to storm Chester, where he was twice thrown

off the scaling ladder and 'with the violence of the stones cast forth of the city upon your petitioner he was grievously wounded', so that he was long under the care of doctors and forced 'to have one of his great toes cut off to prevent the loss of his foot, which is not yet cured'; and of Thomas Hinchcliffe, who in one of the last battles of the civil war received a dozen wounds, having 'his left ear wholly cut away from his head and so utterly lost' and 'the elbow of his left arm cut away'.[9]

Few sources refer or allude to mental or psychological damage caused to combatants. The royalist officer Richard Atkyns hinted at later mental problems probably suffered by many former soldiers. He recalled how in spring 1643 Prince Maurice rewarded a junior officer who had provided him with a fresh horse during a skirmish, giving him money and promising promotion. But the man proved either a deserter or a turncoat, for 'this graceless fellow went from my troop, and took two troopers with him, none of which ever returned again.' Around 15 years later, in the late 1650s, Atkyns bumped into him again in the capital. 'I saw him begging in the streets of London, with a muffler before his face, and spake inwardly, as if he had been eaten up with the foul disease.'[10] Civilians as well as soldiers caught up in a particularly brutal operation might suffer trauma and mental illness, such as 'Lady Jordan [who] being at Cirencester when it was besieged […] was so terrified with the shooting that her understanding was spoiled that she became a child, that they made babies for her to play withal.'[11]

While the incomplete state of financial records, especially on the royalist side, means that few conclusions can be drawn about royalist finance or the overall cost of the war, the sort of sums collected and spent by parliamentarian administrations can be reconstructed and reveal the high cost of war. A complete and fully paid foot regiment could cost £15,000 per year, a horse regiment twice that sum, a small-to-medium garrison might cost up to £10,000 per year and a major operation, such as the siege of Chester during the closing months of the war, could cost £5,000 per week. The Eastern Association army required £35,000 per month, the parliamentarian wartime navy well over £300,000 per year. In total, adding royalist and parliamentarian costs together, the direct military cost of the main civil war of 1642–6 was probably in excess of £10 million, though that is little more than an educated guess. Clearly, to cover these sorts of costs, huge sums were being raised through taxation.

During 1643 parliament's main tax was raising £35,000 per week, its Eastern Association had an annual income in 1643 and 1644 roughly equivalent to the Crown's annual revenue in the early seventeenth century and many parliamentarian counties were paying as much or more in wartime taxes per month as they paid per year in Ship Money during the 1630s. Although the rates varied from county to county and in the course of the war, many historians suggest that the main and regular direct taxes of the war years were the equivalent of an income tax of somewhere between 10 and 12.5 per cent.[12]

Most historians conclude that the indirect costs to individuals, households, counties and the country of plunder and free quarter extracted by the armies on both sides at least equalled and probably exceeded the direct costs of taxes and other exactions.[13] It is very hard to be sure of the cash value of those impositions. Claims that Brentford and its inhabitants suffered plunder and damage amounting to £4,000 as the royalist army moved through in autumn 1642 or that over £50,000 in cash, goods and wares was taken by the king's men when they captured and plundered Marlborough in early December 1642 cannot be substantiated.[14] Even small towns, not much more than villages, might claim significant losses and seek substantial compensation, such as the 'goods, chattels and cash taken from the parish of Ridgley [Rugeley in Staffordshire]' between 1644 and 1647, a long account of cash, horses, grain, cheese and other foodstuffs, tools, wood, hay, coal, horses, cattle, waggons, arms and other items, valued at £3,141 in total.[15] Seventy-five townspeople of Montgomery, including the bailiffs and rector, shopkeepers and ordinary householders, alleged damage to their houses, losses of cash, personal and household goods, grain and cattle, suffered at the hands of both royalist and parliamentarian forces during the fight for control of town and castle in September 1644, totalling over £3,000; this was presumably over and above the £300 or so claimed by the townspeople in 1646 specifically to cover the costs 'for quartering of soldiers in the said town upon just account taken the 4th of November last' and of cattle and other goods taken by the garrison.[16] These figures are dwarfed by the £28,740 claimed by inhabitants of Gloucester for their losses incurred through the destruction of their houses and their contents in the town's suburbs, deliberately demolished and fired by the parliamentarian garrison at the start of the siege in order to clear the area around the town

defences.[17] Other towns making broadly similar financial claims included Arundel for around £3,700, Coventry for almost £3,500, Faringdon in Oxfordshire for over £55,000 and Bridgnorth, which was very badly affected and damaged by wartime activity, for £60,000.[18]

In such uncertain and acquisitive times, it is no wonder that many people tried to hide their valuables, squirrelling away and burying cash and plate. Many coin hoards – deliberate deposits of coins buried in containers – were hidden, by soldiers or civilians, during the 1640s, and then either the death or relocation of the original depositor or his or her failure upon returning to relocate the original burial spot meant that the hoard remained secreted. Through a mixture of archaeological excavation, metal detecting and chance discoveries, a little over 200 coin hoards have been found which appear, given the dates of the coins, especially those most recently minted, to have been gathered and deposited during the civil war. Many of them are quite modest and the total face value of the coins is under – often well under – £100, though a few are significantly larger. Most of the coins are usually silver rather than gold and most had been minted in England during the reigns of James I and Charles I, though some hoards include older coins minted during the Tudor period, northern hoards often include some Scottish coins and many hoards include the odd forged or foreign coin.[19]

Sources do not provide a comprehensive picture of physical damage to the natural and built landscape of England and Wales wrought by the conflict. On the other hand, contemporary accounts make frequent reference to such destruction and it was clearly very substantial. Much of the wartime destruction focused on towns and villages caught up in the conflict, many of them garrisoned and contested, some of which were besieged, attacked or stormed, while others were simply unlucky to be plundered by armies as they moved through or by nearby garrisons. While each side alleged that the other indulged in sheer wanton vandalism, much of the wartime property destruction had some purpose, including the demolition of houses and properties owned by particular individuals viewed as enemies; the demolition of property to make way for new wartime offensive and defensive structures, including lines of bank and ditch and detached earthen artillery forts; the clearance of built-up areas, often suburbs, to deny enemy forces cover and to provide a clear field

of fire for defenders; the destruction of potential strongholds to deny them to the enemy; destruction caused by artillery bombardment and counter-bombardment; and accidental destruction, often resulting from fires or the explosion of gunpowder stores caused by careless troops. It has been estimated that around 200 towns and villages in England and Wales suffered significant wartime damage, resulting in over 10,000 houses being demolished, destroyed or damaged beyond repair, rendering perhaps 55,000 people temporarily homeless, that is around 1 per cent of the population of England and Wales. Contemporary sources combined with more recent work by archaeologists and architectural historians indicate that hotly contested towns and cities might have had several hundred houses destroyed during the war – for example, Chester may have lost 350, Hereford and York around 400 each. Even smaller, nucleated settlements or towns which saw limited military action might lose substantial numbers of houses – Holt in Denbighshire had over 100 houses destroyed and Coventry around the same number.[20]

Some sources provide particularly good insights into how particular people or places might be affected by wartime property damage or destruction. Bulstrode Whitelocke recorded how a royalist regiment briefly quartered at his main country residence, Fawley Court near Reading, early in the war. They plundered the house and took valuables, including linen and curtains, plus grain and coaches stored in barns and coach houses, and they also destroyed some items they found, including 'diverse books and writings of consequence', which they 'tore and burnt and lighted tobacco with them, and some they carried away to Wh[itelocke's] extreme loss and prejudice in his estate and in his profession, losing many excellent manuscripts of his father's and others and some of his own labours'. Although the fabric of the house seems to have escaped without too much damage, while there the royalists 'broke down his park pale, killed most of his deer […] and let out the rest, only a tame hind and his hounds they presented to Prince Rupert'.[21] Later in the war, Whitelocke suffered further when some other properties he owned around Henley were occupied by parliamentarian forces. In 1644 The Bell in Henley 'was on fire and received much damage […] done by the carelessness of some parliament soldiers quartered there', while around the same time parliament's garrison in nearby Phyllis Court 'did him much spoil and mischief, though he was a parliament man,

but brutish soldiers make no distinctions'. Like many other landowners, Whitelocke found some of his natural resources also taken or destroyed by troops, for his woods suffered 'great mischief' from parliamentarian troops based there.[22]

John Taylor, former waterman turned poet and traveller, described the sad state of some towns he saw in post-war tours around parts of England and Wales. In summer 1649, en route to the South West, he passed through Faringdon, a small town garrisoned to protect the approaches to Oxford and attacked by parliamentarians several times, causing the loss of around 200 houses, some of them destroyed by fire in the course of a parliamentarian siege of Faringdon House towards the end of the war. Taylor reported that

> the king's party burnt one part of the town and the parliamentarians fired the rest, so that between them there was a good, handsome market town turned into ashes and rubbish. It begins to bud and spring out again, for here and there a pretty house peeps up, so that it will in short time be rebuilt and Phoenix like (out of its own cinders) be revived and renewed to a more pleasing and beautiful prospect.[23]

Taylor was less optimistic about the state of and prospects for several Welsh towns which he passed through three years later. At Flint he noted that

> surely war hath made it miserable, the sometimes famous castle there […] is now almost buried in its own ruins and the town is so spoiled that it may truly be said of it, that they never had any market (in the memory of man), they have no saddler, tailor, weaver, brewer, baker, butcher or button-maker, they have not so much as a sign of an ale-house.

At Rhuddlan he saw 'an old, ruined wind- and war-shaken castle' and at Harlech 'a strong castle, but the town is all spoiled and almost [un] inhabitable by the late lamentable troubles', while a few days later he arrived at 'a miserable market-town called Aberystwyth, where before the late troubles there stood a strong castle, which being blown up, fell down, and many fair houses (with a defensible thick wall about the town) are transformed into confused heaps of unnecessary rubbish'.[24]

The condition of Aberystwyth Castle was due to more than simply damage inflicted during the fighting and instead provides an example of a particular type of war-related destruction. Although a few castles had been wrecked by wartime action, heavy bombardment by seventeenth-century artillery made limited impact on such thick stone walls and even those which had endured a siege and bombardment often emerged almost unscathed. But very selectively during and at the end of the war of 1642–6, and far more extensively and indeed as a national programme in the wake of the renewed fighting of 1648, parliament took a political decision to render indefensible many stone castles and a few other semi-military buildings, such as fortified manor houses, so that never again could they be used to foment civil war and be employed against parliament, a process known as slighting. The resulting partial or extensive demolition of scores of castles across England and Wales, together with some town walls and urban defences and a few fortified houses, took place mainly during 1648–51. In some cases, the job was done by demolishing a stretch of curtain wall or a particular feature,

56. *Remote in north-west Wales, the great Edwardian castle at Harlech was far removed from most of the fighting and it was the last mainland base to hold out for the king at the end of the main civil war, for not until March 1647 did a significant parliamentarian force besiege the castle, compelling the governor and his garrison of less than thirty men to surrender. Although ordered to be slighted by parliament, in fact the demolition was very selective and, unlike the town below it, John Taylor found it impressive and mighty still as he passed through in the early 1650s.*

often the gatehouse; in others, either through laborious stone-by-stone removal, undermining or the more general use of gunpowder, most of the stone walls and towers were brought down. Surviving accounts of work undertaken at Montgomery, Wallingford and Pontefract castles reveal that, at least in those cases, it was no crude flattening operation, but instead proceeded in stages in order to salvage valuable materials, including timber, tiles and glass, lead and other metalwork, which were carefully removed and stored before the main walls were brought down. On the other hand, the work at Montgomery may not have gone smoothly, as modern excavations at the site, including the clearance of much of the masonry brought down when the castle was slighted, also uncovered four human skeletons – three adult males and a teenage girl – amongst the stonework, perhaps some of the 150-strong team working there on the demolition between June and October 1649, killed and instantly entombed, their bodies left buried, when part of the wall collapsed prematurely or unexpectedly upon them.[25]

57. *In contrast to Harlech, Montgomery Castle, a hilltop fortress built by Henry III in the early thirteenth century, was very thoroughly slighted on parliament's orders in 1649, leaving standing nothing more than low walls, with occasional jagged remnants of towers. This view is of the middle ward in the foreground, looking towards the inner ward, to which a modern bridge now gives access, spanning the deep rock-cut ditch separating the two wards and in which human remains were found in the course of modern archaeological excavations.*

THE SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR: 1646–60

Parliament's military victory in the civil war did not bring durable peace and a settlement. Instead, in the short term, during the later 1640s, the country and the parliamentarian cause were rocked by unexpected and – at least at the outset – unforeseen consequences and loose ends of the war. The collapse of censorship and the greater freedom war had brought allowed a range of new and radical political, constitutional, social and economic ideas to flourish and to gain support, so that in the later 1640s groups such as the Levellers and the Diggers were pressing for change. The collapse of the Church of England and its control over religion had allowed Protestantism to fragment and during the 1640s and on into the early 1650s religious groups and sects such as Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Fifth Monarchists and other smaller but more radical groups emerged and were active, pressing for religious freedom or for a religious settlement to their liking. Above all, the strains of waging an intensive civil war and the divergent views which emerged about the political and religious strands of a possible post-war settlement led the parliamentarian cause, always something of an uneasy coalition, to fragment as war gave way to fragile peace. Divisions opened up between radical and conservative groupings in both Houses of parliament; between the parliamentarian armies, especially the New Model, and the more conservative political grouping who came to dominate parliamentary developments; between radical junior officers and ordinary soldiers on the one hand and their more cautious senior officers on the other; and between the English parliamentarians and their Scottish Covenanter allies, who felt that the English were not keeping their side of the 1643 agreement.

All these divisions encouraged the king to play divide and rule and to hold back from reaching a settlement with any of the English groupings and on any of the terms they offered him during 1646–7. His continuing intrigues in turn encouraged deepening divisions, while the deal he reached with the Scottish Covenanters at the end of 1647, under which they undertook to intervene militarily to restore him to full power in England and Wales, was the catalyst for a string of risings and rebellions in parts of the country in the course of 1648. In part overtly pro-royalist

movements, in part fomented by parliament's failure to reach a settlement which would restore normal civilian and peacetime forms, the renewed resistance and fighting during 1648 was again crushed militarily. But an energised and more vengeful army was not prepared to see a repeat of what had occurred after its victory of 1646. At the end of 1648 it purged from parliament those thought to be sympathetic to trying to reach a settlement with the king, as well as those hostile to the army and its very different agenda. This left a small number of MPs sitting in what was soon dubbed the Rump of the Long Parliament, a few dozen hard men and allies of the army who, with military support, pushed through the trial and execution of the king in January 1649, as well as of several other leading royalists around the same time, the abolition of monarchy and the House of Lords and the establishment of a republic.[26]

These developments of the later 1640s, as well as the consequences of the war of 1642–6, continued to shape events during the period 1649–60, which might be viewed as the medium-term consequences of that war. In major campaigns of 1649–50 and 1650–1, part of the New Model Army under Cromwell firstly reversed the consequences of the Irish Rebellion by breaking the back of Irish Catholic resistance and then defeated a Scottish army which was supporting the eldest son and heir of Charles I in his claim to be king of England, Scotland and Ireland and took control of lowland Scotland; however, Scottish military resistance was not really broken until September 1651, when a Scottish–royalist army which had entered England was surrounded, outnumbered and destroyed in battle at Worcester. After further more modest campaigns in both countries, by 1652–3 Ireland and Scotland had effectively been conquered by the English republic and were under English military control and rule. That position was maintained for the rest of the decade, with a strong English military presence and semi-military English administrations in both, on paper at least enforcing a degree of union with but very much under England. While in Scotland English rule was in some ways quite benign, with efforts to pardon, to reconcile and even to win over the native population, a harsher line was taken with the majority Irish Catholic population, who were excluded from power and office, while Catholic landowners were generally dispossessed of their property and many were forcibly resettled in the north-west of the island. In their place, the English further empowered

Protestants there, laying the ground for a long period of Protestant ascendancy in Ireland.

As well as resolving 'British' issues, during the 1650s parts of the army as well as the navy were employed in an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy. Employing the enhanced military capacity built up during the civil war, the English regimes of the 1650s were able to play a far more active role on the European stage than the royal regimes of the pre-war decades. In defence of commercial and mercantile interests, in 1652 the Rump embarked upon a naval war with the Dutch Republic, in which English vessels often outperformed their opponents, before peace was concluded in 1654. Less than a year later, the English regime launched amphibious attacks upon Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, leading to a commercial, colonial and naval war with the Spanish and, by the later 1650s and in alliance with France, to Anglo-French land operations against Spanish armies, towns and strongholds in and around Flanders. A strong military performance brought prestige abroad, international respect and territorial gains, especially the island of Jamaica and the fortified town of Dunkirk.

Domestically, there were signs of strength and weakness, stability and instability. During the 1650s several of the wartime direct and indirect taxes were continued and became the mainstay of state finance, raising large sums of money, over £2 million per year during much of the decade. But government expenditure also remained high, not least to maintain the army and navy, military operations in Scotland and Ireland and on land and at sea further afield. Thus state finances were repeatedly in deficit and debts grew. During the 1650s radicalism and some radical groups, such as the Levellers, the Diggers and a little later the Fifth Monarchists, faded. As well as acting against immorality and blasphemy, the successive governments of the 1650s guaranteed broad liberty of conscience for almost all Protestant faiths and sects, so they were able to meet and to worship freely and openly, to gather together in congregations and to choose their own ministers; in practice, even Catholics who were discreet and kept their heads down were not rigorously pursued or persecuted by the regimes in England and Wales. They also took steps to ensure that parishes were provided with good clergymen, filling vacancies and removing undesirables and incompetents. Order and security were generally maintained in England and Wales,

helped by the plentiful harvests of the 1650s and signs of economic expansion. Similarly, wartime conditions and expedients slowly faded, with a return of traditional local government and administration in much of England and Wales.

On the other hand, the 1650s were marked by constitutional change, uncertainty and instability. This should not be exaggerated, as two of the regimes proved reasonably durable, one lasting a few months under and the other a few months over five years. But a succession of different forms came and went, tried but judged by some to have failed, including the Rump parliament removed by Cromwell and the army officers in spring 1653; the unelected Nominated Assembly which they set up in July 1653 but which lasted less than six months before collapsing and resigning; the Protectorate, established by a written constitution in December 1653, which provided for a British government and for a single head of state – in the person of Oliver Cromwell, who became Lord Protector for life – and which lasted in slightly different forms until spring 1659, surviving constitutional revision in spring 1657 and the death of Oliver Cromwell and the succession of his elder son Richard as Protector in September 1658, before Richard and the whole regime were removed by the army; and the return of the Rump for a year between spring 1659 and spring 1660, excepting a few weeks in late 1659 during which it was temporarily removed by another military coup and a small group of senior officers attempted naked military rule, only for that initiative quickly to implode.

Most people in England and Wales had no part in these changes. They did not actively oppose them, there was no renewal of civil war or serious rebellion and instead acquiescence was the prevailing mood. But whenever parliamentary elections were held, even with novel restrictions on who could vote and sit as MPs, the resulting House of Commons proved to be divided and to contain many MPs who were antagonistic to the regime of the day, leading to further purges, turbulent and unproductive sessions and angry dissolutions or military coups. Even during the lifespan of the various regimes, there was often an undercurrent of constitutional uncertainty, occasionally bursting out into anger, confrontation or crisis. Most regimes were or wanted to appear predominantly civilian, but they had to tread carefully in dealing with the military. They needed the army to maintain stability and security, and they also had

to work with the military to ensure that it was supportive or at least not inclined to mount a coup and to overthrow the regime. Although the army intervened to remove regimes in which it lost trust, it repeatedly refrained from taking political power itself via direct military rule. In spring 1653 after removing the Rump, in late 1653 after the Nominated Assembly had gone and in spring 1659 after removing the Protectorate, power effectively rested with the army and its senior officers, but every time they established or re-established an alternative, mainly civilian government. Only towards the end of 1659, after removing the Rump for a second time, did a small group of officers try to rule the country themselves. The outcome was a short-lived fiasco, for it was a step too far even for many other army officers, their regiments and a large part of the navy and the attempt swiftly collapsed, leading on to the return of the Rump for its third iteration and, within five months, to the end of the whole republican experiment and the Restoration of monarchy and of Charles II. In this area, too, the loose ends left by the civil war had shaped but had also undermined government over the following decade.[27]

THE LONGER-TERM CONSEQUENCES AND LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR: THE POST-RESTORATION ERA AND BEYOND

The Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 and the reigns of Charles II, who died without legitimate children in 1685, and his younger brother James II, who reigned only until 1688, in many ways marked a return to traditional forms. While the reforming legislation agreed by Charles I during 1641 was largely accepted and preserved – so some of the prerogative law courts and most of the medieval and feudal sources of income did not return after 1660 – all other legislative changes of 1642–60 without royal assent were deemed null and void and monarchy was restored without any further limitations on its powers. Accordingly, both Charles and James were very powerful monarchs, with huge prerogative authority, and the Crown's personal formulation and direction of state policies resumed. The traditional executive arm, under the Privy Council, and the role of occasional parliaments summoned and dismissed more or less at the king's will, also returned. The Crown again

became unquestioned commander-in-chief, but while the Royal Navy was maintained, most of the army was quickly paid off and under Charles England and Wales again had no significant standing army. The Crown had direction of foreign policy and the making of peace and war and there was a speedy return to the traditional inactive foreign policy of the early Stuart age. Although the country stumbled into two brief and sometimes disastrous naval wars with the Dutch, for most of their reigns both Charles and James kept the country at peace. The shotgun union of Ireland and Scotland under England was abandoned and both kingdoms regained their own separate parliaments and other institutions [Plate 24]. However, the dramatic shift of land away from Catholics in Ireland was not reversed and the Irish Protestant ascendancy was cemented. A fairly traditional, episcopal Church of England returned as the only legal and permissible church and religion in England and Wales; no other form of Protestantism was allowed. Crown and church and many royalist families regained most of the lands and properties held before the civil war and the Crown also regained direct control over state income and expenditure. Most financial innovations of the civil-war period were abandoned, though the wartime innovation of excise duties, a sales tax on certain items, continued and became a major source of royal income. With just a handful of minor exceptions, therefore, it appeared that the post-Restoration church and state had reverted to pre-civil-war forms, reversing or abandoning most of the innovations of the 1640s and 1650s. The legacy of the civil war appeared to have been swept away.[28]

However, the Restoration settlement lasted less than a generation, for in autumn 1688 the Glorious Revolution removed the Catholic James II, who fled abroad, and the Crown passed jointly to James's nephew and son-in-law William of Orange – who as well as being head of the Dutch Republic was himself a Stuart, the son of a sister of Charles II and James II – and to William's wife Mary, James II's eldest child. In the aftermath of the Revolution and with the assent of the new king, William III, parliament effected key changes in church and state. The Church of England was retained, but legislation extended full religious toleration to almost all other Protestant groups and faiths, giving them the right to meet together, to build their own chapels, to appoint their own ministers and to conduct their own religious affairs. During the course of the 1690s, parliament oversaw a financial revolution which changed

the whole basis of state finance. With royal approval, parliament and a new state bank, the Bank of England set up in 1694, gained control over the raising and spending of state money. On taking the throne, William agreed a Bill of Rights, including promises regarding the future role of parliament. But it was the financial revolution of the 1690s, as much as a triennial act passed in 1694, which gave parliament much more power in running the country and also guaranteed its permanent position at the heart of government; parliament had to meet each year to pass key financial measures, including approving and renewing a new direct and regular tax on property, otherwise the financial system would collapse and the government would default. William had been particularly keen to acquire the throne in 1688–9 in order to bring the country into a major European war, already being waged by the Dutch and several other powers, against the expansionist policies of France under Louis XIV. So as a direct result of the Glorious Revolution, foreign policy

58. *Beginning life as a pair of early-seventeenth-century cottages in the village of Walpole, by the late 1640s the building had been converted into a chapel where, taking advantage of the religious liberty of the post-war years, a non-Church of England minister and congregation gathered and worshipped. Although the congregation was suppressed or forced underground by the religious legislation of the Restoration, which reimposed conformity to the Church of England, the building survived and flourished once more as a nonconformist congregational chapel after the Glorious Revolution, when the Toleration Act of 1689 guaranteed freedom of worship to almost all Protestant groups outside the state church.*

was realigned, a new army was raised and the country's military and much of its financial resources were directed to a major European war on land and sea, which continued long after William's death in 1702 and also dominated the reign of his sister-in-law, the younger sister of Mary II – who had died in 1694 – Queen Anne, who reigned until 1714.

As head of the Dutch state and active commander of the Continental war effort, William III was absent from England for large parts of his reign. Moreover, because of his upbringing and political education in the Dutch Republic, he had become accustomed to exercising limited and negotiated power and to working closely and successfully with representative assemblies. Thus William was nowhere near as acquisitive of personal and royal power as had been all his Stuart predecessors and although by no means a constitutional monarch in the modern sense, he was willing to share government and power with parliament and senior politicians. His priority was peace and harmony at home in order to secure military and other resources for his war against France and that also made him more willing to compromise and to negotiate away some powers held by previous monarchs. Overall, therefore, directly and indirectly the Glorious Revolution led to a series of fundamental changes and reorientations in church and state. If the Restoration settlement in and after 1660 had apparently wiped away much of the legacy of the civil war, perhaps the Revolution settlement less than a generation later returned to and resurrected some aspects of that legacy.[29]

Attempts to trace these longer-term consequences through the post-Restoration era into the post-Revolution state are fraught with difficulties. Historians are divided, and in any case, when exploring possible longer-term outcomes, their starting point is generally changes brought about by the period 1640–60 as a whole, rather than those specifically springing from the war of 1642–6. From that broader foundation, some believe that the mid seventeenth century saw a revolution, with profound and lasting consequences, but others that the clock was turned back in and after 1660, that the changes of the mid century were swiftly undone and that the real revolution, the profound changes which lasted and lived on to shape the modern state, occurred in and after the Glorious Revolution.[30] Arising from this, some historians hedge their bets and talk of seeds sown during the 1640s and 1650s which lay dormant for two or three decades, only to spring up and to flourish again in and

after 1688. In this way and using rather airy horticultural images, some historians have conceded that while most of the policies and innovations of 1640–60 were undone at the Restoration, precedents had been set and issues continued to lurk out of sight for a generation, to be pursued afresh or reactivated after the fall of James II. In some cases, a continuum can be traced – the Protestant plurality created during the civil war and cemented during the 1650s was never completely undone by attempts after 1660 to restore enforced conformity to a single state church; clandestine and persecuted nonconformist groups survived and questions about the wisdom of the religious policy continued, clearly leading to a very different and more tolerant religious settlement after the Glorious Revolution. In other areas, however, the links are far less tangible. Thus while it may be suggested that the active foreign policy of William III and Anne and their willingness to commit the country's armed forces and resources to major Continental wars owed something to the expansionist foreign policy of the 1650s, itself to some extent building on the military changes of the civil war, the two periods were separated by nearly 30 years of the Stuarts' traditional low-key, non-military foreign policy and clear links between the 1640s and 1650s and the period after 1688 are hard to discern.

We are on historically clearer ground in exploring the longer-term physical and human legacy of the war. Most castles and some other buildings shattered by war and post-war slighting were not repaired or reoccupied and their ruined state continued to be a visual reminder of the destructive nature of the war. If their elite owners wished to continue to reside in style in the area and had the means to do so, they generally constructed new non-military country houses in up-to-date materials and architectural styles. Thus a scattering of grand country houses, a few begun during the 1650s, most dating from the post-Restoration era, bear their own witness to wartime destruction. In contrast, most churches and those cathedrals damaged during the war were repaired or rebuilt, often fairly quickly, and much of the surviving church fabric and ecclesiastical fittings of the 1650s and 1660s, which with a few notable exceptions were decades of little church-building or new ecclesiastical work, have their roots in wartime damage [Plate 25]. Although most civil-war earthworks were thrown down at the end of the conflict or were engulfed by new buildings and urban expansion over the following

59. *The medieval church at Brampton Bryan was so badly damaged during the wartime siege and bombardment of the nearby castle that only a few stretches of walling could be saved, incorporated into what was a largely reconstructed church, built by the Harley family in the mid 1650s. Although the Victorians altered the windows and added the bellcote, much of the present building reflects the church of the 1650s, a fairly simple structure with a wide nave and chancel in one, with no screen or arch to divide them.*

60. *Holy Trinity Church in Berwick was an entirely new church, built in 1648–52, and it did not replace an earlier structure damaged in the civil war. Designed by a London architect and built under the supervision of the parliamentarian governor of the town, George Fenwick, the exterior is quite low and squat and shows elements of classical design, while plans for a tower were reputedly vetoed by Cromwell as he viewed the work in progress when he passed through Berwick en route to Scotland in 1650.*

61. *This view of the interior of Holy Trinity in Berwick, looking east, reveals that inside a much more traditional, medieval Gothic style was adopted, with arcades of Tuscan columns and rounded arches separating the body of the nave from the side aisles. The chancel, accessed through the large arch cut into and through the far wall, is a Victorian addition.*

62. *Sir Robert Shirley's new church at Staunton Harold was built in the mid seventeenth century, but in style and appearance it harks back to a medieval design and to ecclesiastical Gothic, complete with buttresses, battlements and pinnacles, square-headed semi-perpendicular windows in the clerestory, pointed-arched windows lighting the aisles below and a large, heavy west tower of three stages.*

century, in a few cases, around Basing House and Newark, Carew, Donnington and Raglan castles and overlooking Dartmouth in Devon, for example, civil-war earthworks can still be seen. In towns which sustained significant property damage, post-war rebuilding in the suburbs has itself long gone, demolished to make way for something better, but some post-war buildings constructed in town centres were of such quality that they still survive, including a number of town houses built in the old black-and-white timber-framed style [Plate 26] and, a little later, in more modern brick in Chester during the 1650s, 1660s and beyond, and a peppering of civic buildings such as town halls and market halls, including Bridgnorth town hall of 1652 [Plate 27].[31]

Perhaps the richest and most vibrant legacies of the civil war were and are the memories, recollections and later lives of those who lived through and participated in the conflict. The preceding chapters have often drawn upon the memoirs, histories and autobiographies of those who, during the post-war decades, as the years slipped by and the war became a more distant memory, wrote accounts of their own experiences. In a few cases, too, we can still see these men, not only in portraits and in their own pen portraits, but also as depicted in funeral effigies in parish churches, standing or recumbent, if they fought in the war often shown in armour, sometimes with accompanying inscriptions proclaiming their role in war [Plates 28–30]. But inevitably and as the funeral effigies and monuments themselves confirm, given the span of a human life, by the closing decades of the seventeenth century those direct links with the war were being broken, as the combatants and the rest of their generation passed from the world. A small number lived on into the early eighteenth century. In 1717 Welsh Thomas, claiming to have fought in the war as a royalist infantryman, regaled a Gloucestershire antiquary with tales of his wartime service, but claims by other figures during the 1730s to be old royalist soldiers who had fought for the king at Edgehill and who still remembered the battle – one of them claiming to do so at the ripe old age of 123 – push plausibility beyond breaking point.[32]

Richard Gough's account of his north Shropshire parish and its inhabitants was written well over half a century after the war ended. Born in 1635, he lived through the war as a child and witnessed some local events, which clearly made a deep impression upon him. By the time he wrote his local history, during the opening years of the eighteenth

century, he must have been one of a small and dwindling number still alive who could truly remember the war. His account is peppered with tales of wartime sufferings and of the impact of the conflict upon his neighbours and local families. It thus gives a colourful insight into the diverse but often detrimental experiences of the war, as well as into its equally diverse human legacy. Gough tells us about the one local who volunteered for parliament, 'a pretty little fellow and a stout adventurous soldier', who ended up 'shot through the leg with a musket bullet, which broke the master bone of his leg […and] his leg […] healed but was very crooked as long as he lived'; about a royalist cornet who was fatally wounded in a skirmish at Myddle and slowly bled to death, with Gough's enduring memory of seeing 'much blood running along the floor'; about the hanging of so-called Irish prisoners by the parliamentarians and of parliamentarian prisoners by Prince Rupert in retribution; about another local man, pleasant but indebted, who sought to elude his creditors by going off to fight for the king, who served throughout the war, 'but never attained to any higher post than a corporal of foot', who, having survived the fighting, returned but 'brought nothing home but a crazy body and many scars, the symptoms of the dangerous service which he had performed', and who returned also to find his debts increased and in the end was forced to sell his property; and about William Preece, nicknamed Scoggan, who fought for the king throughout the war, suffering imprisonment at Wem for a time, who, as royalist governor of Albright Hussey, frightened off a parliamentarian assault party by bragging loudly about the number of men under his command and by taking a pot shot at an enemy soldier, and who after the war came to live nearby with his third wife: 'he was not troubled by the parliament party, as many others were, for he that sits on the ground can fall no lower, so he died in peace.'[33] Scarred, deformed, crippled or financially ruined many may have been, but for the survivors of the civil war and for that generation who had witnessed the fight between a king and his parliament and between royalist and parliamentarian armies, life went on.

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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NOTES

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CHAPTER 1

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13 The works on Charles I and his kingship already cited examine the Personal Rule. See also Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven, CT, 1992) for a very weighty but also very positive assessment.
14 This tends to be the line taken in Sharpe, *Personal Rule.*
15 This tends to be the line taken by the other historians already cited, plus studies of contemporary personal responses to aspects of the Personal Rule found mainly in journal articles, such as Kenneth Fincham, 'The judges' decision on ship-money in February 1637: The reaction of Kent', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* lvii/136 (1984), pp. 230–7; John Fielding,

'Opposition to the personal rule of Charles I: The diary of Robert Woodford 1637–1641', *Historical Journal* xxxi/4 (1988), pp. 769–88; Ian Atherton, 'Viscount Scudamore's "Laudianism": The religious practices of the first Viscount Scudamore', *Historical Journal* xxxiv/3 (1991), pp. 567–96; Peter Salt, 'Sir Simonds D'Ewes and the levying of ship money, 1635–1640', *Historical Journal* xxxvii/2 (1994), pp. 253–87; and Christopher Haigh, 'The troubles of Thomas Pestell: Parish squabbles and ecclesiastical politics in Caroline England', *Journal of British Studies* xli/4 (2002), pp. 403–28.

16 For the Jacobean church and religious policy in Scotland, see Alan Macdonald, *The Jacobean Kirk, 1567–1625: Sovereignty, Polity and Liturgy* (Aldershot, 1998), and for Charles's input see Allan Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 1625–1641* (Edinburgh, 1991) and David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution 1637–44: The Triumph of the Covenanters* (2nd edn, Edinburgh, 2003). Both are explored in Braddick, *God's Fury*, ch. 1.

17 Braddick, *God's Fury*, Peter Donald, *An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637–1641* (Cambridge, 1990) and Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars*.

18 The most detailed recent accounts of contest between king and parliament in 1640–2 are Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991) and John Adamson, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London, 2007), which stresses the role of the peerage and Lords and emphasises secular concerns more heavily than Russell. Wider contexts, exploring the interplay between the political elite and broader society in London and the provinces, are found in Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1981) and David Cressy, *England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642* (Cambridge, 2006).

19 See Ronald G. Asch, 'Wentworth, Thomas, First Earl of Strafford (1593–1641)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004); C.V. Wedgwood, *Thomas Wentworth, First Earl of Strafford, 1593–1641: A Revaluation* (London, 1961); Anthony Milton, 'Laud, William (1573–1645)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004); and Charles Carlton, *Archbishop William Laud* (London, 1987).

20 Jane Ohlmeyer, *Ireland from Independence to Occupation* (Cambridge, 1995); Brian MacCuarta (ed.), *Ulster, 1641: Aspects of the Rising* (2nd edn, Belfast, 1997); Micheál Ó Siochrú and Jane Ohlmeyer, *Ireland, 1641: Contexts and Reactions* (Manchester, 2012); and Eamon Darcy, *The Irish Rebellion of 1641 and the Wars of the Three Kingdoms* (London, 2013).

21 Parliament's claim is contained in its defence of the Militia Ordinance of 6 June, the king's in his response to parliament's Nineteen Propositions. See Barry Coward and Peter Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents, 1603–1660* (London, 2010), nos 364, 365.

CHAPTER 2

1 *Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester and Cambridge* (1642), single-page broadsheet.

2 *A True and Exact Relation of the Manner of His Majesty's Setting Up His Standard at Nottingham* (1642), unpaginated.

3 Barry Coward and Peter Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents, 1603–1660* (London, 2010), no. 298.
4 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the Year 1641*, 3 vols (Oxford, 1707), vol. 1, p. 720.
5 Dorothy Gardiner (ed.), *The Oxinden Letters, 1607–1642: Being the Correspondence of Henry Oxinden of Barham and His Circle* (London, 1933), p. 272.
6 Bertram Schofield (ed.), *The Knyvett Letters (1620–1644)* (London, 1949), pp. 100–8.
7 Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1981), ch. 8 and map on p. 269, though more counties petitioned than shown there. The texts of several county petitions cited as examples here are in Coward and Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents*, no. 596.
8 Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 302–6; Jacqueline Eales, *Puritans and Roundheads: The Harleys of Brampton Bryan and the Outbreak of the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 1990), ch. 6; David Ross, *Royalist But… Herefordshire in the English Civil War, 1640–51* (Woonton, Herefordshire, 2012), chs 4 and 5.
9 Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 307–10; Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, 1640–1660* (Leicester, 1973), ch. 4.
10 Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 200–8 and map on p. 205.
11 Julie Spraggon, *Puritan Iconoclasm in England, 1640–1660* (London, 2001).
12 T.L., *True News from Norwich* (1642), pp. 3–8.
13 Thomas Taylor Lewis (ed.), *Letters of Lady Brilliana Harley*, Camden Society, old series 58 (London, 1854), pp. 167, 170–1; Eales, *Puritans and Roundheads*, pp. 143–5, 157–8.
14 Coward and Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents*, no. 364.
15 Ibid., no. 299.
16 Ibid., no. 296.
17 Ibid., no. 364.
18 Gardiner (ed.), *Oxinden Letters*, p. 312.
19 Schofield (ed.), *Knyvett Letters*, pp. 102–3.
20 Fletcher, *Outbreak*, maps on pp. 349 and 357 and discussion on pp. 347–68.
21 Ibid., pp. 324–5; Clive Holmes, *Seventeenth Century Lincolnshire* (Lincoln, 1980), pp. 146–50, 156–9.
22 John Giffard, *A Letter Sent to a Worthy Member of the House of Commons* (1642), pp. 3–5. The incident is considered within a wider context in Nick Poyntz, 'The attack on Lord Chandos: Popular politics in Cirencester in 1642', *Midland History* xxxv/1 (2010), pp. 71–88.
23 Stephen Bull, '*A General Plague of Madness': The Civil Wars in Lancashire, 1640–1660* (Lancaster, 2009), pp. 83–92. Contemporary printed accounts can be found in George Ormerod (ed.), *Tracts Relating to Military Proceedings in Lancashire during the Great Civil War*, Chetham Society 2 (Manchester, 1844), pp. 13–35, 324–332.
24 A[dam] Jones, *Horrible News from Leicester* (1642), unpaginated.
25 Related in detail in *Terrible News from Warwick, Leicester and Staffordshire* (1642) and several other pamphlets of mid to late June.
26 John Chambers, *A True Relation of the Transaction of the Commands of Both Houses of Parliament in the Execution of the Militia in the County of Leicester* (1642), unpaginated.

27 See also the brief account in Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 351, 366–7.
28 Ibid., pp. 339, 365–6, 372–3; Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620–1660* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 136–47; Philip Tennant, *Edgehill and Beyond: The People's War in the South Midlands, 1642–1645* (Stroud, 1992), pp. 19–33.
29 Edward Walsingham, *Britannicae virtutis imago, or, The Effigies of True Fortitude* (1644), pp. 11–12.
30 *A True Relation of the Barbarous Cruelty of Divers of the Bloody Cavaliers* (1642), unpaginated.
31 Tennant, *Edgehill and Beyond*, pp. 34–9; John Golbee, *A True and Exact Relation of the Most Remarkable Passages Which Have Happened at Warwick and Banbury* (1642), pp. 4–5.
32 Tennant, *Edgehill and Beyond*, pp. 39–42; *Propositions from the King's Most Excellent Majesty* (1642), p. 6.
33 Tennant, *Edgehill and Beyond*, pp. 43–6; *A True and Perfect Relation of the First and Victorious Skirmish between the Army under the Conduct of the Right Honourable the Lord Brooke* (1642), p. 5; *Several Occurrences That Have Lately Happened at Warwick, Coventry, Northamptonshire and Oxfordshire* (1642), p. 5.
34 Henry Ellis, 'Letters from a subaltern officer of the Earl of Essex's army written in the summer and autumn of 1642', *Archaeologia* xxxv (1853) (pp. 310–34), pp. 315–17.
35 *Truths from Leicester and Nottingham, August 1* (1642), single-page broadsheet.
36 Coward and Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents*, no. 297.
37 C.E.H. Chadwyck-Healey (ed.), *Sir Ralph Hopton's Narrative of His Campaign in the West, 1642–1644*, Somerset Record Society 18 (London, 1902), pp. 1–2.
38 Ibid., p. 3.
39 Ibid., pp. 3–5; *The Lord Marquess of Hertford, His Letter Sent to the Queen in Holland* (1642), pp. 5–8 (a parliamentarian report on the incident); *August 19th. A True and Exact Relation of All the Proceedings of Marquess Hertford* (1642), unpaginated. See also modern accounts in John Wroughton, *An Unhappy Civil War: The Experiences of Ordinary People in Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1642–1646* (Bath, 1999), pp. 13–14, and David Underdown, *Somerset in the Civil War and Interregnum* (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 32–4.
40 Chadwyck-Healey (ed.), *Sir Ralph Hopton's Narrative*, pp. 7–9; *August 19th. A True and Exact Relation of All the Proceedings of Marquess Hertford* (1642), unpaginated.
41 Ibid., pp. 9–10; *August 19th. A True and Exact Relation of All the Proceedings of Marquess Hertford* (1642), unpaginated; *A Relation of All the Passages and Proceedings in Somersetshire and Bristol* (1642), single-page broadsheet; *A Perfect Relation of All the Passages and Proceedings of the Marquess Hertford, the Lord Paulet, and the Rest of the Cavaliers That Were with Them in Wells* (1642), pp. 3–8; *Joyful News from Wells in Somersetshire* (1642), pp. 1–6; *A Second Letter Sent from John Ashe, Esquire* (1642), pp. 3–16. See also Wroughton, *Unhappy Civil War*, pp. 14–15 and Underdown, *Somerset in the Civil War*, pp. 35–8.
42 In the process, he also lost the naval depot and its supplies at Chatham on the Medway in Kent.
43 Peter Young and Wilfrid Emberton, *Sieges of the Great Civil War* (London, 1978), pp. 44–8; David Cooke, *Yorkshire Sieges of the Civil War* (Barnsley, 2011), pp. 8–15. Developments at Kingston upon Hull were recounted in a string

of London pamphlets, whose titles give a taste of fluctuating reports there: *Exceeding Good and Joyful News from Hull*; *Horrible News from Hull*; *Joyful News from Hull*; *The Joyfullest News from Hull*; *Terrible News from Hull*.

44 John Webb, *The Siege of Portsmouth in the Civil War*, Portsmouth Papers 7 (Portsmouth, 1969); Young and Emberton, *Sieges*, pp. 8–13; *A Declaration of All the Passages at the Taking of Portsmouth* (1642); *A Relation from Portsmouth Wherein Is Declared the Manner How the Castle Was Taken* (1642); *A True Relation of the Several Passages and Proceedings of Colonel Goring at Portsmouth* (1642); George Goring, *True News from Portsmouth* (1642); *A True Report of the Occurrences at Portsmouth* (1642); *A True Relation of the Passages Which Happened at the Town of Portsmouth* (1642); I.S., *The Taking of the Castle of Portsmouth* (1642).

45 Bull, '*A General Plague*', pp. 93–101; Ormerod (ed.), *Tracts*, pp. 49–57, 219–23 – the quotations are from pp. 49 and 56, and also from *A True and Perfect Relation of the Proceedings at Manchester* (1642), unpaginated, which Ormerod did not include.

46 Thomas Lunsford, *A Declaration Made by the Lord Marquess of Hertford* (1642), p. 4; Chadwyck-Healey (ed.), *Sir Ralph Hopton's Narrative*, pp. 12–13.

47 Lat Sampson, *A Diurnal of the True Proceedings of Our Armies at Sherborne* (1642), pp. 1–2.

48 *The Copy of a Letter Sent from Sherborne* (1642) stressed Bedford's problems with desertion.

49 William Russell, Duke of Bedford, *A Letter Written from the Right Honourable the Earl of Bedford to a Lord of the House of Peers* (1642), unpaginated.

50 Sampson, *A Diurnal of the True Proceedings*, p. 3.

51 Chadwyck-Healey (ed.), *Sir Ralph Hopton's Narrative*, pp. 14–16; Sampson, *A Diurnal of the True Proceedings*, pp. 3–4; Russell, *A Letter Written from the Right Honourable the Earl of Bedford to a Lord of the House of Peers*; Captain Aiscogh, *A Relation of the Actions of the Parliament's Forces under the Command of the Earl of Bedford* (1642); *Propositions Propounded by the Marquess of Hertford to the Earl of Bedford* (1642), pp. 2–3; Lunsford, *A Declaration Made by the Lord Marquess of Hertford*, pp. 5–6.

52 Chadwyck-Healey (ed.), *Sir Ralph Hopton's Narrative*, pp. 17–18.

53 The quotations are from the fullest and most detailed set of instructions, dated 22 September. See Coward and Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents*, no. 299.

54 Ibid., no. 301.

55 The preliminary movements are covered in the two fullest modern studies, Peter Young, *Edgehill, 1642: The Campaign and the Battle* (Kineton, 1967) and Christopher Scott, Alan Turton and Eric Gruber von Arni, *Edgehill: The Battle Reinterpreted* (Barnsley, 2004), as well as in Keith Roberts and John Tincey, *Edgehill, 1642: The First Battle of the English Civil War* (Oxford, 2001), and in all the principal military histories of the English civil war, the best of which are Peter Young and Richard Holmes, *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651* (London, 1974); Stuart Reid, *All the King's Armies: A Military History of the English Civil War, 1642–1651* (Staplehurst, 1998); Malcolm Wanklyn and Frank Jones, *A Military History of the English Civil War* (Harlow, 2005); and Malcolm Wanklyn, *The Warrior Generals: Winning the British Civil Wars* (New Haven, CT, 2010).

56 A point made in Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, p. 237, n. 34.
57 Nathaniel Fiennes [?], *A Most True and Exact Relation of Both the Battles Fought by His Excellency and His Forces against the Bloody Cavaliers* (1642), pp. 7–13.
58 The ensuing account of Edgehill and its aftermath, including Brentford and Turnham Green, rests upon primary sources and also the secondary sources already cited, together with Austin Woolrych, *Battles of the English Civil War* (London, 1961) and Malcolm Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles of the English Civil War* (Barnsley, 2006), chs 4 and 5. Further reference will be made to these works only on specific points of detail.
59 Edward Kightley, *A Full and True Relation of the Great Battle Fought between the King's Army and His Excellency the Earl of Essex* (1642), p. 3.
60 The plan of the initial royalist dispositions, drawn up much later by Bernard de Gomme, is of very limited value. It is reproduced in Young, *Edgehill*, plate 9.
61 Transcripts for a good though by no means comprehensive selection of these are included in ibid., part three, sections one and two.
62 Such as *A True Copy of a Letter Sent unto the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor of London from a Trusty Friend in the Army* (1642), apparently written by a participant before dawn on 24 October in expectation of battle resuming; Adoniram Byfield, *A Letter Sent from a Worthy Divine to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor of London* (1642), apparently written sometime on 24 October; and Stephen Marshall, *A Most True and Succinct Relation of the Late Battle near Kineton* (1642), apparently written from Warwick on 25 October.
63 The parliamentarian account is entitled *An Exact and True Relation of the Dangerous and Bloody Fight between His Majesty's Army and the Parliament's Forces near Kineton* (1642) and the royalist *A Relation of the Battle Lately Fought between Kineton and Edgehill by His Majesty's Army and That of the Rebels* (1642).
64 A few historians have suggested that the two armies deployed in a different place and on a different alignment, most notably Glenn Foard and Richard Morris, who, in the light of metal-detector searches across parts of the area and of the resulting finds of a variety of musket, carbine, pistol and artillery shot being plotted on a map, suggest that the armies drew up parallel to each other on a north-north-west to south-south-east alignment, roughly between Radway and Kineton, so that the escarpment of Edgehill lay to the south-east of and almost at right angles to the southern end of both lines: Glenn Foard and Richard Morris, *The Archaeology of English Battlefields: Conflict in the Pre-industrial Landscape* (York, 2012), pp. 121–6 and especially fig. 7.22 on p. 125. However, this appears to be placing a lot of faith in the finds of metal detectorists who have worked on parts of a much-disturbed battlefield, as well as to run against the more likely conclusions drawn from contemporary documentary sources; while certainly fresh, interesting and worth further investigation, it is thus not the interpretation favoured or followed here.
65 Though see Aaron Graham, 'The Earl of Essex and parliament's army at the Battle of Edgehill: A reassessment', *War in History* xvii/3 (2010), pp. 276–93, which argues that the two armies had roughly numerical parity but at a significantly lower figure.
66 *A Relation of the Battle Lately Fought between Kineton and Edgehill by His Majesty's Army and That of the Rebels* (1642), p. 3.

67 Kightley, *A Full and True Relation*, p. 5.
68 Ibid., p. 4.
69 *An Exact and True Relation of the Dangerous and Bloody Fight between His Majesty's Army and the Parliament's Forces near Kineton* (1642), p. 6.
70 Ibid., p. 7.
71 Philip Wharton, Baron Wharton, *Eight Speeches Spoken in Guildhall upon Thursday Night, October 27 1642* (1642), unpaginated.
72 Kightley, *A Full and True Relation*, p. 6.
73 See the discussion by Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, pp. 33–4, and Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, pp. 59–60.
74 Marshall, *A Most True and Succinct Relation*, single-page broadsheet; *An Exact and True Relation of the Dangerous and Bloody Fight between His Majesty's Army and the Parliament's Forces near Kineton* (1642), p. 7.
75 See the interesting discussion in Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, pp. 32–3.
76 Peter Young and Norman Tucker (eds), *Military Memoirs of the Civil War: Richard Atkyns, John Gwyn* (London, 1967), p. 46.
77 Account of 'M.S.' of 15 November printed as an appendix to Godfrey Davies, 'The battle of Edgehill', *English Historical Review* xxxvi/141 (1921) (pp. 30–44), pp. 42–3.
78 *A True and Perfect Relation of the Barbarous and Cruel Passages of the King's Army at Old Brentford* (1642), pp. 5–12.
79 *The Humble Petition of All the Inhabitants of the Town of Old Brentford* (1642), unpaginated.
80 T.B., *Marlborough's Miseries or England Turned Ireland* (1642), pp. 2–8.
81 *A True and Exact Relation of a Great Overthrow Given to the Cavaliers in Winchester* (1642); *A True Relation of the Taking of the City of Chichester by the Parliament's Forces* (1642).
82 Bull, '*A General Plague*', pp. 102–21.
83 Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651* (London, 1992), table 2 on p. 204 suggests that a total of 2,533 royalists and parliamentarians were killed in action in England and Wales during 1642.

CHAPTER 3

1 Francis Bamford (ed.), *A Royalist's Notebook* (London, 1936), pp. 103, 109.
2 J.M. Lloyd-Thomas (ed.), *The Autobiography of Richard Baxter* (London, 1931), pp. 42–3.
3 The discussion in this and the following section draws heavily upon Peter Gaunt, *The Cromwellian Gazetteer: An Illustrated Guide to Britain in the Civil War and Commonwealth* (Stroud, 1987) and upon 30 years of visiting civil-war sites. See also Peter Harrington, *Archaeology of the English Civil War* (Princes Risborough, 1992); Peter Harrington, *English Civil War Fortifications, 1642–51* (Oxford, 2003); Peter Harrington, *English Civil War Archaeology* (London, 2004); Ronald Hutton and Wylie Reeves, 'Sieges and fortifications', in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1660* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 195–233; and Stephen Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars* (Stroud, 1994).

4 *The Soldiers' Report Concerning Sir William Waller's Fight against Basing House* (1643), unpaginated.
5 John Webb and T.W. Webb (eds), *Military Memoir of Colonel John Birch […] Written by Roe, His Secretary*, Camden Society, new series 7 (London, 1873), pp. 23–9.
6 Peter Young and Norman Tucker (eds), *Military Memoirs of the Civil War: Richard Atkyns, John Gwyn* (London, 1967), p. 52.
7 Henry Ellis, 'Letters from a subaltern officer of the Earl of Essex's army written in the summer and autumn of 1642', *Archaeologia* xxxv (1853) (pp. 310–34), pp. 324–7, 331–4.
8 Sir Thomas Fairfax, 'A short memorial of the northern actions', in Francis Maseres (ed.), *Select Tracts Relating to the Civil Wars in England in the Reign of King Charles I*, 2 vols (London, 1815), vol. 1 (pp. 415–51), p. 422.
9 Lloyd-Thomas (ed.), *Autobiography of Richard Baxter*, p. 53.
10 All the main campaigns, battles and other operations referred to or cited as examples here are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6.
11 Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and fortifications'; Harrington, *English Civil War Fortifications*; and Harrington, *English Civil War Archaeology*, chs 2–4.
12 The best introduction to this is Bernard Capp, 'Naval operations', in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1660* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 156–91, though see also Michael Baumber, 'Seizing the fleet in 1642', *Mariner's Mirror* lxxviii (1992), pp. 227–34; Michael Baumber, 'The navy and the civil war in Ireland, 1643–1646', *Mariner's Mirror* lxxv (1989), pp. 265–9; Elaine Murphy, 'Atrocities at sea and the treatment of prisoners of war', *Historical Journal* liii/1 (2010), pp. 21–37; and Elaine Murphy, *Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641–1653* (Woodbridge, 2012).
13 For parliament's conscription ordinance of August 1643, see Barry Coward and Peter Gaunt (eds), *English Historical Documents, 1603–1660* (London, 2010), no. 300.
14 Letter of Colonel Venn of April 1646, quoted in Webb and Webb (eds), *Military Memoir of Colonel John Birch*, p. 197.
15 See, for example, Elias Archer, *A True Relation of the Marchings of the Red Trained Bands of Westminster, the Green Auxiliaries of London, and the Yellow Auxiliaries of the Tower Hamlets, under the Command of Sir William Waller* (1643) and Henry Foster, *A True and Exact Relation of the Marchings of the Two Regiments of the Trained Bands of the City of London, Being the Red and Blue Regiments, as Also of the Three Regiments of the Auxiliary Forces, the Blue, Red and Orange, Who Marched Forth for the Relief of the City of Gloucester* (1643).
16 Richard Gough, *The History of Myddle*, ed. David Hey (London, 1981), pp. 71, 115–16.
17 See Ronald Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort, 1642–1646* (Harlow, 1982), pp. 22–3, and Peter Gaunt, *A Nation under Siege: The Civil War in Wales, 1642–1648* (London, 1991), p. 29, for assessments of this process in action in the raising of royalist regiments in Staffordshire and north-east Wales during the opening months of the war.
18 The best studies are Keith Roberts, *Soldiers of the English Civil War (1): Infantry* (Oxford, 1989); John Tincey, *Soldiers of the English Civil War (2):*

Cavalry (Oxford, 1990), which also covers dragoons and artillery; and David Blackmore, *Arms and Armour of the English Civil Wars* (London, 1990). Most military histories cover this area, including Peter Young and Richard Holmes, *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651* (London, 1974), ch. 3; Stuart Reid, *All the King's Armies: A Military History of the English Civil War, 1642–1651* (Staplehurst, 1998), ch. 1; and Ian Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652* (Harlow, 2007), ch. 4. Most full-length studies of individual battles also do so, including Peter Young, *Marston Moor 1644: The Campaign and the Battle* (rev. edn, Moreton-in-Marsh, 1997), chs 2–3, and, particularly useful, Christopher Scott, Alan Turton and Eric Gruber von Arni, *Edgehill: The Battle Reinterpreted* (Barnsley, 2004), chs 2–4. See also Peter Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638–52* (Stroud, 2000), ch. 1.

19 Edmund Ludlow, *Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow*, 2 vols (Vevey, 1698), vol. 1, p. 50.

20 Ibid., p. 89.

21 Harry Gordon Tibbutt, *The Life and Letters of Sir Lewis Dyve*, Bedfordshire Historical Record Society 27 (Streatley, Bedfordshire, 1948), pp. 71–2.

22 *A True Relation of the Several Passages Which Have Happened to Our Army since It Advanced towards Gloucester* (1643), p. 5. For another example of an arrow nearly striking a royalist officer, see Young and Tucker (eds), *Military Memoirs*, p. 52.

23 *A True Relation of the Several Passages Which Have Happened to Our Army since It Advanced towards Gloucester* (1643), p. 4.

24 *A Narration of the Great Victory (through God's Providence) Obtained by the Parliament's Forces under Sir William Waller at Alton* (1643), p. 7.

25 Fairfax, 'A short memorial', p. 439; Sir Edward Walker, *Historical Discourses upon Several Occasions* (London, 1705), p. 91.

26 Simeon Ashe, *A Continuation of True Intelligence*, no. 5, 10 June–10 July 1644, p. 5.

27 David Underdown, *Revel, Riot and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England, 1603–1660* (Oxford, 1985) and Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620–1660* (Cambridge, 1987), especially ch. 4. See also some support for the Underdown thesis in John Wroughton, *An Unhappy Civil War: The Experiences of Ordinary People in Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1642–1646* (Bath, 1999), ch. 1.

28 Mark Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiances in Devon during the English Civil War* (Exeter, 1994).

29 Andy Wood, *The Politics of Social Conflict: The Peak Country, 1520–1770* (Cambridge, 1999); Andrew Warmington, *Civil War, Interregnum and Restoration in Gloucestershire, 1640–1672* (Woodbridge, 1997).

30 Ruth Spalding (ed.), *The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 134–7.

31 I have heard Brigadier Young quoted along these lines several times, but have been unable to find such a clear and succinct statement in his published works on the war, so I suspect that this was originally drawn from Young's lectures rather than his writings.

32 Sir Richard Bulstrode, *Memoirs and Reflections upon the Reign and Government of King Charles I and King Charles II* (London, 1721), p. 111.

CHAPTER 4

1 *A True Relation of the Late Victory Obtained by the Right Honourable the Earl of Stamford at Plymouth and Modbury* (1643), pp. 1–2. The London bookseller George Thomason acquired his copy on 3 March.
2 The principal campaigns of 1643 are explored in Peter Young and Richard Holmes, *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651* (London, 1974), chs 5–10; Stuart Reid, *All the King's Armies: A Military History of the English Civil War, 1642–1651* (Staplehurst, 1998), chs 3–7; Malcolm Wanklyn and Frank Jones, *A Military History of the English Civil War* (Harlow, 2005), parts 3–4; Ian Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652* (Harlow, 2007), chs 6–7; Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire* (London, 2008), chs 9–10; and Malcolm Wanklyn, *The Warrior Generals: Winning the British Civil Wars* (New Haven, CT, 2010), chs 1, 4–7. Henceforth reference will be made to these works only on specific points of detail.
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CHAPTER 5

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CONCLUSION

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Individuals are indexed under the name or title they held at the time of the civil war and under which they appear in this book; later promotions to or within the peerage have generally been ignored. Italicised page numbers indicate half-tones.

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Young, Peter 121

PLATE 1: The fourteenth-century heraldic glass, described as 'very fair and old' by the royalist Richard Symonds when the king's army halted at Fladbury in early July 1644, can still be seen in St John's Church. Symonds correctly identified the families and individuals represented as Boteler (top left), Mortimer (top right), Henry de Montfort (middle left), Simon de Montfort (middle right), de Bosco (bottom left) and le Despencer (bottom right), most of whom had fought and several of whom died in the battle of Evesham of 1265, during one of England's earlier civil wars.

PLATE 2: The recumbent effigy of Sir William Waller is part of a family memorial that Waller had erected in Bath Abbey in honour of his first wife, who died in 1633. Now badly damaged, reputedly by royalist troops who held Bath for much of the civil war, it shows Waller – still very much alive at the time it was erected – dressed in armour and lying on his side propped up on one elbow, next to and above his deceased wife.

PLATE 3: This near-contemporary image of James VI and I in glass is in Tremeirchion parish church in north-east Wales. Although not a direct copy of any of the better-known portraits of the king, it is broadly similar to some early-seventeenth-century engravings and shows the middle-aged monarch, after he had inherited the kingdoms of England – and with it Wales – and Ireland.

PLATE 4: Although the hopes of James VI and I to establish an Anglo-Scottish political union were thwarted, he sought other ways to promote the post-1603 union of his two crowns, adopting the title king of Great Britain and a new British flag. He also adopted a new royal coat of arms, depicted in this spectacular carved wooden example found in Friston Church, combining the traditional English royal arms with Scottish and Irish elements – see Plate 5 for another image of these arms and a fuller description of their components.

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DIEV ET MONDROIT
AT THE COST OF ROBERT THOMAS AND WILLIAM MILLS CHURCHWARDENS 1631

PLATE 5: Like his father, Charles I employed the redesigned royal arms encompassing Britain and Ireland, seen here in St Cuthbert's Church, Wells. The English royal arms, combining the three English lions and the three fleurs-de-lys of France, representing the anachronistic claims of medieval English kings to the throne of France, were retained, now quartered top left and bottom right and combined with the harp of Ireland bottom left and the red lion rampant within a decorative border, the traditional royal arms of Scotland, top right. As for the supporting heraldic beasts, the traditional English lion (left) was joined by the Scottish unicorn (right), employed by the Stuarts as kings of Scotland since the fifteenth century.

PLATE 6: In the early 1630s John, Viscount Scudamore, refitted and adorned the parish church at Abbey Dore in keeping with the style favoured by his friend, William Laud, and the king. Particularly striking is this big, heavy oak screen, which he erected to separate the nave from the chancel, surmounted by the royal arms in the centre and on either side his own arms and those of Laud.

PLATE 7: Bullet marks on the tower of Powick Church may have been made in the final stages of the engagement around Powick Bridge in September 1642, as some of Rupert's men drove off what remained of the retreating parliamentarian force. They may, however, have been made nine years later, in September 1651, for the preliminary stages of the battle of Worcester saw further significant fighting around Powick.

PLATE 8: That the royalists fortified and garrisoned the small medieval castle at Moreton Corbet and the Elizabethan mansion which by the time of the civil war effectively formed its southern range, a grand but unmilitary building with large outward-facing windows, is probably indicative of the dearth of other military and fortifiable buildings in the area by the 1640s. Based on classical and Continental models, the mansion was captured by parliament but survived the war without major damage, was inhabited again in the later seventeenth century but was then abandoned.

PLATE 9: Earith fort was a small earthwork artillery base built by the parliamentarians close to the confluence of the Great Ouse with the recently cut Old Bedford river, which was an artificial drainage canal. It took the form of a star-shaped earthen bank, with four projecting arrowhead bastions in which artillery would have been mounted, surrounded by a ditch, parts of which still fill with water in wet weather, and an outer bank, all still quite clear on the ground.

PLATE 10: Colonel John Birch, originally from Lancashire, campaigned for parliament in southern England in 1643–4, but the high point of his military career was probably his capture of Hereford in December 1645, following which he became governor of Hereford Castle, acquired property in the county and launched a Herefordshire-based political and administrative career. He was active politically through much of the latter half of the seventeenth century and at his death in 1691 this impressive monument was erected to him in Weobley Church, a town he had represented in parliament, portraying him in armour and recalling his days as a parliamentarian commander.

PLATE 11: Well into his fifties when the civil war began, the Earl of Warwick, portrayed here by Anthony Van Dyck in the mid 1630s, had had a long career as a politician and courtier, albeit one increasingly estranged from Charles I and his policies, and as an active naval officer. It was in this capacity that he made his most valuable contribution to the parliamentarian war effort, moving quickly in summer 1642 to secure the navy and acting as its commander and admiral until he had to resign his commission in spring 1645 under the terms of the Self-denying Ordinance.

PLATE 12: This image of a civil-war matchlock musket and below it a stand on which it could be rested when firing – though such stands went out of fashion during the war – appears in a window of Farndon Church, made and installed there in the early 1660s, commemorating the royalist defence of nearby Chester and depicting civil-war figures and equipment. Like the other plates appearing here drawn from this source, the image is not of the window itself, though it survives in reasonable order, but is taken from a detailed painting of the glass commissioned by a nineteenth-century dean of Chester who had the window restored.

PLATE 13: Although these are modern re-enactors firing replica weapons as a salute – at Montgomery Castle and as part of the celebrations to mark the 350th anniversary of the battle of Montgomery, in fact – this photograph gives a good impression of the large quantities of smoke released when civil-war muskets were discharged, as well as of the brief flash of flame in the pan and from the muzzle when the weapon was fired.



PLATE 14: Taken again from the painting of the civil-war window at Farndon, this image of a musketeer's bandoleer clearly depicts the small containers suspended from it, each holding sufficient powder to fire a shot, together with the small bag or pouch containing musket balls.



PLATE 15: Once again from the painting of the civil-war window at Farndon, this image shows a set of pikeman's armour, that is a breastplate to which were attached the so-called tassels, metal plates protecting the midriff and upper thighs (left), a backplate (right) and between them a helmet and a gorget. When not being worn, the helmet could be slung and carried from the large hook at the bottom of the backplate.

PLATE 16: This fine equestrian portrait, probably painted during the 1640s by an unknown artist, shows Alexander Popham, who held Littlecote House and other properties in west Wiltshire and Somerset and who fought for parliament from the outbreak of the war until he resigned his commission under the Self-denying Ordinance in spring 1645. He is shown wearing full black body armour and holding a commander's baton, and he is armed with an unusually ornate, probably oriental sword and a pair of pistols slung in front of the saddle.



PLATE 17: Three adjoining panels of the painting of Farndon's civil-war window show a trio of royalist officers who held command at Chester, identified by their coats of arms (from left to right) as Sir Richard Grosvenor, Sir William Mainwaring and William Barnston. All three wear swords, Grosvenor and Mainwaring hold commanders' batons and Barnston holds a polearm, all wear clearly expensive boots, clothes and hats, as befit their position and status, but no body armour, while the bands of gold lace on their red breeches may have been another designation of military rank.

PLATE 18: Head of a Derbyshire family and one of the county's richest gentlemen, Sir John Gell fought for parliament from the outbreak of war, secured Derby and most of Derbyshire and was active in the wider region during 1643–5; however, he then became disenchanted with the parliamentarian cause, failed to support New Model Army campaigns in the Midlands in 1645–6 and flirted with royalism in the late 1640s and 1650s. Upon his death in 1671 he was buried close to many of his ancestors in Wirksworth Church, but while the inscription on his mural monument records his first wife and their children, it omits any reference to a brief and failed second marriage in the later 1640s to the widow of a former adversary.

PLATE 19: Sir John Byron, later Baron Byron, raised a royalist horse regiment in summer 1642, fought in the king's army at Edgehill, campaigned across southern England during 1643 and then was appointed to lead the king's campaign in the North West, though after military setbacks during the winter he was on the defensive, trying to hold Chester, all the while gaining a reputation as a sometimes brutal but often effective commander. This portrait by William Dobson, one of many he painted of royalist officers and gentlemen, probably dates from 1643, as it shows the distinct wound or scar on Byron's cheek which he sustained in a minor action in Oxfordshire at the beginning of the year.

PLATE 20: Looking west-north-west from a spot a little north-west of the village of Clipston, this photograph shows the area to the north of the main battlefield of Naseby, probably crossed by such parts of the royalist army which managed to get away. Wadborough or Wadborough Hill, where a concentration of musket balls and other metallic finds has led some historians to suggest that fighting ended with another significant engagement between surviving royalist infantry and their parliamentarian opponents, lies in the middle distance, in the centre and centre-left of this photograph.

PLATE 21: Dating from the 1930s, the Naseby monument stands on the northern slope of Mill Hill, close to where the parliamentarian front line deployed. An inscription extols the role of Oliver Cromwell in the ensuing battle – so much so that it is sometimes now referred to as the Cromwell monument – and the role of the battle in determining the outcome of the whole war, proclaiming that 'From near this site Oliver Cromwell led the cavalry charge which decided the issue of the battle and ultimately that of the great civil war'.

PLATE 22: Sir Francis Gamul, a royalist officer in the Chester garrison, at whose town house the king lodged during his brief visit to the city in September 1645, was reportedly with the king as they watched from a corner tower on the walls of Chester the royalist army being defeated on Rowton Moor and surviving troops trying to get back into the city. Taken from the painting of the civil-war window at Farndon, Gamul is shown standing in front of a large tent.

PLATE 23: By September 1645 the parliamentarians had the royalist garrison tightly besieged within the walls of Chester and a sustained artillery bombardment succeeded in opening a gap in the walls which the royalist governor, Lord Byron, reckoned wide enough that 'six horsemen might march up in rank', though in fact attempts to storm the city here and elsewhere were beaten off. After the war the wall was repaired and rebuilt, but because the masonry used was slightly different from and more regular than the adjoining stonework, the site of the civil-war breach is still evident.

PLATE 24: Although Charles II abandoned the enforced and much tighter union between England, Scotland and Ireland attempted during the Cromwellian Protectorate, he retained the united royal arms adopted by his father and grandfather, seen here in a fine painted example in Nunney Church. They were put up soon after the Restoration and bear the date 1660, though Charles always maintained that his reign started in 1649, immediately after his father was executed, and that his return to England in spring 1660 therefore occurred during the twelfth year of his reign.


In the yeare: 1653
when all thinges sacred were throughout ỹ nation
either demollisht or profaned
Sr Robert Shirley Barronet
Founded this Church
whose singular praise it is
to haue done the best thinges in ỹ worst times
And
hoped them in the most callamitous
The Righteous shall be had in euerlasting remembrance

PLATE 25: In the early 1650s the royalist Sir Robert Shirley began rebuilding the church adjoining his estate at Staunton Harold in Leicestershire, and upon its completion in the 1660s this inscribed tablet, proclaiming his work at a time when churches and religion were allegedly under assault, was placed above the main doorway. In the post-war years Shirley was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of royalist intrigue and he died while imprisoned in the Tower in 1656, though after the Restoration his remains were moved to Staunton Harold and reburied in his newly completed church.

PLATE 26: The extensive damage which Chester sustained in the intense parliamentarian bombardment during the final stages of the siege resulted in substantial rebuilding after the war. This fine timber building was constructed just after the Restoration – its facade carries the date 1664 – and it was for a time the town house of the earls of Shrewsbury, who controlled the nearby Bridgegate into and out of the city and drew an income from tolls collected there, though it later became and remains an inn.

PLATE 27: Bridgnorth was another town which suffered extensive damage, by bombardment and fire, in the course of the civil war and parts of it were subsequently rebuilt, most notably this new town hall of 1652. Positioned in the High Street, the lower storey consists of stone arches now encased in brick, while the upper-storey hall itself is timber framed, possibly reusing some sections of an earlier barn; the turret on the top was added during a Victorian restoration.

PLATE 28: Francis Glanville, son of the former speaker of the House of Commons of the Short Parliament who became a lukewarm royalist, was far more committed to the king's cause than his father, taking up arms and dying while fighting as a lieutenant colonel in the unsuccessful royalist defence of Bridgwater against the New Model Army assault of summer 1645. His standing alabaster effigy in Broad Hinton Church shows him dressed in body armour, holding an ensign decorated with his own arms in one hand, a rather antiquated helmet and gauntlets by his feet.

PLATE 29: John Fettiplace, portrayed here within a triple-decked family tomb in Swinbrook church, was a far less committed and active royalist than Francis Glanville and, although memorialised in armour, he did not take up arms – nearly sixty when the civil war began, he was in any case a little old to fight. Having resisted many royal policies during the 1630s and early 1640s, he slowly warmed to the king's cause, quit London and his seat in the Long Parliament by the end of 1643, sat in the royalist Oxford parliament in 1644–5 and was captured when the king's capital fell in 1646, subsequently enduring fines and spells of imprisonment before his death in 1658.

PLATE 30: Sir Hugh Piper, shown here in Launceston Church kneeling at prayer and facing his wife across a praying desk, was a devoted Cornish royalist. He began the civil war as a mere ensign, but rose through the ranks, fighting for the king in the siege of Plymouth and at Stratton and Lansdown, where he was 'wounded in the neck, thigh and shot thro' the shoulder', though he survived the war and the sequestration of his estates to return to favour and to power after the Restoration, holding military and administrative offices in the South West, being knighted by Charles II during a royal visit to Plymouth and sitting in several parliaments of the period, before his death, aged seventy, in 1687.